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Abstract
Reliability and security of data transmission and access are of paramount importance to
enhance the dependability of time critical remote monitoring systems (e.g. tele-monitoring
patients, surveillance of smart grid components). Potential failures for data transmissions
include wireless channel unavailability and delays due to the interruptions. Reliable data
transmission demands seamless channel availability with minimum delays in spite of inter-
ruptions (e.g. fading, denial-of-service attacks). Secure data transmissions require sensed
data to be transmitted over unreliable wireless channels with sufficient security using
suitable encryption techniques. The transmitted data are stored in secure cloud reposi-
tories. Potential failures for data access include unsuccessful user authentications due to
mis-management of digital identities and insufficient permissions to authorize situation-
specific data access requests. Reliable and secure data access requires robust user authen-
tication and context-dependent authorization to fulfill situation specific data utility needs
in cloud repositories. The work herein seeks to enhance the dependability of time critical
remote monitoring applications, by reducing these failure conditions which may degrade
the reliability and security of data transmission or access.
As a result of an extensive literature survey, in order to achieve the above said security
and reliability, the following areas have been selected for further investigations.
• The enhancement of opportunistic transmissions in cognitive radio networks to pro-
vide greater channel availability as opposed to fixed spectrum allocations in conven-
tional wireless networks.
• Delay sensitive channel access methods to ensure seamless connectivity in spite of
multiple interruptions in cognitive radio networks.
• Energy efficient encryption and route selection mechanisms to enhance both secure
and reliable data transmissions.
• Trustworthy digital identity management in cloud platforms which can facilitate
efficient user authentication to ensure reliable access to the sensed remote monitoring
data.
• Context-aware authorizations to reliably handle the flexible situation specific data
access requests.
Main contributions of this thesis include a novel trust metric to select non-malicious
cooperative spectrum sensing users to reliably detect vacant channels, a reliable delay-
sensitive cognitive radio spectrum hand-off management method for seamless connectiv-
ity and an energy-aware physical unclonable function based encryption key size selection
method for secure data transmission. Furthermore, a trust based identity provider se-
lection method for user authentications and a reliable context-aware situation specific
authorization method are developed for more reliable and secure date access in cloud
repositories. In conclusion, these contributions can holistically contribute to mitigate the
above mentioned failure conditions to achieve the intended dependability of the time-
critical remote monitoring applications.
xxii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Time-critical remote monitoring systems (TCRMSs) collect large volumes of data using
sensors and data aggregators. By using the remote monitoring data, time-critical deci-
sions are made. Examples of TCRMSs include, monitoring of critical components in the
smart grid [Wang et al. 2013], telemonitoring applications in pervasive healthcare [Soomro
and Cavalcanti 2007][Korhonen et al. 2003][Feng et al. 2010], remote status monitoring
of propulsion systems [Horvitz 1995], building management systems [Suryadevara et al.
2015] and ambient assisted living home care solutions for the elderly [Kleinberger et al.
2009] [Botia et al. 2012][Bisio et al. 2015]. The dependability of TCRMSs rely on how
efficiently these data are handled by minimizing the associated delays during transmis-
sion and access. For example, in TCRM applications on electric fire detection [Herald
2014] and propulsion system monitoring [Horvitz 1995], the main impediments for timely
critical decision making include the failure of the communication infrastructure [Gungor
et al. 2013] [Ma et al. 2013], the delays due to communication latency and rigorous access
control.
In most of these emerging sensory arrangements of TCRMSs, wireless networks are
used for data transmission [Akan et al. 2012] [Shah et al. 2013] [Maler and Reed 2008]
[Suryadevara et al. 2015]. To realize sensed data transmission using a sufficiently secure
encryption mechanism is a significant challenge in the resource constrained devices. In
wireless networks, spectrum utilization is a delay-prone critical issue due to its highly
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competitive nature [Mitola and Maguire 1999] [Haykin 2005] [Yin et al. 2012] [Tragos
et al. 2013]. Even though the bandwidth may be reserved for different applications, it is
often not regularly utilized to its full capacity. This is the motivation for cognitive radio
networks, that sense the spectrum using intelligent transceivers and transmit data over
the vacant channels [Akyildiz et al. 2006] [Haykin 2005]. Thus, the opportunistic spectrum
utilization becomes an effective solution to reduce delays due to channel unavailability. In
TCRMSs, data is accessed by the decision making agents for operations and maintenance
requirements. Cloud computing infrastructure are increasingly used as scalable data stor-
ages and efficient distributed platforms to effectively manage the digital identities and
rigorous access control [Buyya et al. 2010] [Zissis and Lekkas 2012] [Thilakanathan et al.
2014][Pandey et al. 2012] [Solanas et al. 2014] [Liang et al. 2012][Satyanarayanan et al.
2013].
Example Application - In a power generation remote monitoring system with cloud
based data storage and access management (e.g. Netbiter [Netbiter 2017], Cummins
solutions [Cummins 2017]), various data logs are accessed to make time critical decisions.
A power generation remote monitoring system generates different sets of data, such as
annunciator, alternator and engine data, transfer switch data, source, load and switch
connection status data etc [Cummins 2017] and transmitted over wireless channels. The
data are stored in secure cloud repositories. When there are number of distributed power
generation plants, the secure cloud storages may be remotely accessed by the decision
making agents from other locations.
A brief comparison of different techniques and devices that are used in different
TCRMSs is shown in Table 1.1. In summary, almost all of the TCRMSs make use of
different wireless technologies for data transmission. Majority of the TCRMSs use low
power sensor nodes for data generation. In these light-weight sensors, a large proportion
of energy is used for data transmission when compared to that of processing, encryption
and computation [Gunduz et al. 2014] [Kinalis et al. 2014] [Tutuncuoglu and Yener 2012].
In most TCRM applications, the data is stored in cloud platforms to provide distributed
access to the decision making agents.
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Table 1.1: Summary of Different Data Generation, Transmission and Access Mechanisms
for Different Time Critical Remote Monitoring (TCRM) Applications.
Application Categories Examples
Electric system automation - C1 [Gungor and Lambert 2006] [Lu and Gungor
2009]
Surveillance applications (e.g.
smart grid) - C2
[Wang et al. 2013] [Premarathne et al. 2015c]
[Bicen et al. 2012a] [Li et al. 2012a] [Qiu et al.
2011]
Patient Health monitoring applica-
tions - C3
[Soomro and Cavalcanti 2007] [Korhonen et al.
2003] [Pantelopoulos and Bourbakis 2010]
[Al Mamun et al. 2017] [Spano` et al. 2016]
[Peta¨ja¨ja¨rvi et al. 2016] [Immoreev and Ivashov
2008] [Shah et al. 2016]
Fire monitoring applications-C4 [Anghel et al. 2016] [Wang et al. 2016b]
Building monitoring applications -
C5
[Dutta and Roy 2017] [Pacheco et al. 2016]
Devices/Technologies Examples
Data Generation sensors (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5), wireless sensor de-
vices with larger memory (C1), wearable bio-
sensors (C3)
Data Transmission wireless sensor networks (C1,C2,C3,C5), opti-
cal fiber networks, Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) (C3), Universal Mobile Telecommuni-
cation System (UMTS) (C3), Global System for
Mobile communication (GSM) (C3,C4), Gen-
eral Packet Radio Service (GPRS) (C3), Wire-
less Fidelity (WiFi) (C3), Bluetooth (C3), Zig-
bee (C3), infra-red communications (C3), Indus-
trial, Scientific and Medical radio band commu-
nications (ISM) (C3)
Data Storage Cloud (C1,C2,C3,C4,C5)
1.1 Dependability of Time Critical Remote Monitoring
Systems
In this section, a definition for dependability for TCRMSs is obtained in terms of reliability,
security and privacy. Then, the existing failure conditions that degrade the dependabil-
ity are discussed. Based on the potential failures, necessary reliability requirements are
inferred.
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1.1.1 Definitions
From [Avizˇienis et al. 2004], dependability is defined as the ability to deliver a service
strictly within the specified requirements in terms of availability, reliability, safety, con-
fidentiality, integrity and serviceability (maintainability). For a particular application,
emphasis can be on different attributes based on the requirements. According to the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization, the standard ISO 8402, reliability is defined
as, the ability of an item to perform a required function, under given environmental and
operational conditions and for a stated period of time. [ISO8402 1994]. The term item
represents any component, subsystem or such entity. A required function may be a single
function or a combination of different functions necessary to provide a specified service.
A failure occurs when a system is not capable to perform a required function or a set of
functions [Rausand and Høyland 2004]. The meaning of capability here can be identified
based on the specific scenario or the application.
Availability denotes the ability of an entity (under combined aspects of its reliability,
maintainability and maintenance support), to perform its required function at a stated
instant of time or over a stated period of time (British Standard - BS4778) [Rausand and
Høyland 2004]. According to the document published by National Institute of Standards
[Kissel 2013], following definitions are obtained. Security is defined as, ”A condition
that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that enable
an enterprise to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats
to its use of information systems. Protective measures may involve a combination of
deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection, recovery, and correction that should form
part of the enterprises risk management approach.”. Confidentiality is defined as the
ability to control the disclosure of data to a specific party and nobody else. It is such
that even if an authorized party receives the data, it cannot be utilized in terms of its
content. Privacy is defined as the non-disclosure of data beyond relevant or authorized
parties. Authentication is defined as the verification of the identity of a user, process,
or device, often as a prerequisite to allow access to resources in an information system.
Authorization is defined as the process or the acts of granting access privileges to a user,
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program, or process.
Reliability denotes the ability of an entity to continue to maintain its specifications
over its operational life-time [Høyland and Rausand 2009]. Reliability is generally referred
to as, failure free operation of an entity (a system, subsystem or a component). The
reliability may be measured in different ways depending on the selected attributes, as
listed under the definition of dependability. General measures include mean time to failure
(MTTF), number of failures per time (unit failure rate), the probability that the item does
not fail in a time interval (0, t ] (survival probability), the probability that the entity is
able to function at time ’t’ (availability at time ’t’ ). However, for a TCRM application,
the performance measures may vary depending on the specific communication and data
access needs.
1.1.2 Current Issues in Time Critical Remote Monitoring Systems
According to [Rausand and Høyland 2004], for any system, it is necessary to identify
the functions (or categories of functions/operations) to characterize its possible failures.
For a TCRMS, there are several essential functions: data generation, data transmission,
data storage and data access (Figure 1.1). Investigation of this thesis is limited to data
access and transmission. In addition to the failures, a failure mode is defined as the
scenarios in which it is not possible to fulfill a required function (or a set of functions)
[Rausand and Høyland 2004]. In general, for any system, different types of failure modes
may occur: failure during operation, failure to operate at a prescribed time, failure to
cease operation at a prescribed time and spurious premature operations. In this section,
the failure modes which cause delays in each of the essential functions of a TCRMS are
described (Table 1.2). Since the existing TCRMSs use secure cloud storages, it is assumed
that the operational failures during data access is solely accounted by the failures during
the data access. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the cloud storages are highly
reliable data hosts.
Data Generation - In the data generation stage, a sensor reads a physical parameter
and converts it into a corresponding electrical signal. Once it is appropriately processed
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Figure 1.1: Three Essential Functions in a TCRMS.
it becomes the data output of the sensor. Examples for failures modes (or the scenarios)
in data generation include, failure of the sensor, failure of the processing circuit or the
firmware [Akyildiz et al. 2002][Ye et al. 2003]. In this thesis, it is assumed that the installed
sensors complete the expected operational life-time such that the potential failures are at
a minimum.
Data transmission - In the transmission stage, data is transmitted from the sensor
to the secure cloud storage over wireless channels. This thesis will focus on unreliable
band limited wireless channels. Functional requirements for data transmission in TCRMSs
include,
1. gaining access to the channel
2. secure transmission of data and
3. minimum latency between the source and the secure cloud storage.
Examples of specific failure modes include channel failures due to fading, transmis-
sion circuitry failures, synchronization errors etc. Dependability of data transmission
requirements in terms of reliability and security can be summarized as,
1. Reliability [Rausand and Høyland 2004]
a) guaranteed reception of the data
b) non-repudiation (inability to deny transmission or reception by either party)
2. Security [Stallings 2006]
a) confidentiality
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b) integrity
c) authenticity
Focus of this thesis shall be emphasized on the functional failure modes of data trans-
mission in terms of reliability, security and latency [Agarwal 1991] [Angrisani et al. 2003].
The delay causing factors include, delays due to encryption, insufficient residual energy
for transmission, framing, channel access, channel hand-off, transmission, propagation and
queuing.
Data Storage - For brevity, it is assumed that there are sufficient cloud storage such
that availability does not get hindered.
Data Access - Most significant functional requirement of secure data access min-
imizes latencies associated with authentication, authorization and context-aware access
management. In this thesis, the context is described based on the point of access and
the situation (e.g. during and emergency). The main failure modes includes inability
to verify the authenticity of an intruder from a legitimate user during an impersonation
(or mimicry), granting access to an unauthorized agent due to an incorrect decision [Yu
et al. 2010] [Zissis and Lekkas 2012] [Sathiamoorthy et al. 2013]. An example would
be the failure to verify sufficient attributes of an agent/user identity due to resource
(computational and/or bandwidth) constraints [Jensen 2012] [Chadwick and Inman 2013]
[Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012a] [Thomas et al. 2008] which may cause repeated authen-
tication attempts. Other undesirable outcomes resulting in accidental privileged access
[Brucker and Petritsch 2009] [Ray and Ray 2014] [Bartsch 2010] can be exploited by an
attacker mimicking the identity of a privileged user [Premaratne et al. 2010a] or due to
mis-management of permission overrides.
The Table 1.2 shows a summary of the failures for each function and the corresponding
failure modes. In summary, according to the British Standard 5760-5 cited in [Rausand
and Høyland 2004], the failure modes for each of the two essential functions (i.e. data
transmission and access) of TCRMSs correspond to the type of failures during operation.
Based on the above definitions, it is possible to describe dependability as the ability of
a TCRMS to operate (or function) as expected in a reliable and secure manner during
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Table 1.2: Summary of failure modes in TCRMSs for the three essential functions: Data
generation, data transmission and data access.
Sub-system Functional Failure During Operation
Data Generation
- Loss of device (sensor) availability - hardware failure, soft-
ware failure, external hazards
- Loss of security due to data not being encrypted.
Data Transmission
- Channel failures
- Transmission device failure
- Latency
Data Access
- Inability to validate identities.
- Authorization violations
- Access control latency
data transmission and access. As evidenced by the potential failures in TCRMSs, the
failure minimizations during transmission over insecure (or vulnerable), unreliable wireless
channels and data access over unreliable distributed systems are necessary to be declared
as a reliable TCRMS.
1.2 Limitations of the Existing Solutions
In this section, the limitations of existing solutions that can be used to minimize the
failure conditions in Section 1.1.2 are discussed.
Cognitive radio networks are effective solutions to utilize sporadically available ra-
dio spectrum, however, the channel availability is uncertain. A feasible solution would
be to increase the accuracy is spectrum sensing [Pham et al. 2009] [Cheng et al. 2012]
[Deng et al. 2012] [Akyildiz et al. 2011]. Depending on the application and the choice
of network architecture, applicable spectrum sensing techniques vary. In overlay network
architectures, cooperative spectrum sensing techniques offer greater accuracy to detect
vacant and occupied channels [Akyildiz et al. 2011] [Yu¨cek and Arslan 2009]. Among
cooperative spectrum sensing techniques, the accuracy of decision of the selected users
determine the accuracy of the final decision on channel availability [Sele´n et al. 2008]
[Malady and da Silva 2008] [Wang et al. 2014a]. Another significant problem within the
scope of cooperative spectrum sensing is the possibility of falsifying the spectrum avail-
ability data by a malicious agent [Duan et al. 2012] [Hyder et al. 2012]. Therefore, it is
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necessary to formulate strategies which can reliably select the set of users to cooperate
on spectrum sensing. In addition, when there are interruptions due to the licensed user
arrivals, efficient hand-off techniques [Wang et al. 2010][Song and Xie 2012][Wang et al.
2012][Sheikholeslami et al. 2015] are proposed. However, development of delay sensitive
mechanisms to manage the spectrum hand-off is still an open research problem.
For secure data transmission from sensors, physically unclonable function (PUF)
based robust encryption solutions have been proposed [Selimis et al. 2011] [Guajardo
et al. 2008]. The level of security is determined by the complexity of the encryption key
which in turn depends on the number of bits [Meguerdichian and Potkonjak 2011a]. In
a sensor with a limited energy reserve, computationally intensive encryption may results
in rapid energy drain and ultimate failure of the transmission device [Meguerdichian and
Potkonjak 2011a] [Wang and Tehranipoor 2010]. Managing the trade-off between encryp-
tion and energy usage is a challenging task. Energy efficient route selection is desirable
when it is necessary to aggregate certain remote monitoring data in a distributed TCRMS.
Although there are various energy efficient routing metrics [Chang and Tassiulas 2004][Ok
et al. 2009][Liu et al. 2012] , the investigations on the impact of the encryption key size
and the residual energy of the sensors is an open research topic.
Reliability of user authentication for data access in cloud computing infrastructure
is hindered due to poor digital identity management [Gopalakrishnan 2009] [Cox 2012].
Cloud based federated identity management is more suitable to provide efficient access
for distributed users [Zwattendorfer et al. 2013] [Birrell and Schneider 2013] [Dreo et al.
2013]. Unreliability of identity management depends on the delayed response of the digital
identity providers and the limitations of the expressiveness of identity disclosure policies
[Yan et al. 2009] [Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012a] [Ghazizadeh et al. 2012]. The development
of effective strategies to minimize the communication delays of the identity providers and
at the same time to enhance the expressiveness of the disclosure policies is an open research
problem [Squicciarini et al. 2008].
Under unreliable conditions, the authentication of a user itself cannot sustain effective
authorization enforcements due to context dependencies [Almutairi et al. 2012] [Zissis and
Lekkas 2012] [Fernandes et al. 2014], shared use of computing devices as well as emerging
9 (February 20, 2018)
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
practices such as bring-your-own-device [Wang et al. 2014b] [Miller et al. 2012] [Scarfo
2012]. Sole use of location dependent authentications, and device specific authentications
fail in the above scenarios [Sampangi and Hawkey 2016] [Margaria et al. 2014]. Due to
such inherent unreliable conditions, it is necessary to incorporate additional measures to
perform authorizations that account for context dependent access requests. The challenge
is to develop innovative solutions to help the authorizations to be fail-safe provided that
there are verifiable security metrics to associate with a specific application dependent
context [Jonsson and Olovsson 1997] [Pamula et al. 2006] [McQueen et al. 2006] [Tupper
and Zincir-Heywood 2008] [Premaratne et al. 2008] [Premaratne et al. 2010b].
1.3 Thesis Research Questions
The main research objective of this thesis is to propose effective novel solutions for se-
cure and reliable data transmission and access for TCRMSs. The research questions are
formulated based on the reliability aspects stated in Section 1.1.2 and to address the lim-
itations discussed in Section 1.2. In the first research problem the reliable time-critical
data transmission over opportunistic cognitive radio networks is addressed. In the sec-
ond research problem, energy efficient secure data transmission using low power sensors
is addressed. The third and fourth research questions address the requirements of reliable
identity management for efficient user authentications and context-dependent authoriza-
tion enforcements in cloud computing infrastructure respectively.
1.4 Contribution
The contribution of this thesis can be summarized as:
• The development of a novel multi-attribute trust based cooperative spectrum sensing
mechanism for reliable channel detection in cognitive radio sensor networks. The
proposed solution detailed in Chapter 3 is more reliable compared to randomly
selected coalition based cooperative spectrum sensing techniques in the presence of
malicious secondary users (SUs). The reliability is enhanced primarily by designing a
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mechanism to reliably select the most trustworthy set of secondary users to perform
the cooperative spectrum sensing. New evidence based trust metrics are defined and
used to identify three types of spectrum sensing data falsification attackers based
on their attack profiles in order to distinguish the genuine secondary users. Content
published in Adhoc Networks [Premarathne et al. 2016]..
• The development of an innovative delay bounded re-entrant spectrum access model
based on renewable counting process. The proposed solution detailed in Chapter 4
is more reliable compared to existing hand-off mechanisms where transmission delay
constraints on the number of possible hand-offs are not considered. Content is under
review - Adhc Networks, Elsevier.
• The development of a novel energy efficient physically unclonable functions (PUF)
based secure data transmissions over the sensed spectrum channels. The proposed
solution described in Chapter 5 is more reliable due to energy aware PUF key size
determination, which minimizes the probability of partial re-identification of the
key. This solution is more appropriate to provide minimum security guarantees to
support selective data encryption for secure transmissions over the sensed wireless
channels. Content published in Pervasive and Mobile Computing [Premarathne et al.
2015c].
• The development of novel reliable trust metrics to identify the most trustworthy
identity providers to participate in the trust negotiations with federated identity
management in cloud platforms. The proposed solution detailed in Chapter 6 en-
hances the reliability by selecting the most trustworthy identity providers based on
the novel metrics. These novel trust metrics are sufficiently descriptive in terms
of the secure availability and to reveal the extent of agreement of the credential
disclosure policies. Furthermore, the proposed solution has been mapped to an ex-
isting quality assurance model for trust based authentications in cloud computing
infrastructure. Content published in IEEE Transactions in Cloud Computing [Pre-
marathne et al. 2015a].
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• The development of a situation-specific authorization enforcement mechanism for
TCRMSs using a novel context-aware disclosure risk metric. To control the dis-
closure risks under unreliable conditions, a novel location dependent disclosure risk
metric based context-aware authorization enforcement mechanism is described in
Chapter 7. The use of this metric to enforce situation specific authorizations based
on Rumpole [Marinovic et al. 2014], a Belnap logic based framework, is described
and compared with the existing logic frameworks. In comparison, the proposed solu-
tion offers more flexibility to enforce situation-specific break-the-glass rules for more
robust access control. Content published in Computer Networks [Premarathne et al.
2015b].
Overall, this thesis resulted in the following publications.
1. U. S. Premarathne, I. Khalil, and M. Atiquzzaman. Secure and reliable surveillance
over cognitive radio sensor networks in smart grid. Pervasive and Mobile Computing,
22, 3-15, 2015. Special Issue on Recent Developments in Cognitive Radio Sensor
Networks.
2. U. S. Premarathne, I. Khalil, and M. Atiquzzaman. Trust based reliable transmission
strategies for smart home energy management in cognitive radio based smart grid.
AdHoc Networks, 41, 15-29, 2016. Special Issue on Cognitive Radio Based Smart
Grid The Future of the Traditional Electrical Grid.
3. U. Premarathne, I. Khalil, Z. Tari, and A. Zomaya. Cloud-based utility service
framework for trust negotiations using federated identity management. IEEE Trans-
actions on Cloud Computing, 5:2, 290-302, 2015.
4. U. S. Premarathne, I. Khalil, and M. Atiquzzaman. Location dependent disclosure
risk based decision support framework for persistent authentication in pervasive
computing applications. Computer Networks, 88, 161-177, 2015.
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1.5 Thesis Organization
The remaining chapters in this thesis are organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the ex-
isting literature on failure preventive techniques for TCRM data transmission and data
access are surveyed. This is followed by Chapter 3, which describes a trust based user
selection method for reliable cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks.
In Chapter 4, a delay analysis of the interruptions on reliable opportunistic data trans-
missions is described. Then, in Chapter 5, a novel energy efficient PUF based secure
TCRM data transmission mechanism is described. In Chapter 6, an effective trust based
identity provider selection mechanism for reliable user authentications in cloud platforms
is described. In Chapter 7, an innovative context-aware authorization enforcement model
to handle the situation-specific TCRM data access requests is described. Finally, Chapter
8 concludes the thesis.
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Related Work
This chapter describes the related background information to understand the contributions
of this thesis. This includes the preliminaries of cognitive radio networks (CRNs), wireless
sensor networks (WSNs), cloud computing, pervasive computing aspects.
2.1 Background
Most TCRMSs are pervasive computing applications with distributed sensor networks
which transmit the sensed data over wireless channels. The remote monitoring data are
stored and accessed over distributed cloud platforms to facilitate reliable time-critical
decision making processes.
2.1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks contain nodes (or individual embedded systems) that are capable
of (1) interacting with the environment, (2) processing information locally (e.g. encryp-
tion, data aggregation), and (3) communicating this information over wireless channels
[Akyildiz and Vuran 2010]. Each node has a sensing mechanism (or a sensor), a micro-
processor, and a transceiver. The sensor captures data from a physical phenomenon. The
on-board microprocessors can be programmed to perform complex tasks including data
encryption and transmission. The transceiver provides wireless connectivity to communi-
cate the observed phenomena and to transmit the sensed data on the dedicated wireless
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channels. The sensor nodes are generally stationary and are powered by limited capacity
batteries. As a proactive measure to prolong the lifetime, the sensor nodes may switch-
off the transceivers and essentially become disconnected from the network. Although it
minimizes the energy consumption, it is a major challenge to provide connectivity of the
network in TCRM applications. When the sensor node is damaged or has very little resid-
ual energy, depending on the TCRM application, it may be cost-prohibitive to replace
each exhausted battery or even impossible to install new sensors with minimum latency
(e.g. hostile environments, large coverage distances or areas) [Min et al. 2014][Bruyneel
and Ninane 2014]. Therefore, when designing for a specific application, it is important to
address the core requirements which needs to be satisfied to ensure a failure-free opera-
tion in a wireless sensor network [Karlof and Wagner 2003] in terms of energy efficiency,
availability and data integrity.
2.1.2 Cognitive Radio Networks
According to Federal Communications Commission [Tadaion 2004], a CRN is defined
as, a radio or a system that can sense its operational electromagnetic environment and
can dynamically and autonomously adjust its radio operating parameters to modify the
system operation, such as to maximize throughput, mitigate interference, facilitate inter-
operability, etc. In a CRN there are two types of users: primary users (PUs) and secondary
users (SUs) [Akyildiz et al. 2006] [Akyildiz et al. 2011]. A PU has the higher priority or
legacy rights to access a certain part of the spectrum. A SU has a lower priority than the
PU but the SU can exploit the opportunity to use that part of the spectrum when the PU
does not transmit.
In a CRN, at a particular time-slot, if the channels are not occupied by the PUs,
these are available for the SUs to transmit [Akyildiz et al. 2008] [Akan et al. 2012]. For
this spectrum reuse functionality, the SUs have to sense the radio channels [Li et al.
2012b]. Spectrum sensing is the task of obtaining awareness about the spectrum usage
and existence of PUs in a geographical area. If it is observed that the PU is active, the SU
will have to vacate the channel immediately or within a certain amount of time. Failure to
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accurately detect the presence of a PU and a vacant channel, decreases the reliability of SU
transmissions. Therefore, spectrum sensing has significant importance in CRNs to make
reliable decisions for accessing the vacant channels. In CRNs, when an interruption on the
current channel is detected, the transceivers adapt to continue the active communications
over the newly detected vacant channels. This operation is known as spectrum hand-off
[Wang et al. 2010] [Song and Xie 2012].
Cognitive radio capabilities may also be exploited by wireless sensor networks (WSNs),
which otherwise employ fixed spectrum allocations. Due to the congestion in dedicated
spectrum, cognitive radio based wireless sensor networks are useful for various delay-
sensitive remote monitoring applications. In general, a cognitive radio sensor network
(CRSN) [Akan et al. 2009] can be defined as a distributed network of wireless cognitive
radio sensor nodes, which sense signals and collaboratively communicate their readings
dynamically over available spectrum bands in a multihop manner to ultimately satisfy
the application-specific requirements [Khan et al. 2016][Tragos et al. 2013][Akyildiz et al.
2008]. Informative discussions on cognitive radio based wireless sensor networks are pro-
vided in [Khan et al. 2016] and [Tragos et al. 2013].
2.1.3 Pervasive Computing
Pervasive computing (also called ubiquitous computing) is the interaction of everyday
objects to communicate information by being constantly connected and available [Hen-
ricksen et al. 2002] [Satyanarayanan 2001]. This interaction is provided based on the data
generated by the sensors attached or embedded in these objects. Data communication
is facilitated through the wireless networks. Pervasive computing applications are more
environment-centric compared to web-based or mobile computing. Therefore, pervasive
computing applications which require remote monitoring data collection and analyses can
be conveniently characterized as a TCRMS. Examples include, pervasive health monitoring
systems [Abawajy and Hassan 2017], scalable cloud based data and service management
[Maler and Reed 2008][Xia et al. 2016].
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2.1.4 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is established as a successful utility computing paradigm [Dastjerdi
and Buyya 2014][Buyya et al. 2010][Moreno et al. 2014]. Utility based cloud computing
provides packaged computing resources (e.g. storage, software development platforms)
as a metered service (e.g. subscriptions, utility based pricing) [Dastjerdi and Buyya
2014][Buyya et al. 2010]. With the advent of pervasive computing concepts such as the
Internet-of-Things (IoT) [Atzori et al. 2010][Gubbi et al. 2013][Botta et al. 2016][Palattella
et al. 2016], essential features of utility based cloud computing services include oﬄoading,
delegating and outsourcing certain tasks on to the cloud platform. For TCRMSs, cloud
platforms provides an excellent choice as secure data storage hosts [Cummins 2017][Net-
biter 2017]. Capacity to hold huge volumes of data and the ability to facilitate distributed
access further strengthens this choice.
2.2 Limitations of Existing Solutions on Reliable Data
Transmissions
As mentioned before, delays associated with the remote monitoring data transmission and
access are among the main hindrances for dependability of accurate time-critical decision
making in the TCRMSs. Primarily, the data transmission delays are caused due to channel
unavailability and the interruptions. Delays associated with the distributed data access is
caused due to the latencies during the distributed user authentications using the digital
identities as well as during authorization decision making. In this section various existing
solutions to minimize the above mentioned delays are discussed.
Most of the existing wireless networks use a fixed spectrum assignment policy [Aky-
ildiz et al. 2006]. Main disadvantages of such assignments include a large portion of the
assigned spectrum being sparsely utilized. According to Federal Communications Com-
mission [FCC 2003], this variation in spectrum utilization ranges from 15% to as high
as 85%. Existing issues and concerns related to the limited available spectrum and the
inefficiency in the spectrum usage demands new communication solutions to exploit the
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existing wireless spectrum opportunistically [Akhtar et al. 2016] [Kwon et al. 2017]. This
requirement has resulted in NeXt Generation (xG) Networks, Dynamic Spectrum Access
(DSA) and cognitive radio networks [Akyildiz et al. 2006][Akyildiz et al. 2011][Mitola and
Maguire 1999].
2.2.1 Spectrum Availability Detection
Spectrum sensing is the task of detecting vacant channels for the SUs to transmit. Alter-
natively, in a CRN, failure-free channel access depends on the accurate detection of the
vacant spectrum in which there are no active PUs. In [Akyildiz et al. 2011][Axell et al.
2012][Reyes et al. 2016][So and Sung 2016][Li et al. 2017] detailed discussions are provided
on various spectrum sensing techniques. Generally, in primary transmitter detection based
spectrum sensing, a weak signal is detected through local observations. Three schemes
that are commonly used for transmitter detection include matched filter detection, energy
detection, and feature detection [Akyildiz et al. 2011][Axell et al. 2012]. Due to the lack
of interactions between primary users and secondary users and interferences such as the
hidden terminal problem, the primary transmitter detection techniques alone may not
be sufficient to achieve accurate spectrum sensing [Akyildiz et al. 2006][Akyildiz et al.
2008][Yu¨cek and Arslan 2009][Akyildiz et al. 2011][Cheng et al. 2012]. Delays associated
with spectrum sensing result in latencies for channel access for the sensors to transmit
the sensed data. To overcome the above said limitations and to increase the detection
accuracy, cooperative spectrum sensing techniques have been developed [Akyildiz et al.
2011][Axell et al. 2012][Reyes et al. 2016][So and Sung 2016].
In cooperative spectrum sensing, a group of SUs participate to sense the spectrum.
Based on these local decisions, an aggregated decision is computed by using pre-defined
rules (e.g. AND rule, OR-rule, Majority rule) [Akyildiz et al. 2011]. When the OR rule is
used, if there is atleast one user to indicate the channel is vacant, the decision fusion center
declares the spectrum available. The majority rule requires at least a half of the cooper-
ative users to report the channel as being vacant. For the AND rule, all the cooperating
users have to indicate the channel as being vacant. Due to decision fusion, the accu-
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racy of the aggregated decision is more accurate than the individual spectrum availability
decisions. However, cooperative spectrum sensing may provide less accurate results on
spectrum availability detection due to spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks
[Duan et al. 2012]. In these SSDF attacks, the local spectrum sensing data are maliciously
altered to generate erroneous results which results in false detection or miss detection. A
false detection occurs when it is declared that the channel is occupied when it is in fact
not being used by the PUs. A miss detection occurs when the SUs are not being able
to detect the vacant channels when the PUs are in fact not transmitting (or PUs are
inactive). Erroneous spectrum availability decisions contribute to the overall delays in the
data transmission.
To reduce the impact of spectrum sensing data falsification attacks, trustworthiness
of the participating SUs is a significant concern for reliable cooperative spectrum avail-
ability detection [Sele´n et al. 2008]. Existing user selection methods consider the location
and fading characteristics of the participating secondary users and provide less focus on
computing the trustworthiness of SUs [Peh and Liang 2007][Malady and da Silva 2008].
Literature review on the specific cooperative user selection criteria will be discussed in
Chapter 03.
2.2.2 Spectrum Hand-off Management
Spectrum hand-off is necessary to sustain the data transmission of a SU when it is inter-
rupted due to the arrival of a PU [Wang et al. 2012]. For an interrupted SU, the spectrum
hand-off mechanisms allow access to a suitable channel which is available with minimum
waiting time. When the waiting time is longer, the transmission delays become much
larger. These subsequent spectrum allocations can be done based on: reactive, proactive
and hybrid spectrum hand-off management strategies [Wang et al. 2012]. In reactive spec-
trum hand-off management, the SU is allowed to access the spectrum on the next available
channel in an on-demand manner. In proactive spectrum hand-off management, the SU
is allowed to access a predetermined channel by estimating the probability for it to be
vacant. These two approaches have been quantitatively compared in [Wang et al. 2011].
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However, it is more reliable to establish the connection in proactive hand-off management
as the availability can be pre-determined before the connection is established. In hybrid
spectrum hand-off schemes, the reactive and proactive schemes are combined by using the
proactive spectrum sensing and reactive hand-off action.
Existing proactive spectrum hand-off management solutions [Song and Xie 2012]
[Song and Xie 2010] offer more reliable probability estimations based on previous chan-
nel utilization statistics. On the other hand, existing reactive spectrum hand-off man-
agement schemes the reliability of finding a vacant channel completely depend on the
spectrum sensing accuracy. In [Nguyen et al. 2013], the authors propose a proactive spec-
trum hand-off method to reduce the number of hand-offs with minimum switching time
between the channels for a SU. To perform the dynamic hand-off process, a channel se-
quence is pre-defined. In addition, to initiate a spectrum hand-off, following conditions
should be satisfied (i) PU is non co-existent and (ii) the common control channel strength
is higher than a pre-defined threshold. However, in [Nguyen et al. 2013], the feasibility
of a hand-off also depends on a maximum tolerable delay bound. In Chapter 04, specific
spectrum hand-off management techniques related to multiple interruptions in cognitive
radio networks are discussed.
2.2.3 Residual Energy-Aware Sensor Data Transmission
In wireless sensor networks, energy consumption of the sensors in relation to secure data
transmission is discussed focusing on secure routing mechanisms to avoid attacks such as
crippling attacks, sink holes, hello floods [Karlof and Wagner 2003][Kuthadi et al. 2016].
To sustain the operational life-time of a sensor, energy harvesting mechanisms have been
proposed to replenish atleast some of the depleting energy [Alippi et al. 2009][Zhang et al.
2013b][Wu et al. 2015]. In addition, radio optimization mechanisms including transmis-
sion power control, modulation optimization, cooperative communications, energy efficient
cognitive radios are proposed [Feng et al. 2013][Rault et al. 2014]. In a TCRM application,
apart from enhancing the operational life-time of the sensors, the ability to perform se-
cure data transmissions over an expected period of time is vital. Existing work on energy
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management in cognitive radio sensor networks include, (i) sleep/awake scheduling for co-
operative spectrum sensing [Deng et al. 2012][Cheng et al. 2012][Xu and Liu 2008][Pham
et al. 2009], (ii) scheduling to access available spectrum [Bayhan and Alagoz 2013], (iii)
adaptive cluster based operations [Deng et al. 2012], (iv) energy harvesting mechanisms
[Park et al. 2012][Wang et al. 2015] and combinations of above mentioned strategies [Hoang
et al. 2014]. For a CRSN with cooperative spectrum sensing energy efficiency is a sig-
nificant operational aspect. In [Pham et al. 2009], optimal number of cognitive sensors
participating in the cooperative spectrum sensing is computed while minimizing the to-
tal energy consumption of the cooperative sensing. In [Bayhan and Alagoz 2013], the
authors propose an energy efficient heuristic scheduler to manage spectrum access to en-
sure prolonged network life-time but the associated energy depletion due to secure data
transmission using a suitable encryption mechanism is not considered.
However, in cognitive radio sensor networks, energy-efficient secure data transmissions
should consider the energy expenditure in a sensor to perform the required sensory and
data encrypting operations. In Chapter 05, energy efficient route selection methods and
the significance of residual energy for CR sensors are discussed further.
2.2.4 Secure Data Transmission in Sensors
Secure data transmission over unreliable wireless channels is vital for TCRMSs. Inaccurate
data reception causes delays due to repeated data transmissions and even corruption or loss
of accurate sensed data. These lapses cause to degrade the dependability of the TCRMS
[Gungor et al. 2013][Ma et al. 2013]. Since the sensors have limited computational power
lightweight encryption techniques with sufficiently strong security is necessary.
Recently, secret key pre-distribution techniques have been proposed for secure data
transmissions in wireless sensor networks [Henry and Stinson 2011][Knox and Kunz 2012].
Main limitation of this approach is when new sensor nodes are added on to the network,
keys have to be updated. Also, when existing nodes are removed from the network,
the keys have to be revoked. Thus, increase the complexity of managing a large sensor
network with key pre-distributions. Random key pre-distribution schemes assume that
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a sensor node is able to accurately verify the identity of a sender, which makes it a
rather weak security enforcement. For example, radio frequency fingerprint [Henry and
Stinson 2011] [Bonne Rasmussen and Capkun 2007][Knox and Kunz 2012] can be used to
identify a sensor based on the physical characteristics of the wireless signals. However, it
is not unique for every sensor and the identification accuracy depends on the classification
technique employed [Knox and Kunz 2012].
Recent work on secure sensor data transmissions propose PUF based secure key gener-
ation and deployment schemes [Selimis et al. 2011][Guajardo et al. 2008]. PUF based keys
are highly secure as these cannot be forged since the responses are generated with hard-
ware inherent noise characteristics which are unclonable [Ru¨hrmair et al. 2010]. However,
the PUF-based key should be sufficiently large enough to sustain a reasonable opera-
tional life-time of a sensor. In [Wei and Potkonjak 2012], authors describe minimizing
energy leakages in order to reduce the vulnerabilities based on hardware Trojan attacks.
This work considers the energy efficiency aspect but it has little relevance to facilitate
key size selection based on th residual energy content. In [Meguerdichian and Potkonjak
2011b], energy efficiency of PUF based key generation in sensors is studied using existing
models on delay and aging of hardware. However, this work does not indicate how the
adjustments are made to reduce the energy losses due to data transmission over unreliable
wireless channels. PUF based cryptographic device identification applications have been
proposed for wireless sensor networks [Guajardo et al. 2008], RFID systems [Bolotnyy
and Robins 2007][Guajardo et al. 2009], secure storage applications [Kursawe et al. 2009].
However, PUF based authentications with energy expenditure awareness have not been
explored in CRSN based time-critical applications. In Chapter 05, specific secure sensor
data transmission mechanisms using physical unclonable functions are discussed.
2.2.5 Sensors using PUF for Remote Monitoring Applications
In wireless sensor networks, PUF based node authentication is desired compared to stan-
dard sensor node authentication schemes, such as the Security Protocol for Sensor Net-
works (SNEP), due to the wireless channel unreliability [Yang et al. 2011]. In [Yang
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et al. 2011], PUF based mutual node authentication scheme is proposed for delay toler-
ant wireless sensor networks. In [Mahapatra et al. 2015], optical PUF based secure data
transmission in wireless body sensor networks are described. The dark current variation of
photodiodes is used to generate the PUF key for encryption. In other applications such as
in body sensor network [Lee et al. 2013], PUF generated challenge-response values are used
for mutual authentications among the nodes. In addition, each node needs to complete the
hashed and MAC operations in the verification process. Authors in [Meguerdichian and
Potkonjak 2011b], matched PPUF (public key PUF) proposes a low power single clock
cycle energy consumption scheme for mutual authentication of sensors (or low energy de-
vices). During the authentication, to match two mPPUF keys, it is expected that both the
parties use the same aging and disabling procedures in order to match the corresponding
gate delays. The proposed scheme complements this work by considering the transmission
and encryption functions and the residual energy constraints in determining the PUF key
size. In [Wei and Potkonjak 2012], hardware Trojan attack detection scheme based on,
power profiling, time, location and PUF is proposed for wireless sensor networks. PUF is
used to authenticate a particular sensor as a trust measure to verify the validity of the
power profile of the sensor at a particular location. In [Delvaux and Verbauwhede 2014],
sensors are useful for remote monitoring applications when the helper data are protected
such that the pattern reproducibility is minimized. The attack scenarios described in [Del-
vaux and Verbauwhede 2014] reveal that it is vital to consider the pattern reproducibility
issue when the secure data transmissions rely on PUF based keys.
In addition to node authentication PUF is integrated with the sensor to sense the
ambient environmental variations to guarantee the veracity of the sensed value [Gao et al.
2017]. The authors assume that, (i) the sensor with PUF is located in a hostile envi-
ronment, (ii) the wireless communication channel is insecure, and (iii) no complex crypto
module relying on stored secret keys is involved. In [Gao et al. 2017], it is shown that
response bits reproduced consistently for a given environmental condition can track the
changes in environmental parameters in a repeatable manner. PUF based sensor nodes are
also used as trusted anchors for secure data transmissions. In [Haider et al. 2016], PUF
based trusted sensor is an anchor to ensure integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation
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guarantees on the sensed data when mobile devices are used in participatory sensing for
IoT applications. The trusted PUF sensor serves as secure key storage for the digital
signatures and secure boot processes.
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that although the PUF based solutions
are proposed for wireless sensor based remote monitoring applications, energy efficient key
size selection problem so as to minimize the probability of reproducibility (e.g. to guess a
few or all of the consecutive bits in a key) has received very little attention.
2.3 Limitations of Existing Solutions on Reliable Data
Access
2.3.1 Cloud based Identity Management Models
Authentication and authorizations for data access in TCRM applications can be efficiently
managed over distributed cloud platforms. A summary of different cloud identity man-
agement (IDM) models is given in Table 2.1.
According to Birrel et al [Birrell and Schneider 2013], existing identity management
systems can be categorized based on their functionality as i) single-sign-on, ii) federated
identity and iii) anonymous credentials. In a federated system, multiple distinct identities
are used to authenticate a single user to a service provider. In cloud, the user identities
may be residing in multiple IDPs. These IDPs may reside i) within or ii) outside the
domain of cloud service provider [Almutairi et al. 2012]. In [Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012b],
a taxonomy is proposed to classify the risks involved in facilitating collaborations over
federated identity management. The main objective of this risk computation framework
is to enhance the ability to provision various cloud services.
Cloud based identity management is essentially controlled by a set of administrative
and provisioning policies [Gopalakrishnan 2009]. These policies may vary across different
cloud domains and based on the way they collaborate [Almutairi et al. 2012]. Therefore,
identity management in cloud is challenging due to the i) heterogeneity of the visibility
and scope of attributes, ii) multiple user accounts with different application and service
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Table 2.1: Summary of Classifications of Cloud Identity Models
Reference Model Description
Gopalakrishnan
Trusted IDM pattern ID system runs on a trusted cloud based
domains (e.g. private cloud).
[Gopalakrishnan
2009]
External IDM Pattern Public clouds. ID system is external to
the cloud service providers’ domain.
Interoperable IDM
Pattern
Can use different authentication tech-
nologies for multiple service providers.
Cox [Cox 2012]
First Model Cloud service provider generates and
manages identities.
Second Model Different systems synchronize to manage
identities and the cloud services.
Third Model Cloud service provider use the federated
identities of the organizations.
Cloud Service Alliance
Hub-and-spoke model Identities are managed centrally by a
broker or a proxy.
Free-form model Cloud service provider manages iden-
tities generated by several identity
providers.
Hybrid model Combination of the advantages of the
above two models.
Zwattendorfer
Identity in the Cloud
Model
Cloud service provider generates, au-
thenticates and manages identities.
[Zwattendorfer et al.
2013]
Identity to the cloud ID system is external to the cloud service
providers’ domain.
Identity from the
cloud
Identity provider entirely within the do-
main of the cloud service provider. Sim-
ilar to the Identity-as-a-Service model
[Emig et al. 2007]
providers, iii) inter-operation of different types of identity attributes, iv) service launch
and termination conditions and v) notifications and updates of active and inactive vs
trustful and untrusted entities at the network level.
Recently, authors in [Adams et al. 2011] have proposed a receipt mode trust ne-
gotiation protocol with load balancing and encrypted proxy certificates for secure and
trustworthy communications. There are other computing oﬄoading techniques based on
cost graphs, pointer analysis techniques, partitioning techniques based on efficiency, envi-
ronmental changes, application specific requirements [Deng et al. 2015]. However, these
techniques are performance oriented with little consideration on the reliability require-
ments. Since the digital user identities are highly privacy sensitive data, trust between
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the identity provider and the cloud utility service provider is vital. Moreover, when trust
negotiations are offered as a utility based service, the reliability of the negotiations has to
be maximized while the failure rate, due to interruptions should be minimized. Therefore,
the cooperativeness of the identity providers in disclosing the credentials is vital. Based
on the above discussion, in facilitating IDM as a cloud utility service, the above mentioned
challenges should be accounted strategically in order to ensure reliable trust negotiations
based authentication services in TCRM applications. In Chapter 06, federated identity
management models, the related risk assessment frameworks and the trust evaluation
methods are discussed.
2.3.2 Disclosure Control of Data
In TCRMSs, disclosure of sensitive information can occur in two ways: identity disclosure
of the users and attribute disclosure of the stored data (e.g. health data of patients, critical
measurements of electrical generation units in smart grids, smart meter data etc) [Hun-
depool et al. 2012]. Existing disclosure risk measures offer to preserve privacy depending
on the collective disclosure of certain attributes. The disclosure risks are computed using
statistical properties of data (e.g. frequency of occurrence, mean, mode, variance, Ham-
ming distance between the data points in spatial representations). Time-critical remote
monitoring applications may require situation aware data utilization demands such as ac-
cess from different locations and pervasive computing devices. Such situation dependent
data access requirements in TCRMSs may result in unintended disclosure of sensitive data
[Shilton 2009][Kotz 2011][Chakraborty et al. 2012].
Statistical disclosure control aim to protect by controlling the release of data to pre-
vent link between different attributes of sensitive data [Hundepool et al. 2012][Willen-
borg and De Waal 2012]. Assessing the disclosure risks and implementing disclosure
controls are equally important [Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz 2002]. Existing dis-
closure risks include k-anonymity [Truta and Vinay 2006], t-closeness [Li et al. 2007],
l-diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007], distance based record linkage measures [Torra
et al. 2006][Shlomo 2014] consider the content but does not use the contextual information
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(e.g. time, location) or the situation specific information. An effective disclosure control
method would be to restrict the authorizations to access the sensitive data [Hundepool
et al. 2012] based on the contextual or situation specific requirements. This approach
is apt for a TCRMS since the situation-specific data access requirements demand more
flexible yet robust access control.
2.3.3 Disclosure Risk Measures
In Table 2.2 categorization of different types of disclosure risk metrics is shown.
Table 2.2: Disclosure Risk Measures
Feature Metrics Purpose
Record linkage Distance based metrics (Euclidean dis-
tance, Mahalanobis distance Manhat-
tan distance [Torra et al. 2006], [Torra
2000], Kernel distance, Choquet in-
tegral based distance [Abril et al.
2012b]), Probabilistic record linkage
metrics [Shlomo 2014]
To identify the link be-
tween data.
Similarity based
membership
k -anonymity [Samarati 2001], l -
diversity [Machanavajjhala et al. 2007]
and t-closeness [Li et al. 2007]
To reveal the existence
of sensitive attributes
Entropy Entropy based metrics [Willenborg and
De Waal 2012][Bezzi 2007][Domingo-
Ferrer et al. 2001][Antal et al.
2014][Airoldi et al. 2011]
To quantify the extent
of information loss
Statistical disclo-
sure control
aggregation [Kokolakis and Nanopou-
los 2001], rounding [Domingo-Feffer
et al. 2002], swapping [Dandekar et al.
2002], adding random noise to data
To reduce disclosures
based on statistical
measures of the data
Main drawback of these disclosure risk measures is that the extent of revealing sen-
sitive information is solely dependent on the content of the data. It is not possible to
incorporate the context of the data utilization to provide a more holistic measure on the
disclosure risk. In identity disclosure risks are associated with records and files. Risk mea-
sures assess the extent for an intruder can match the identities directly or indirectly. File
level risks measure the average risk across the entire file based on population uniqueness
[Duncan et al. 2011]. Population uniqueness is defined as the proportion of individual data
that has unique values on a set of variables. Conventional use of perturbed protection
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methods (e.g. statistical disclosure control protection methods [Nin et al. 2010]) apply
only to the non-confidential attributes leaving the confidential attributes. Attributes based
disclosure risk estimations attempts to find the extent of risk for an intruder to identify
an individual by using identifiers or a combination of quasi-identifiers. Attributes based
disclosure risk is measured using (i) distance based or (ii) probabilistic record linkage
techniques. However, these techniques do not consider the contextual dependencies for
risk estimation [Abril et al. 2012a].
2.3.4 Risk based Authorization Models
In TCRMSs, depending on the situation, permissions on data access may have to be
changed. Stating separate rules for each type of emergency (or critical) situations would
complicate the authorization policies. Therefore, permission over-rides are employed to
effectively manage necessary exemptions to facilitate situation specific data access needs.
The recently published risk aware authorization model in [Gasparini 2013] proposes
an obligatory model to be accountable for access permits. However, there is no guarantee
to ensure the user obligations. Recently, a dynamic sensitivity based access control model
was proposed by [Harel et al. 2010]. The authors in [Harel et al. 2010] use a metric called
the M-score to estimate the potential risk of mis-usability of a data item by incorporating
the quality of information, quantity of information exposed and the amount of effort to
identify data. M-score can be used for tabular data. Also, the authors in [Harel et al. 2010]
do not consider the location or such contextual dependency in estimating the disclosure
risk of data.
In [Cheng et al. 2007], fuzzy multi-level security model is used to make the authoriza-
tion decisions. The authors propose an economic perspective in solving the access control
problem by quantifying risk as a mode of currency that is expendable. They optimize the
legitimate access control decisions based on risk by using an equivalent fuzzy controller.
However, they do not consider the contextual dependencies in evaluating the risk.
In [Dimmock et al. 2004], trust and risk based role based access control model is
presented. They measure trust for a specific principal to perform a particular action.
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Cost-benefit analysis is performed to evaluate the amount of trust that is necessary to
offset the risk associated with the intended actions to be performed in the initial user
request. Then, this trust measure is compared with a cost and generates a predicate.
The predicate is used with role based access control in open systems to produce the
authorization decisions.
Recently, a similar cost based risk evaluation is proposed by extending the widely
accepted role based access control [Chen and Crampton 2012]. In [Molloy et al. 2009],
risk is treated as a finite resource which can be quantified as a liability for performing
an action. For a particular access request, the risk is calculated based on the known
information, such as the previous access history logs. Each request will bare a price which
is quantified based on risk units. So for a denial access request the price will be infinite.
Since the user is unable to pay-off the risk, the request is denied. However, in this model
the authors do not have explicit consideration on the context dependencies associated with
each access request.
On the other hand context dependent access control models [Zhang and Parashar
2004] [Kulkarni and Tripathi 2008] [Wang et al. 2009] have been proposed to account for
smart environments to ensure accurate authorizations. Location changes are also consid-
ered as a contextual change that characterize the dynamic user behaviors. However, the
risk of an authorization and a permission override (e.g. break-the-glass rules or permission
overrides) to access shared data resources and risk variability due to change of context
(e.g. location, time and situation) has not been explored in existing models. In Chapter
07, the logic frameworks to specify the break-the-glass authorizations and the associated
metrics for computing the context-related risks are discussed.
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Multi-Attribute Trust based Reliable
Transmission Over CRSN
3.1 Outline of the Chapter
This chapter describes a reliable user selection method for cooperative spectrum sensing as
a reliable strategy to access the vacant channels in a CRN. For TCRMSs, channel accesses
with minimum delays are vital to ensure reliable data transmissions. Compared to other
existing techniques, cooperative spectrum sensing offers greater accuracy to detect vacant
channels by aggregating the local decisions of the cooperative secondary users. However,
the accuracy of detecting the vacant channels is reduced due to the presence of false local
sensing data injected by malicious spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attackers.
Main contribution of this chapter is a novel multi-attribute trust metric which is
capable of (i) selecting the most trustworthy cooperative users and for (ii) identifying the
non-malicious users in the presence of three types of spectrum sensing data falsification
attackers. Part of the content of this chapter is published in [Premarathne et al. 2016].
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 limitations of the existing solutions
and the research problem are described. In Section 3.3, the notations used in this chapter
are summarized. Next, in Section 3.4 the multi-attribute trust metric, its functional form
and the reliability analysis are described. In Section 3.5 multi-attribute trust based user
selection for cooperative spectrum sensing is described. Reliability of the trusted user
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selection is further analysed in Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.6 where the non-malicious user
are identified in the presence of both cooperative users and the potential spectrum sensing
data falsification attackers. Finally, this chapter concludes with Section 3.7.
3.2 Introduction
In cognitive radio networks, for a secondary user (SU), spectrum sensing is vital to detect
if a channel is vacant to begin data transmission. When the primary user (PU) is not
transmitting on a channel, it is considered as a vacant channel. Inaccurate spectrum sens-
ing, when the PU is transmitting, causes interferences to the PU resulting in transmission
failure. On the other hand, inaccurate spectrum sensing when the PU is not active, pre-
vents the SU from transmitting resulting in reduction of the spectrum utilization. Thus,
accurate spectrum availability decision making with true spectrum sensing data is vital
prevent transmission failures to both PUs and SUs. For TCRMSs, accurate spectrum
sensing is crucial to reduce delay sensitive data transmission failures due to channel un-
availability [Akan et al. 2012][Shah et al. 2013][Malady and da Silva 2008][Suryadevara
et al. 2015].
Among different spectrum sensing techniques [Akyildiz et al. 2011], cooperative spec-
trum sensing provides far more accurate results due to the aggregation of local decisions
on spectrum sensing [Zhang et al. 2009] [Akyildiz et al. 2011][Yu et al. 2012][Lee 2015]. In
Chapter 02, Sections 2.1.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 describe the significance of spectrum sensing,
the cooperative spectrum sensing technique and how the decision fusion using pre-defined
rules, can improve the accuracy of the spectrum availability decisions. Moreover, coop-
erative spectrum sensing is advantageous compared to other spectrum sensing techniques
when the cognitive radios experience independent fading or shadowing [Akyildiz et al.
2011]. Also, with cooperative sensing, it is possible to overcome the hidden primary user
problem with fusion of local decisions to reduce the collisions which in turn decreases the
spectrum utility [Akyildiz et al. 2011]. To make the final spectrum availability decision,
the fusion center (FC) collects the individual sensing information from the users, identifies
the spectrum holes and broadcasts this information over a control channel to the other
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SUs.
3.2.1 Cooperative Sensing Strategies
In this section, different types of cooperative spectrum sensing strategies [Zhang et al.
2009][Akyildiz et al. 2011] [Yu et al. 2012] are discussed.
• Sequential cooperative sensing - Users sequentially sense each channel one after
another. This approach increases the detection accuracy and more suitable when
there are unpredictable channel conditions. However, it takes a long time to complete
the sequential spectrum sensing.
• Parallel cooperative sensing - As opposed to sensing all the channels, each user senses
different channels in one sensing period. This strategy aims to improve the channel
sensing efficiency rather than the detection accuracy. Channel states can be sensed
in a much shorter time compared to the sequential strategy.
• Semi-parallel cooperative sensing - FC uses a beacon signal to communicate with
the cooperating SUs. All the cooperative SUs sense the channels synchronously
over the sensing time. Once a channel is detected to be free, FC signals to cease
further spectrum sensing. A selected source SU informs the FC with the index of
the available channel.
• Non-consensus based cooperative spectrum sensing - The fusion center only consid-
ers the spectrum sensing reports from one-hop neighbors but not from the entire
network.
• Consensus based cooperative spectrum sensing - The fusion center consider the spec-
trum sensing reports from all users or the entire network. Takes a longer time to
compute the final decision compared to the non-consensus based fusion scheme.
Sequential, parallel and consensus based cooperative spectrum sensing techniques are
not reliable as these may fail completely due to one or more inaccurate spectrum sensing
decisions. Such failure is more pronounced when there are malicious spectrum sensing
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data falsification (SSDF) attackers [Hyder et al. 2014] [Hyder et al. 2012] [Duan et al.
2012]. Semi-parallel cooperative sensing method with non-consensus decision making is
more suitable for spectrum sensing in TCRMSs as it offers greater control to select a set
of cooperative users based on a pre-defined selection criterion. Using consensus based
schemes, the delays associated to make the final decision at the FC becomes larger as the
spectrum sensing local decisions for the entire network is required.
Accuracy of cooperative spectrum sensing depends on the aggregated decision result
for detecting the presence of a PU in a channel (Qd) and the aggregated decision result
for falsely declaring the presence of PU in a channel (Qf ). The two measures Qd and Qf
depend on the local decisions, Pd,j and Pf,j respectively [Akyildiz et al. 2008] [Akyildiz
et al. 2006]. For the jth SU, Pd,j is the probability of detection of the presence of a PU
when actually transmitting. Pf,j is the probability of falsely declaring the presence of a
PU when the channel is vacant. The probability of misdetection for the jth SU is defined
as Pm,j = 1 − Pd,j . In addition, it is also important to consider the rules on how the
aggregated sensing results are used to formulate the final decision. The decisions of each
cooperative user is combined using well known majority rules (i.e. logical AND or OR
rules) [Akyildiz et al. 2011] to make the final decision on channel availability. In addition to
these rules, a trust based fusion scheme has been proposed in [Wang et al. 2016a]. In this
scheme, the trustworthy users are identified based on the overall trust value computed
using the trust gain (or loss) when true (or false) spectrum sensing data are reported.
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that the accuracy of the cooperative spectrum
sensing largely depends on the credibility or trustworthiness of the cooperative users to
provide true spectrum sensing data.
3.2.2 Reliability of Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
In TCRMSs, reliability of channel access for delay sensitive data transmissions is measured
in terms of the accuracy of spectrum sensing. For example, in smart grid remote monitor-
ing systems, the delays in accessing the wireless channels cause a significant impediment
to transmit the delay sensitive data [Bicen et al. 2012b][Ma et al. 2013]. High accu-
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racy of spectrum sensing is vital to reduce the channel access delays in order to support
delay-sensitive data transmissions [Li et al. 2012a]. The accuracy of cooperative spectrum
sensing depends on the trustworthiness of the cooperating SUs as to provide true data
[Duan et al. 2012]. In addition, the accuracy of spectrum detection can be hindered due
to the inefficiency of spectrum detection technique [Akyildiz et al. 2006][Akyildiz et al.
2008], poor signal conditions (e.g. due to fading, shadowing) or malicious interruptions,
such as SSDF attacks [Hyder et al. 2014] [Hyder et al. 2012] [Duan et al. 2012]. If it is
assumed that the channel conditions do not vary drastically, false spectrum sensing data
contributes largely to inaccurately detect the available channels.
As mentioned in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1, malicious SSDF attacks cause a grave threat
to hinder the accuracy of spectrum sensing. The impact of SSDF attacks contributes to
two failure scenarios. The first issue is the inability to use available spectrum due to false
declaration of the PU activity when in fact the PU is not transmitting any data. The
second issue is the occurrence of collisions when allowing the SU to transmit when in
fact the PU is transmitting data. Any of these failures cause delays to access the vacant
channels for data transmissions in TCRMSs. Significance of the SSDF attacks increase
the total transmission delay as the opportunities in subsequent time slots are missed due
to the inaccurate spectrum availability decisions. Among the possible solutions to prevent
such failures include the selection of genuine users to participate in cooperative spectrum
sensing. Trust measures are stated as a justifiable measure for SSDF attack resilience
[Duan et al. 2012]. In order to distinguish between the genuine and the malicious users,
appropriate trust measurements (or metrics) are necessary. Based on the selected mea-
surements, the genuine SUs can be distinctly identified among potential SSDF attackers.
Trust computation is generally used to evaluate the reliability of an entity [Duan et al.
2012][Qin et al. 2009] [Chatterjee and Chatterjee 2015]. The trustworthiness of coopera-
tive users is a critical factor which significantly contributes to the accuracy of the local
spectrum sensing decisions as well as how these are combined [Duan et al. 2012].
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3.2.3 Limitations of Existing Cooperative User Selection Methods
Existing solutions which helps to distinguish the genuine (or non-malicious users) from the
SSDF attackers (or the malicious users) mainly focus on user selection methods. Different
types of user selection methods include trust and reputation based clustering [Hyder et al.
2014], penalty based cooperation strategies [Duan et al. 2012] [Chatterjee and Chatterjee
2015] as well as optimal decision fusion strategies [Cai et al. 2014]. Most of the optimal
decision fusion strategies use additional information such as distance, channel conditions
etc. Summary of the existing user selection methods for cooperative sensing are compared
in Table 3.1.
Most of the user selection criteria (see Table 3.1) are capable of reducing the negative
impacts on channel conditions, such as correlated shadowing and fading, to improve the
accuracy of spectrum sensing. However, the trustworthiness of the SUs has not been
quantitatively estimated as a potential measurement to select genuine users for cooperative
spectrum sensing. The contributions described in this chapter bridge this research gap
by proposing a novel multiple-attribute based trust metric for reliable user selection for
cooperative spectrum sensing.
In the three trust based schemes [Vosoughi et al. 2014], [Guo et al. 2015] and [Wang
et al. 2016a] proposed for selecting the honest users among the SSDF attackers, the trust
is computed based on the previous spectrum sensing results (or the interaction history).
All three schemes distinguish the malicious and non-malicious users based on the trust
values marked using a pre-defined threshold value. Trust based weighted sensing results
aggregation presented in [Qin et al. 2009] is the most closely comparable with the proposed
solution. The authors propose a trust based framework for cooperative spectrum sensing.
Trust computation for each SU is based on a Beta distribution using two behavioural
rating attributes. Malicious and non-malicious users get different reputation values based
on the previous behaviour ratings. The positive rating characterizes honest behaviour
while negative rating characterizes the dishonest behaviour. Unlike the proposed multi-
attribute trust metric (MATM), to compute the reputation in [Qin et al. 2009], these two
types of behaviours have to be explicitly stated in terms of positive and negative ratings.
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Table 3.1: Existing User Selection for Cooperative Spectrum Sensing.
Selection Feature No. of At-
tributes
Ability to Characterize SSDF Attacks
shadow correlation, location[Sele´n
et al. 2008]
2 Depends on the channel state characteris-
tics.
location [Malady and da Silva 2008] 1 -
distance between the FC and the SU
[Najimi et al. 2013]
1 -
distance between the PU and SU
[Han et al. 2010]
1 -
channel gain under Rayleigh fading
[Sun et al. 2007]
1 -
location, received PU power [Guo
et al. 2009]
2 Limited ability depends on the available
PU characteristics.
largest channel gain [Wei and Zhang
2010]
1 -
cooperation footprint based on spa-
tial diversity [Mishra et al. 2006]
1 -
Cost function based on transmission
energy, sensing energy and detection
probability [Najimi et al. 2013]
3 -
Reputation based cluster selection:
sensing history, initial reputation,
votes between clusters based on
channel status and the distance be-
tween the node and the median of
the cluster [Hyder et al. 2014]
3 Limited to individual and collaborative
SSDF attacks. Specific attack behaviors
are not characterized using the reputation
metric.
Trust based on past behaviour as
positive rating, negative rating [Qin
et al. 2009]
2 Use Beta distribution for de-centralized
reputation computation.
Trust-aware gossip-based scheme
[Vosoughi et al. 2014]
1 Useful for consensus based spectrum sens-
ing with push-sum gossip protocol to elim-
inate the involvement of SSDF attackers.
Trusted social behaviour inspired
clustering scheme [Guo et al. 2015]
1 Identify the honest users based on the
inter-cluster and intra-cluster friendship
values.
Trust scheme based on D-S evidence
theory [Feng et al. 2015]
1 Reliability function to compute the trust
and to identify the trustworthy users
based on the previous spectrum sensing
results.
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The novel multi-attribute trust metric described in this chapter complements that of [Qin
et al. 2009] based on (i) the evidence based trust computation using three attributes and
(ii) the ability to distinctly characterize three SSDF attack types rather than just consider
as a dishonest behaviour in general.
3.2.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter are described as follows.
• Novel multi-attribute trust metric (MATM) for user selection for cooperative sens-
ing - A novel multi-attribute trust metric using three trust attributes is proposed.
The three trust attributes are computed based on the history of incorrect spectrum
sensing data instances, responses received by the FC and the number of attempts
for channel access. This contribution differs significantly from the existing user se-
lection strategies as three distinct evidence based trust attributes are selected to
compute the trustworthiness of a SU instead of using only the previous spectrum
sensing results.
• SSDF attack behaviour characterization using the expressiveness of the three at-
tributes of MATM . It is demonstrated that MATM is sufficiently expressive to
describe the three SSDF attack behaviours distinctly. Reliable identification of ma-
licious users and non-malicious users are demonstrated. This contribution signif-
icantly differs from existing solutions as the three evidence based attributes char-
acterize the SSDF behaviors based on the value of MATM and probabilistic local
spectrum sensing decision accuracy measures (i.e. Pf,j and Pd,j).
Based on the simulation experiments, MATM provides an accuracy upto 100% to
distinctly identify the non-malicious users in the presence of SSDF attackers. Thus,
provides a promising metric to distinctly identify trustworthy users in the presence
of SSDF attackers and to enhance the reliability of cooperative spectrum sensing
decision making.
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3.3 Notations
Notation Description
τ duration of the sensing time
λ the threshold of the decision statistic (either Qf or Qd) below which the
hypotheses are invalid
tr local sensing result reporting time
T frame duration
p(h0) prior probability of the absence of a PU
p(h1) prior probability of the presence of a PU
GQ() Gaussian Q-function
var variance of a Gaussian variable
γ signal-to-noise ratio
fs channel frequency
NR total number of local spectrum sensing decisions
ch channel
H0 decision hypothesis for the presence of a PU in ch
H1 decision hypothesis for the absence of a PU in ch
Pd,j probability of detection of the j
th SU
Pm,j probability of misdetection of the j
th SU
Pf,j probability of false alarm of the j
th SU
Pd,j(λ, τ) probability of detection of the j
th SU for a given τ and λ
Pf,j(λ, τ) probability of false alarm of the j
th SU for a given τ and λ
Qd aggregated decision result for detecting the presence of a PU in ch
Qf aggregated decision result for falsely declaring the presence of PU in ch
Q¯d aggregated decision result for detecting the presence of a PU in ch for a
given τ
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Q¯f aggregated decision result for falsely declaring the presence of PU in ch
for a given τ
A1, A2, A3 trust attributes where Ai where i = 1, 2, 3 at t
A∗1, A∗2, A∗3 trust attributes where Ai where i = 1, 2, 3 at (t− τ)
t, t1, t2 time, two time instances where t1 < t2
Xj number of false spectrum sensing data samples from the j
th SU
Xtotal,j total number of spectrum sensing data samples received at FC from the
jth SU
Drsp,j number of responses received from the j
th SU
Respj total number of requests sent from FC to the j
th SU
Ij(ref) degree of greediness of the j
th SU
Ij(mean) average greediness
aj number of channel allocations for the j
th SU
rj number of channel access requests from the j
th SU
FGF forgetful factor
u(MATM)j utility of MATM of the j
th SU.
u(Ai) utility of each trust attribute Ai
kscale,i scaling constant where 0 < kscale,i < 1 and
∑
i kscale,i = 1 for the i
th
attribute.
TC trusted coalition
Tthr threshold of u(MATM) for TC selection(
NR
l
)
l number of local spectrum sensing decisions out of NR (where NR2 <
l < NR)
Eresidual,j residual energy of the j
th SU
Eth the limiting amount of residual energy required for secure transmission
ED energy detection threshold
Beta (a1,b1) Beta distribution with parameters a1 ad b1
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Gamma
(a2,b2)
Gamma distribution with parameters a2 and b2
Weibull
(a3,b3)
Weibull distribution with parameters a3 and b3
Lognormal
(a4,b4)
Lognormal distribution with parameters a4 and b4
KLD Kullback-Leibler divergence
3.4 Multi-Attribute Trust Metric
In this section, the proposed multi-attribute trust metric is derived and the reliability of
the metric is analyzed. It is assumed that a centralized spectrum availability decisions are
made at a fusion center (FC) by combining the local decisions of the trusted cooperative
users according sets of pre-defined rules [Akyildiz et al. 2002][Akyildiz et al. 2006][Akyildiz
et al. 2008][Akyildiz et al. 2011].
3.4.1 Overview of Trust Metrics
Trust may be termed as direct trust or indirect trust depending on the application sce-
nario and the observations [Bertino et al. 2010][Thirunarayan et al. 2014][Zhao and Li
2013][Bhalaji and Selvaraj 2017]. Direct trust specifies the direct observations. Direct
observations are also known as first hand information. An example would be the interac-
tions between two entities in a network. Some of the interactions may be successful while
some may be unsuccessful. Indirect trust specifies the indirect observation which are also
referred to as second hand information. For example, the reputation scores given to enti-
ties in a network are useful measures of indirect trust. For the direct trust computations
[Marsh 1994], the history of sensing decisions are used to compute the trustworthiness
as the ratio between the correct sensing decisions and the total sensing decisions over a
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period of time. Direct trust computations usually make use of historical data of previous
interactions between two entities over a period of time.
A trust metric provides means to evaluate the subjective assessment among two enti-
ties to perform a particular action. Trust metrics can also be considered as functions which
compute the trust values using quantitative or qualitative measures [Mahoney et al. 2005]
[Marsh 1994]. For example, in wireless networks the trust can be measured based on the
data packets forwarded, control packets forwarded, availability based on beacon messages,
battery life-time, consistency of reported values, reputation responses etc [Movahedi et al.
2016] [Mali and Misra 2016] [Kerrache et al. 2016]. In cloud computing, certificate or
tickets based trust mechanisms are used to establish the trust among the service providers
and the authenticated users while the graph theoretic models and data ownership based
information are used for the trust computation [Premarathne 2017][Werner et al. 2017]
[Cusack and Ghazizadeh 2016]. Different types of trust metrics use numerous computa-
tional techniques. Arithmetic type trust metrics use simple mathematical operations to
compute the trust values. Another example is the chain of proof type metrics, which
perform validations as a chain of evidences. Each validated link (i.e. between a pair of
users) contributes to the validation of the entire chain. In probabilistic type of measures,
the trust is computed using probabilities by preserving the total probability principle.
3.4.2 Trust Attributes
Trust is essentially a multi-dimensional feature which can be described by a set of at-
tributes corresponding to each of the selected dimensions. To compute multi-dimensional
trust, multiple attributes are necessary [Das and Islam 2012][Luo et al. 2010][Li et al.
2010][Li and Du 2013]. Once the multiple attributes are identified, the functional form
of the combination of these attributes need to be computed. In [Keeney 1974], an at-
tribute is defined as a dimensional space. An attribute can take values in this dimensional
space. Using the multi-attribute utility theory [Keeney 1974][Keeney 1972], based on the
dependencies between these attributes, a suitable functional form is derived.
The proposed multi-attribute trust metric is composed of three attributes A1, A2, A3
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corresponding to three dimensions. These three dimensions characterize the trustworthi-
ness of a SU are as follows:
• SU provides accurate sensing decisions to the FC upon request
• SU responds with the local sensing decisions and
• SU genuinely request to access the spectrum for data transmission.
To determine the direct trust of a cooperative SU, the first trust attribute (A1) is
computed based on the probability of falsifying the spectrum sensing data during time
”t”, by using previously detected such incorrect data over a fixed time window.
A1 =
Xj
Xtotal,j
(3.1)
where Xj denotes the number of instances where the spectrum sensing data were false
and Xtotal,j represents the total number of correct spectrum sensing data sent by the j
th
SU during a a fixed time duration. Larger the value of A1 reflects more trustworthiness.
Possible values of A1 include a maximum of 1 and a minimum of 0. It is assumed that a
cooperative SU using the energy detection technique for PU detection [Akyildiz et al. 2011].
The values of Xj and Xtotal,j can be computed using the interaction history data stored
at the FC. The spectrum availability decision is stated based on a pre-defined threshold
for energy detection method [Akyildiz et al. 2011]. At the FC, it is also assumed that
based on the overall decision, each individual local spectrum sensing data is classified as
a correct or false sensing data.
Next, the second attribute A2 is selected to characterizes the responsiveness of a
SU. It is assumed that when the FC request for local sensing data, a responsive SU will
send the spectrum sensing result. It is assumed that the SU has a good reception of the
control channel to receive the request from the FC. Failure to respond is considered as
an indication of an untrustworthy user.
A2 =
Drsp,j
Respj
(3.2)
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where Drsp,j and Respj denote the number of responses received from the j
th SU and
the total number of spectrum sensing requests received by the jth SU respectively. Larger
the value of A2, the trustworthiness is high. Possible values of A2 includes a maximum of
1 and a minimum of 0. It is assumed that the communications in terms of responses and
requests are recorded in the form of a response record matrix at FC. Rows and columns
of the matrix corresponds to responses and requests.
Next, the third trust attribute (A3) is computed based on the history of channel
access requests. When a SU indicates the requirement to transmit the data, a channel
is allocated for a SU if it is vacant at time t. The term relative greediness is used to
characterize an SU to harness more spectrum resources for transmission based on the
spectrum allocation success rate. It is assumed that when some SUs do not get a chance
to transmit in a particular time slot, they have greater demand to transmit in the next
time slot. Such persistent behaviour for accessing a channel is characterized as greed.
A3 =
Ij
Imean
(3.3)
Ij represent the degree of greediness and Imean represent the mean degree of greediness
over a fixed time period. To compute the value of Ij , the average signal strength over
that fixed time period T and the failure rate of channel allocation is taken into account.
This is equivalent to the computation of current trust using a forgetful factor (FGF ) [Das
and Islam 2012]. The forgetful factor is included to express the relative staleness of the
ratio of average signal strength during the fixed time period. In [Das and Islam 2012],
it is generally assumed to be FGF = 0.9 which indicates that the ratio does not vary
drastically.
Ij = FGF × (aj
rj
)
Imean =
∑K
j=1 Ij
K
(3.4)
where aj and rj represents the number of times in which channels were allocated and
data transmitted by the jth SU and total number of requests made by that SU to access
a channel respectively. The ratio between aj and rj represents the indirect trust [Marsh
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1994] based on the channel allocation history. The values of aj and rj are computed based
on the channel allocation history data at FC for the jth SU over the time period T . The
value of Imean is computed as the average of Ij for j = {1, 2, · · · ,K} over T . Larger the
value of A3, the user is more reliable. Possible values of A3, is a maximum of 1 and a
minimum of 0.
In addition to the above trust attributes, a direct trust measure based on the residual
energy of each SU is also considered. For a SU, if the residual energy content is greater than
a pre-defined threshold, the SU is considered to be trustworthy in terms being operational
without failure. When selecting the trusted set f SUs, this direct trust is also considered
(see Section 3.5).
3.4.3 Functional Form of Multi-Attribute Trust
A utility function quantifies the preference by assigning a numerical value to indicate the
satisfaction of a particular criterion [San Cristo´bal 2012]. According to [Akyildiz et al.
2011], when the cooperative users are selected using different strategies, the utilities of the
selections vary. Also, the impact of preferences (i.e. kscale,i in Equation 3.6) among the
trust attributes vary. Next, the utility of MATM is computed using the multi-attribute
utility theory [Keeney 1972]. The three main steps [San Cristo´bal 2012] to compute the
utility value of MATM are, (i) to determine the utility functions for each attribute A1, A2
and A3, (ii) verification of utility independence conditions, and (iii) identification of the
functional form of the multi-attribute utility function for MATM .
To compute the functional form of MATM , multi-attribute utility theory is used
[Keeney 1974]. According to [Keeney 1974], multiple dimensions of a metric is described
using the corresponding attributes multiplicatively. Values taken by each attribute reflect
the overall trust for an agent. In Equation 3.5, the three trust attributes A1, A2, and A3
are used to express the multiple dimensions of the overall trust measure MATM .
MATM = A1 ×A2 ×A3 (3.5)
In order to compute a utility functional form for MATM , it is necessary to fulfill the
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conditions stated in [Keeney 1974].
• Minimum number of attributes required to define the concept of preferential indepen-
dance - According to [Keeney 1974], for preferential independence to be validated,
atleast three (03) are required. Hence, the selection of A1, A2, A3 would suffice.
• Utility independence of A1, A2, A3 for all possible scenarios - There are two main
scenarios that arise are, (i) when there is sufficient signal strength or (ii) when there
is insufficient signal strength to receive a request to cooperate with spectrum sensing
local decision. In (i), A1, A2, A3 are utility independent. These utilities only depend
on the time (e.g. at what time the SU receives, responds and when the response
is received.). In (ii), utility of A2 and A3 are not independent of each other since
the responsiveness depends on the reception of the request. On the other hand,
A1 is utility independent of A2 and A3. Therefore, it can be concluded that utility
independence among the three attributes are not preserved in all scenarios.
• Preferential independence of A1, A2, A3 for all possible scenarios. Either scenario (i)
or (ii) exists at a particular time. For the same scenarios (i) and (ii) described above,
the preference for each attribute is independent as there is no existence of a condi-
tional preference relation between the attributes on their individual computations
respectively (see Equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3).
According to the conditions satisfied above, Theorem1 proved in [Keeney 1974] is
satisfied to confirm the utility of MATM of the jth SU (or u(MATM)j) takes an additive
functional form stated as follows (Equation 3.6).
u(MATM)j =
3∑
i=1
kscale,iu(Ai) (3.6)
For each utility function u(Ai), a scaling constant kscale,i is defined as 0 < kscale,i < 1
such that
∑
i kscale,i = 1 [Keeney 1974]. The value of kscale,i is subjective as it depends on
the particular scenario. It is selected as a qualitative value which represents the most and
least desirable attributes for that particular scenario. Then, the utility functions u(Ai)
for A1, A2, A3 are described.
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• For A1, the variation of the utility is considered to linearly degrade (from 1 to 0)
as the ratio
Xj
Xtotal,j
(in Equation 3.1) varies from 0 to 1. Utility is a maximum
when there data is not found to be false atleast once. Since A1 is a direct trust
computation based on past behaviour of truthfulness of the responses, A1 = 0.5 is
considered as the point where u(A1) is 50% [Das and Islam 2012].
• For A2, the variation of the utility is considered to linearly increase (from 0 to 1)
as the ratio
Drsp,j
Respj
(in Equation 3.2) varies from 0 to1. Utility is a maximum when
the SU responds to all the requests received from the FC. Since A2 is a direct trust
computation based on the past behaviour of responsiveness, A2 = 0.5 is considered
as the point where u(A2)is 50% [Das and Islam 2012].
• For A3, the variation of the utility is considered to be a sigmoid function which has
the highest utility when the channel conditions are equally good or better at the jth
SU (when compared to FC). It is assumed that FC have good signal conditions for
sensing channel ch, therefore, the ratio given in Equation 3.3 has a maximum of 1
and a minimum of 0. For simplicity it is considered that the utility linearly varies
from 0 to 1 when the ratio (A3) varies from 0.5 to 1 respectively. It is also assumes
that utility will be 50% when A3 = 0.75 [Das and Islam 2012].
3.5 Trusted User Set for Cooperative Sensing
In this section, the reliability of selecting a trusted set of users based on the u(MATM) is
described. A trusted coalition (TC) (Equation 3.7) is defined as the set of SUs participating
in cooperative spectrum sensing.
TC = select(([u(MATM)j ], NR, Tthr)and(Eresidual,j ≥ Eth)) (3.7)
where j = 1, 2, · · · , NR is the number of SUs. The function select is the decision
making function. This function assigns the jth SU as a member of TC if the utility value
is greater than Tthr, which is a pre-defined threshold value (Tthr ∈ [0, 1]), and if that SU
has sufficient energy reserves. Eresidual,j is the amount of residual energy of the j
th SU
and it should be greater than the minimum required (Eth) for a secure transmission.
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3.5.1 Impact of TC Selection on Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
Decision Formation
When the binary local decisions (or sensing data) are reported to the FC, fusion rules are
applied to obtain the cooperative decision [Akyildiz et al. 2011]. The fusion rules combine
the local decisions (or sensing data) to make the cooperative decision at the FC. For a
given Pd,j and Pf,j the generalized fusion rules (see Equations 3.8) states that correct
primary user detection is declared if the decision statistic is greater than a threshold λ.
Majority AND rule is selected since it is assumed that atleast some of the users of the TC
have detected the signal (or sensed the channel). Therefore, it is important to note that
NR
2 < l < NR local decisions are used in the fusion rules.
P{decision = H1|H1} = P{Qd > λ|H1}
P{decision = H1|H0} = P{Qf > λ|H0}
where,
Qf =
NR∑
l=k,j
(
NR
l
)
P lf,j(1− PNR−lf,j )
Qd =
NR∑
l=k,j
(
NR
l
)
P ld,j(1− PNR−ld,j )
where Qf and Qd are the aggregated sensing decision results for the false declaration
of the presence and the actual presence of a PU in the channel ch at the FC. λ is the
threshold of the decision statistic (either Qf or Qd) below which the hypotheses are invalid.
For example, in [Qin et al. 2009], the threshold for λ > 0.65 is considered. H1 and H0
denote the hypotheses of absence or presence of primary user in a particular frequency
band and Pf,j and Pd,j are the individual decision associated accuracy measures for the
jth SU. In this chapter, it is assumed that energy detection is used to detect the presence
of a PU [Feng et al. 2015]. In energy detection, if the energy of the detected signal is above
a threshold, then it is declared that the PU is present. The accuracy of the decisions for
H1 and H0 is determined by Pd,j and Pf,j respectively. The FC declares the spectrum
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available if all the cooperative users decisions indicate as available. When the OR rule
is used, if there is atleast one user who indicates the channel as being vacant, the FC
declares it as available. The majority rule requires at least a half of the cooperative users
to report the channel as being vacant. These simple fusion rules can be generalized to the
l out of the NR rule (see Equations for Qf and Qd in 3.8). When l is taken as 1 and NR,
the l out of NR rule becomes the OR and AND rule respectively. The majority rule can
be obtained from the l out of NR rule under the condition when l ≥ NR2 .
3.5.2 Characterization and Identification of Spectrum Sensing Data
Falsification (SSDF) Attack Behavior using MATM
In this section, the MATM is used to characterize the spectrum sensing data falsification
attack behaviors. The three types of SSDF attack behaviors [Cai et al. 2014] that are
used for the analysis are described below.
• Always-on attack where the malicious user always sends ”1” to indicate that the
channel is occupied by the PU. A selfish user can benefit from this and wastes the
spectrum resource.
It is assumed that the channel sensing period may be varied. Therefore, the respon-
siveness of a cooperative user depends on the varied sensing period. An Always-on
attacker, is excessively greedy in terms of gaining channel accessibility. Since the
response is always a 1, maximum value of A3 is 1. This attacker does not fail to
respond, the value of A2 can also take a maximum of 1. The attacker always report
that the PU is in operation, the value of A1 during a sensing period will be equivalent
to Pf,i. Therefore, knowing the possible values of A
∗
1, A
∗
2, A
∗
3, the expected values of
these attributes (i.e. A1, A2, A3) are computed as shown in the Table 3.3.
• Always-off attack where the malicious user always sends ”0” to indicate that the
channel is vacant when in fact it is occupied by the PU.
The attacker responds during each spectrum sensing, the value of A2 will remain
as 1. The attacker aims to disrupt the utility of the spectrum resource by falsely
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Table 3.3: MATM Attributes based SSDF Attack Behaviour Representation. Updated
Attributes at times t, (t− τ) are denoted as Ai and A∗i respectively.
Behaviour
Updated Attributes
A1 A2 A3
Always-on
A∗1+Pf,i
2
A∗2+1
2
A∗3+1
2
Always-off
A∗1+(1−Pf,i)
2
A∗2+1
2 A
∗
3
Always-
false
A∗1+(Pf,i+Pm,i)
2
A∗2+1
2
A∗3+0.5
2
Trusted SU
A∗1−Pd,i
2
A∗2+1
2
A∗3−Pa,i
2
indicating the channel to be available. Therefore, A3 takes a minimum of 0. Since
this attacker always indicate that the spectrum is vacant A1 is equivalent to (1−Pf,i).
• Always-false attack always send opposite sensing results which causes both spectrum
wastage and interferences for transmission.
Since the attacker responds during each spectrum sensing, the value of A2 will remain
as 1. Since the attacker indicates the opposites of channel status (i.e. occupancy and
the availability) the available channel gets misdetected and the occupied channel is
falsely declared to be available. Therefore, A1 takes the value of (Pf,i +Pm,i). Since
the utility gain have equal probability to be used or not to be used, A3 takes the
value of 0.5.
• For a trusted SU, the expected behavior in terms of A1, A2 and A3 can be described
as follows. For A1, the trusted SU is less likely to provide false spectrum sensing data.
For A2, responsiveness of a SU remains is at a maximum. For A3, the greediness
will increase as the SU gets access to available spectrum with a probability of access
Pd,i.
Based on the above discussion, the three attack behaviors and the expected trusted
user behavior characterized using MATM is summarized in Table 3.3. Each behaviour
is represented by the attributes A1, A2, A3 at time t. Then, after a sensing time of τ , the
updated attributes are represented as A∗1, A∗2, A∗3 (at time (t− τ)). It is assumed that each
SSDF attack behaviour is progressively computed using the three attributes of MATM .
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3.6 Experimental Results and Discussion
In this section the suitability of the proposed metric for SSDF attacker identification and
trusted cooperative user selection is analyzed. In addition, a delay analysis is described to
demonstrate the variation of the accuracy of cooperative spectrum sensing decision with
the sense time.
In the first experiment the usefulness of MATM and the context-dependent trust
metric proposed in [Qin et al. 2009] to holistically describe the three types of SSDF
behaviors is compared. Next, the performance of Beta distribution based attack behaviour
simulation using the behaviour characterization described in [Qin et al. 2009] and the three
attribute of MATM is compared.
3.6.1 Effectiveness of Characterizing SSDF Attack Behaviours to
Identify the Malicious Users
The proposed MATM is compared with the trust computation proposed in [Qin et al.
2009]. In order to do the comparison, the trust metric proposed in [Qin et al. 2009] is
interpreted as follows.
The three SSDF attack behaviours and the trusted SU behavior corresponds to four
different contexts which can be characterized by different positive and negative behavior
scores [Qin et al. 2009]. Pf,j is equivalent to E1 in [Qin et al. 2009] and Pm,j (or (1−Pd,j)
is equivalent to E2 in [Qin et al. 2009]. The authors state two context-dependent forget
factors corresponding to Always-on and Always-off attack behaviours. Since the authors
in [Qin et al. 2009] does not state the preferences of the context-dependent forget factors,
it is assumed that an attacker will not change its behaviour between different types of
attack behaviour. Also, it is assumed that an attacker does not exhibit more than one
attack behaviour at the same time.
The attack behaviours were simulated by varying the attribute values as described in
Table 3.3 to satisfy the malicious behaviours described in Section 3.5.2. The three attack
behaviours are comparatively analyzed by fitting statistical distributions (Table 3.4) and
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Table 3.4: Characterizing SSDF Attack Behaviour using MATM - Compared the ap-
proximated distributions using Standard Error (SE) corresponding to the parameters of
the specific distribution (where ai and bi (where i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are the parameters of the
corresponding distributions).
Behaviour
SE of Approximated Distributions
Beta
(a1,b1)
Gamma
(a2,b2)
Weibull
(a3,b3)
Lognormal
(a4,b4)
Always-on (0.093,
0.292)
(0.13,
0.004)
(0.005,
0.054)
(0.024,
0.015)
Always-off (0.086,
0.454)
(0.084,
0.004)
(0.004,
0.042)
(0.022,
0.016)
Always-false (0.168,
0.757)
(.165,
0.0022)
(0.0033,
0.053)
(0.026,
0.0184)
Non-malicious (0.101,
0.536)
(0.097,
0.0033)
(0.0037,
0.04)
(0.017,
0.013)
compared with the fitted distribution to the expected trust user behaviour (as mentioned
in Table 3.3). In the comparison, the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) is used to analyze
the difference in the probability distribution. KLD is a statistical measure which reveals
how close a probability distribution to a candidate distribution [Shlens 2014]. As shown in
Table 3.4 the attack behaviours and the expected non-malicious behaviour are presented.
The standard error of approximation values are compared in Table 3.4. The standard
error values are computed for each statistical measure (e.g. mean, variance) depending
on the statistical distribution. Each statistical measure is indicated for the respective
distribution in Table 3.4. Based on these results it can be concluded that standard error
is minimum when the behaviours are approximated by a Weibull distribution with different
values for the statistical measures. In order to compare with the context-dependent trust
explained in [Qin et al. 2009], the standard error approximation for the Beta distribution
is compared. Based on the standard error values, it is evident that the Beta distribution
explains the attack models well but not better than the Weibull distribution.
The attack behaviours characterized by MATM attributes are simulated as per Table
3.3 and the outcome is statistically approximated to a Beta distribution. Then, the
equivalent parameters Pf,i ≡ E1 and Pm,i ≡ E2 [Qin et al. 2009] is used for the simulation.
Outcome is statistically approximated to a Beta distribution. The fitted Beta distributions
for each of the two distributions are compared. The KLD measure is used to estimate the
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Table 3.5: Comparison of SSDF Attack Behaviour using MATM and Context-dependent
Trust [Qin et al. 2009]. α and β corresponds to the shape parameters of the Beta distri-
bution using Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD).
Attack Behaviour
Proposed Model [Qin et al. 2009]
KLD
α β α β
Always-on 2.38 5.71 2 3.71 0.0643
Always-off 1.74 7.31 2 3.71 0.4515
Always-false 3.18 13.7 2 3.71 0.5487
difference between the two distributions that are being compared (see Table 3.5). In the
next experiment, the variation of the MATM can be traced and used as a heuristic to
identify the malicious behaviours of SSDF attackers.
The attack behaviours (Table 3.3) were simulated such that for each iteration any
one of the above mentioned behaviours are randomly selected. Similarly, same number
of iterations were run to compute the behaviours according to the equivalent parameters
Pf,i ≡ E1 and Pm,i ≡ E2 [Qin et al. 2009] used for the simulation. The two sets of data
generated from the two simulations run contain any of the three types of attackers as well
as the non-malicious users which can be identified based on the respective behaviours.
The objective of this experiment was to compare the classification accuracy of MATM
with the context-dependent trust metric [Qin et al. 2009]. The performance was analyzed
using different classification techniques available in WEKA [Holmes et al. 1994]. Perfor-
mance of the two models were compared using classification accuracy, false positive rate
and true positive rate. According to the results (Table 3.7) it is evident that among the
features and metrics used for reliable SU identification in the presence of SSDF attackers
MATM results in the most accurate identification. Using MATM , the average classifi-
cation accuracy of 94.83% was obtained to distinctly identify the four classes. Therefore,
it is more reliable to use MATM for accurate non-malicious SU identification.
Next, the performance of genuine user selection accuracy of different cooperative user
selection models are compared with the trust based methods described in [Hyder et al.
2014][Guo et al. 2015], context-dependent trust model [Qin et al. 2009], and [Feng et al.
2015] with MATM . Evidently, for MATM , it is possible to distinctly identify each of
the three SSDF attacker classes with high accuracy.
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Table 3.6: Classification Accuracy of MATM and Context-dependent Trust Model [Qin
et al. 2009]. NB - Naive Bayes, MP - Multi-layer Perceptron, TP - True Positive, FP - False
Positive, C1 - Always-on attacker class, C2 - Non-malicious User class, C3 - Always-off
attacker class and C4 - Always-false attacker class.
Performace
MATM Model [Qin et al. 2009]
J48 NB MP J48 NB MP
Classification
Accuracy
87.625% 100% 96.875% 77.125% 71.375% 72.75%
TP Rate
(C1, C2,
C3, C4)
(0.96,
0.775,
1,0.77)
(1,1,1,1) (0.98,
0.925,
1,
0.97)
(1,1,
0.54,
0.05)
(1,1,
0.415,
0.44)
(0.995,
1,
0.415,
0.5)
FP Rate
(C1, C2,
C3, C4)
(0.007,
0.075,
0,
0.077)
(0,0,0,0) (0,
0.01,
0.022,
0.01)
(0.002,
0, 0.15,
0.153)
(0,0,
0.187,
0.195)
(0,0,
0.168,
0.19)
Table 3.7: Classification Accuracy of MATM and Context-dependent Trust Model [Qin
et al. 2009], . NB - Naive Bayes, MP - Multi-layer Perceptron, TP - True Positive, FP -
False Positive.
Model No. of
classes
Average FP rate
(J48,NB,MP)
Average TP rate
(J48,NB,MP)
[Hyder et al. 2014] 02 (0.9,0.9,0.85) (0.14,0.2,0.13)
[Guo et al. 2015] 02 (0.82,0.78,0.8) (0.2,0.23,0.26)
[Feng et al. 2015] 02 (0.7,0.7,0.78) (0.32,0.3,0.3)
[Qin et al. 2009] 04 (0.64,0.7,0.73) (0.09,0.098,0.09)
MATM model 04 (0.86,1,0.97) (0.077,0,0.12)
3.6.2 Effect of Trusted Coalition Selection
The objective of this set of experiments is to show the effectiveness of MATM to compute
the trustworthiness of a SU and to select the TC. Example: Consider a short-range TCRM
application, such as precision agriculture referenced environment monitoring [Wang et al.
2006], time-critical health monitoring [Pantelopoulos and Bourbakis 2010], where the sig-
nal strength degradation due to fading is assumed to be a minimum. The experiment
starts when the FC requests for the local sensing information from the SUs. It is assumed
that the sensing capability of SUs follow the Gaussian distribution. For each SU, its true
sensing capability is modeled by a Gaussian distribution with mean 0.6 and variance 0.2
[Wang et al. 2016a]. The reported sensing capability for a malicious SU is set to a high
value of 0.95. The initial trust score for all nodes is set to 1 representing ignorance. Sens-
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ing time is fixed to 20ms. The signal-to-noise is set to −2dB. In the experiment there
are 10 channels and 16 SUs. Location for each SU is predefined as a two dimensional
Cartesian coordinate (in a 20 × 20 grid) and FC is placed at (10, 10). Each SU provides
the local sensing decisions to the FC over 500 transactions and randomly request to access
the vacant channels for data transmission. Among the 16 SUs, a maximum of 50% of them
are malicious (i.e. can exhibit any of the three SSDF behaviours [Cai et al. 2014]). For
each subsequent interaction, each of the three attributes are updated according to the
Table 3.3. The local signal-to-noise ratio for energy detection for each SU is taken from
the data published in [Quan et al. 2008]. It is assumed that in each interaction with the
FC, a SU will provide the following information, Eresidual, Xj and acknowledgments sent
by each SU to keep track of Drsp,j . Based on these information provided by each SU, it
is assumed that the FC keeps record of Xj , Xtotal, Drsp,j for each j
th SU and a record of
Respj for each SU. When the SUs send requests to access a vacant channel and based on
whether those requests are granted and utilized the corresponding aj and rj information
for each SU is also stored at the FC. Then, based on the recorded data the three trust
attributes (A1, A2, A3) for each of the SUs are computed. When the number of malicious
users are increased the ratio between non-malicious (malicious) and total number user for
MATM based trust computation shows a decrement (increment). When the threshold to
declare a trusted user is varied, the size of the TC varies. The results are shown in Figure
3.1.
As mentioned earlier, in this chapter the non-consensus based fusion rules are consid-
ered. Therefore, the trust based decision fusion scheme described in [Wang et al. 2016a]
is not included in this comparison as it is proposed for consensus based decision fusion
model. The accuracy of spectrum availability decision depends on both the selection of
TC as well as the type of fusion rule. Performance of the cooperative spectrum sensing
decision accuracy (in terms of Qd and Qf ) for MATM based TC selection for different
fusion rules is comparatively analysed. The performance of the decision fusion when there
is a TC selection versus random cooperative user selection is compared (N = 8). The
experiment was conducted assuming energy detection and the decision fusion approxi-
mated using a Gaussian Q-function (GQ) [Hu et al. 2013]. As evidenced by the results,
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Figure 3.1: TC selection based on Tthr and Eth
the performance improves when there is a TC based decision fusion (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
Significant performance improvement is shown for AND rule as the final decision is 1 only
when the sensing data are all 1. When there is a TC the performance improves. However,
the size of the TC does not have a significant impact on the decision accuracy.
Figure 3.2: Variation of Qd for Different Fusions Rules with TC Selection and Random
User Selection.
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Figure 3.3: Variation of Qf for Different Fusions Rules with TC Selection and Random
User Selection.
3.6.3 Delay Analysis
In the proposed TC based cooperative spectrum sensing scheme, the secondary user trans-
mission delay occurs in four cases: spectrum sensing, sensing results reporting, false alarm
and correct detection of the PU. The delay caused by spectrum sensing and reporting is
inevitable, since the cooperative SUs need to sense the spectrum and send the local sens-
ing results to the FC to make a final decision on the PU status. To compute the delays
in the latter two cases, the formulation used in [Hu et al. 2013] (the Equations 1 and 2
in [Hu et al. 2013]) is used where only a single sensing time slot is considered instead of
multiple slots. For a single sensing time slot of duration τ , the Pf,j(λ, τ) and Pd,j(λ, τ)
are computed as follows. In Equations 3.8 and 3.11 the associated sensing delays are
incorporated. These are modified versions of the equations 1 and 2 in [Hu et al. 2013].
Pf,j(λ, τ) = GQ((
λ
var
− 1)
√
τfs
2
) (3.8)
Pd,j(λ, τ) = GQ((
λ
var
− γ − 1)
√
τfs
2
) (3.9)
The average delay for a SU is computed as (from Equation 3.10),
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D(τ,NR) = τ +NR.tr + (T − τ +NR.tr) · · · (3.10)
×[p(h0) ¯Qf (τ,NR) + p(h1) ¯Qd(τ,NR)]
where,
Q¯f =
NR∑
j=1
(
NR
l
)
P jf,j(λ, τ)(1− PNR−jf,j (λ, τ)) (3.11)
Q¯d =
NR∑
i=1
(
NR
l
)
P jd,j(λ, τ)(1− PNR−jd,j (λ, τ)) (3.12)
For a frame duration of T = 200ms, the prior probability of the absence of a PU is
taken as p(h0) = 0.7 which implies p(h1) = 0.3, NR = 8. A channel with a bandwidth
of 1000Hz using binary phase shift keying modulation and noise of equal bandwidth is
represented using a Gaussian variable with zero mean and var variance, λ = 0.8, the
sensing time τ = 40ms and assumed tr = 0.5 ∗ τ for evaluation purposes. γ is varied
between 2dB to 8dB. Variation of the average delay with the signal-to-noise ratio is
shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Variation of the delay with the spectrum sensing time for fixed NR = 8 and
different γ values.
58 (February 20, 2018)
SECTION 3.8: CONCLUSIONS
3.7 Conclusions
The main contributions of the chapter are, a novel multi-attribute trust attribute frame-
work that is evidently shown to be useful for TCRM applications for i) user selection for
cooperative spectrum sensing and ii) to identify the SSDF attackers distinctly based on
the behaviours. The significance of these contributions enhances the overall reliability
using cognitive radio networks for delay sensitive data transmissions in TCRMSs.
3.8 Epilogue
The next chapter investigates further improvements on delay bounded spectrum access
when there are multiple interruptions due to primary user arrivals.
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CHAPTER 4
Delay Sensitive Re-entrant Data
Transmission
4.1 Outline of the Chapter
This chapter describes a reliable delay-sensitive persistent data transmission mechanism
for TCRMSs provided that the available spectrum in the CRN has been accurately de-
tected. The delay sensitive data transmission requires a cognitive sensing capable node to
transmit data seamlessly within an acceptable delay when interrupted over multiple times
due to the arrival of the PU on that channel. In order to ensure failure free transmission,
an efficient hand-off management with a strict upper delay bound is necessary. The main
contribution of this chapter is the delay bound computation for the re-entrants (i.e. the
pre-empted SUs due to multiple interruptions) using the renewal counting process. The
content of this chapter is under review.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of
the research problem, summary of the limitations of existing work and the specific contri-
butions of the chapter. In Section 4.3, the notations used in this chapter are summarized.
The re-entrant delay sensitive spectrum hand-off management approach is described in
Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, the reliability of the delay sensitive analysis is described. Sub-
sequently, in Section 4.6 experiments and the results are discussed. The chapter concludes
with Section 4.7.
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4.2 Introduction
When a SU is transmitting, it is not unlikely for a PU to arrive to start communications on
that channel by interrupting the SU to pre-empt and vacate the channel [Sheikholeslami
et al. 2015][Wang et al. 2012]. If the PU is co-existing in a channel, the SU does not get
pre-empted [Nguyen et al. 2013]. Else, as the PU has a higher priority over the SU, then,
SU gets pre-empted resulting in an interruption or a failure in its data transmission. Once
a SU is interrupted, in order to complete the transmission of the remaining data, it is
necessary to provide the re-entrant with another available channel or the same channel
after a waiting for the PU to completed its transmission.
As mentioned in Chapter1, TCRMSs require the data to be transmitted over a period
of time with minimal delay. In TCRMSs, when the transmissions are interrupted spec-
trum hand-off techniques are useful to access another available channel to continue the
data transmission [Wang et al. 2010][Song and Xie 2012][Wang et al. 2012][Sheikholeslami
et al. 2015]. However, when there are multiple interruptions over a period of time [Chai
et al. 2014], the total transmission delay of a SU may increase due to spectrum hand-off.
Evidently, if the sensing time is fixed and the collective cooperative spectrum availability
decision making time is fixed, the contribution of waiting times for channel switching is
significant for the total transmission time. Therefore, it is necessary to realize an effec-
tive mechanism for the SUs to re-gain transmission opportunities with spectrum hand-off
management without exceeding a finite delay bound.
4.2.1 Limitations of Existing Work
In addition to the details on spectrum hand-off schemes described in Chapter 02, the
always-staying and always-changing spectrum hand-off methods are discussed along with
the existing re-entrant SU queuing models. Then, the scheduling methods suitable for
queuing of the re-entrant SUs are discussed.
The IEEE 802.22 standard describes the listen-before-talk scheme in order to avoid
causing harmful interferences to the PUs [Popescu et al. 2016]. When using a pre-emptive
resume priority queuing model there can be two possible policies for spectrum hand-
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off under the above contention-avoidance approach: (i) always-staying and (ii) always-
changing [Wang et al. 2010][Wang et al. 2012]. In the always-staying policy, the SU will
always stay in this channel until its data transmission is completed. In always-changing
policy, the SU will switch to another channel when an interruption happens. For instance,
if there is a target channel which is idle, the SU can execute data transmission immediately.
Otherwise, the SU has to wait until a channel is idle.
For TCRMSs, it is necessary to ensure a likelihood of spectrum access in the next
attempt without exceeding a pre-defined maximum tolerable delay. It is reasonable to
assume atleast twice the active period of spectrum sensing as a tolerable delay limit for
cognitive radio networks when the channel switching time during a hand-off is significantly
small [Liu et al. 2013] (e.g. for 15s of active spectrum sensing time [Weichold et al. 2015],
the maximum tolerable delay can be set as 30s). In [Wang et al. 2012] multiple hand-
offs resulting due to multiple interruptions have been studied. The authors propose a
pre-emptive queuing model with proactive decision making to reduce the extended data
delivery period considering different traffic arrival and service time distributions. The
effects of multi-user sharing and multiple interruptions on the extended data delivery
time of the SUs were also studied in [Borgonovo et al. 2008] [Shiang and Van der Schaar
2008]. The main limitation of the above solutions is the requirement for the secondary
users to stay on the current operating channel to complete their unfinished transmissions.
The waiting time is not limited based on a delay constraint. In [Zhang et al. 2013a], the
authors describe a delay analysis of the re-entrants when there are multiple interruptions.
In their experimental analysis the maximum number of interruptions are limited to 5.
However, the maximum number of attempts within a given tolerable delay has not been
considered. In [Wu et al. 2014], assignment of priority values during spectrum hand-offs
based on the quality-of-experience for multimedia transmissions are discussed. When there
are multiple interruptions, the channel with a maximum expected mean opinion score for
spectrum hand-off is allocated in order to enhance the quality-of-experience. Based on the
above discussion, although the multiple interruptions cause delays for data transmissions,
the existing solutions do not consider the number of possible hand-offs permissible to
satisfy a pre-defined maximum tolerable delay.
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Another important aspect is how the re-entrants should to be scheduled to allo-
cate the channels. Scheduling methods to queue the pre-emptive re-entrants include the
earliest-deadline-first (EDF) [Liebeherr et al. 1996], least laxity first (LLF) [Mok 1983][Oh
and Yang 1998], maximum urgency first (MUF) [Salmani et al. 2005] and modified least
laxity first (MLLF) [Oh and Yang 1998]. Group priority EDF [Li and Ba 2012] is not
considered as a suitable mechanism for pre-emptive scheduling due to the inability to
ensure the different groups of re-entrants. In EDF, the priority is assigned based on the
deadline. Earliest deadline gets higher priority than the late deadlines. Laxity is the
difference between the deadline before which a task must be completed and the amount
of computation remaining to be performed. Least laxity gets the higher priority than a
higher laxity value. In modified laxity scheduling, when there is a tie, the current task
completes as long as the deadline is not missed. The maximum urgency first scheduling
is performed in two phases: EDF is used to sort the tasks and then use laxity to re-sort
the tasks. Performance measures [Salmani et al. 2005][Li and Ba 2012] to compare the
scheduling methods include the success ratio and the utilization [Salmani et al. 2005][Li
and Ba 2012] of the system. Success ratio is computed by dividing the number of tasks
completed successfully by the sum of the execution times of all tasks. In general, the
utilization of the system is computed as the ratio between the sum of the execution times
of all tasks which are ready before the time that the system is terminated and the time
that the system is terminated.
4.2.2 Contribution of the Chapter
Main contribution of this chapter is a solution to achieve efficient and reliable spectrum
hand-off management in TCRMSs to complete delay sensitive data transmission over
a CRN without violating a pre-defined maximum tolerable delay. The delay-bounded
maximum number of re-trials for a re-entrant SU is computed based on renewal counting
process with immediate replacements. Results reveal significant improvement of reliability
in terms of reducing the delay when the probability of interruption (pi) is reasonably large
(on average 0.1 ≤ pi ≤ 0.6)
64 (February 20, 2018)
SECTION 4.2: INTRODUCTION
The above mentioned contributions complements some of the recently published work
addressing the spectrum hand-off management in CRNs.
In [Zhang et al. 2012], the secondary users are divided into two classes, class-1 (SU1)
and class-2 (SU2) secondary users where SU1 has a higher priority compared to SU2
which in turn has a lower priority with respect to the PUs’ to use the vacant channels
opportunistically. The authors considers reactive-decision hand-off management for the
SU1and SU2 using Markov transition model combined with the preemptive resume priority
(PRP). The authors have investigated the effects of multiple hand-off delay using a queuing
model with Poisson arrival and service time distributions and two separate servers for the
normal and re-entrant users. In contrast to the contributions of this chapter, the solution in
[Zhang et al. 2012], considers more than one type of high priority SUs. The pre-emption of
a lower priority SU occur due to any of the high priority SU or PU. There is no maximum
tolerable delay constraint considered in the analysis. Moreover, in [Zhang et al. 2012]
authors do not consider the requirement that an interrupted SU needs to complete its
transmission before a certain deadline. In this chapter, for a TCRM application, it is
assumed that a SU is required to complete its transmission within a maximum tolerable
delay in spite of multiple pre-emptive interruptions.
In [Bicen et al. 2015], the authors characterize the use of a dedicated CRN for frame
transmission and assess the spectrum efficiency and hand-off performance analytically.
The results reveal that the delay for a SU in the absence of a dedicated radio is the sum
of the time periods of spectrum sensing after interruptions. When in the presence of
a dedicated radio, the delay depends on the PU arrival rate, and sensing periods after
interruptions. The contributions of this chapter significantly complements the work of
[Bicen et al. 2015], the total delay when the SU has a maximum tolerable delay.
In [Rehmani et al. 2013], the authors propose channel selections based on maximum
connectivity in multi-hop ad-hoc CRNs. Although there is a channel selection strategy, it
differs from the contributions of this chapter as it does not account for the delay involved in
the sequential channel sensing. In this chapter the delay associated with each interruption
and the largest delay possible for a potential interruption when compared to a pre-defined
maximum tolerable delay is computed.
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In [Zhang and Yeo 2014], optimal sequential channel sensing based on the maximum
residual time is computed. For each interrupted SU, the maximum residual time is com-
puted and a channel which can sustain a transmission over this time is selected after
spectrum sensing. The worst case delay will then be the sum of the sensing times for each
channel. In this chapter, the residual delay when compared to a maximum tolerable delay
after each interruption is computed. Then, the channel which is immediately available is
selected to continue with the transmission.
In [Azarfar et al. 2016], buffering and switching medium access control protocols
are comparatively analysed for the spectrum hand-off performance. When the packet
length geometric distribution model, the delay analysis is similar for a service-repeat model
where the entire packet must be retransmitted after each interruption. The delay due to
re-transmissions and the residual time is accounted. The contributions of this chapter
complements the solution described in [Azarfar et al. 2016] as it does not necessitate
retransmissions but to complete the transmission of the remaining packets. Furthermore,
in the proposed model the main focus is to adhere to the maximum tolerable delay to
complete the transmission despite the multiple interruptions.
4.3 Notations
This section summarizes the notations used in this chapter.
Notation Description
Arri(t) data arrival process of the i
th SU
Bi(t) backlog of the buffer of i
th SU at time t.
kintr number of interruptions
kAtt number of re-trials
kch number of channels
chj channel state information of the j
th channel
CAi,j channel assignment of the i
th SU and the jth channel
Cj channel capacity of the j
th channel
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N number of retrials
TAtt time duration for kAtt no. of re-trials
Tac actual transmission time
dfading delay due to fading
dtr,i delay for transmission at the i
th retrial
Davg average delay
t time variable
Dtotal total delay
Xn inter-arrival time of the n
th retrial
katt(t)
t time average retrial rate over the time interval (0, t]
E() expectation operator
mat(t) expected number of retries
M stopping time
dtc truncated delay constant
tsw,i channel switching delay to the i
th channel
E[Twait]i expected waiting time at the i
th channel
pi probability of interruption by the i
th interruption event
E[Tbusy]j expected busy time at the j
th channel
yh, yl occupancy of the high and low priority users respectively
Resh, Resl residual time of the high and low priority users respectively
servh, servl service time of the high and low priority users respectively
w¯ average waiting time
R¯es average residual time
¯serv average service time
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4.4 Reliable Context-Aware Spectrum Access for the
Re-entrant Users
This section describes a novel solution which addresses the problem of sensed spectrum
allocation to re-entrant SUs for delay-sensitive data transmissions in TCRMSs. The main
objective of this solution is to allocate available spectrum to the re-entrant SUs who need
to complete their data transmissions without violating a pre-defined delay constraint.
4.4.1 Overview and Assumptions
Spectrum hand-off management allocates the vacant channels for the re-entrant SUs to
continue with the data transmission. To establish access to a vacant channel, it is assumed
that the common control channel has sufficient coverage for all the SUs [Nguyen et al.
2013]. In order to maximize the data transmission opportunity of the re-entrant SUs, it is
assumed that each SU can retry more than once to gain spectrum accessibility. It is also
assumed that the number of attempts to resume the transmission should be limited by a
pre-defined maximum tolerable delay. In addition, the following assumptions are made.
1. At any time, only one user can transmit its data over a channel.
2. To increase the accuracy of spectrum availability detection, cooperative sensing is
used.
3. Centralized spectrum sharing entity makes the spectrum allocation decisions
4. Re-entrant SUs gain higher priority than the new arrival SUs at a particular channel.
5. The SUs are pre-empted from spectrum access due to lower priority than the PU
and the PU is non co-existent.
6. The coverage of the common control channel is sufficiently large for all the SUs.
7. For a particular channel, the interference levels are at a minimum and the impact
of the interference sources are at a minimum.
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It is also considered that each SU (for example say the ith SU) receives data according
to an arrival process Arri(t). It is assumed that each i
th SU needs to transmit data over
multiple time slots. This is equivalent to a scenario of transmitting a large amount of
data. Let Bi(t) be the backlog in the local buffer of the i
th SU waiting to be transmitted.
When kch number of channels are assigned for transmission, a finite amount of data is
transmitted by the ith SU. The buffer capacity is updated as,
Bi(t+ 1) = (Bi(t)−
kch∑
j=1
CAi,jCjSj) +Xi(t) (4.1)
where Sj is the channel state information (Sj ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 is for vacant and 0
for occupied status), CAi,j is the channel assignment for the i
th SU (i.e. CAi,j ∈ {0, 1})
and Cj is the channel capacity.
4.4.2 Impact of Channel Fading Conditions
The channel capacity may vary depending on fading and the channel type. According
to [Goldsmith and Varaiya 1997], for a time-varying channel, the capacity is computed
by considering a finite set of values for signal-to-noise ratio or SNR (γ) and the received
signal bandwidth (BW ). The capacity of a fading channel is defined in [Goldsmith and
Varaiya 1997] as follows,
C =
∫
γ
Cγ .p(γ)dγ (4.2)
=
∫
γ
BW.log(1 + γ).p(γ)dγ
when Cγ = BW.log(1+γ) for a time-invariant additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel. The extent of fading is indicated by the Nakagami parameter m. When m = 1,
the scenario is such that the channel is experiencing Rayleigh fading. When m = ∞
the channel experiences AWGN channel without fading. When m goes from 1 to 2, the
severity of fading decreases [Goldsmith and Varaiya 1997]. The relationship between γ
and m is such that for a finite vale j, such that, j = 1, 2, · · · ,mM ∈ Z, γj = jm + γ0,
where γ0 is the cut-off SNR value to maintain an optimal level of power [Goldsmith and
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Varaiya 1997]. When the fading level vary over the channel, the available channel capacity
changes accordingly. The results are shown in Section 4.6.2.
When the channel experiences fading, the capacity is expected to reduce. The trans-
mission time will then increase. The actual transmission time may increase causing a
larger delay. However, this is an additional delay which is independent of the spectrum
hand-off delay due to multiple interruptions.
4.4.3 Spectrum Hand-off Management with Multiple Re-tries using
Renewal Counting Process
A renewal process is a generalized counting process with independent identical inter-
arrival times [Leon-Garcia 2004]. A renewal counting process with finite expectation of
the inter-arrival times satisfy the law of large numbers. Suppose there are finite number of
chances for transmissions over a particular spectrum band during a period of time. This
is equivalent to the number of component replacements over that particular time period
with minimum channel switching delays. Therefore, it is appropriate to use the renewal
counting process to determine the spectrum access probability for a re-entrant SU.
It is assumed that the dtc is a pre-defined tolerable maximum delay for a particular
time-critical application. For a particular channel, a SU is expected to transmit. It is
assumed that over kAtt number of attempts, it is possible for a SU to gain spectrum
accessibility depending on the vacant spectrum. The average delay is computed for kAtt
number of re-tries (see Equation 4.3).
Davg =
∑kAtt
i=1 dtr,i
kAtt
(4.3)
where, dtr,i = tsw,i + E[Twait]i with tsw,i is the switching time and E[Twait]i is the
expected waiting time at the queue of the ith channel. It is assumed that the switching
time is much smaller compared to the waiting time. To compute the sufficient number of
attempts for transmissions to sustain network operations over a finite time t, the Wald’s
equation [Wald 1944] and the elementary renewal theorem [Cox 1962] are used. The
objective of this formulation is to compute an upper and a lower bound for the time
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average renewal rate over the expected delay to gain spectrum access for time-critical
data transmissions. Assume the number of finite attempts as mat(t) and it is denoted
as a function of time. The event of a re-try for another available channel can take place
only if the delay constraint is not violated. The maximum tolerable delay in an individual
attempt is limited by a truncating constant dtc. This requirement helps to formulate the
inter-arrivals of the attempts as follows (Equation 4.4).
Xdtcj = dtc ⇐⇒ Xj ≥ dtc (4.4)
Next, the spectrum access rate is computed using the Wald’s equation [Wald 1944]
and the elementary counting process. According to the Wald’s equation [Wald 1944], a
proven result exists as E(
∑M
i=1) = E(X1)E(M) where M is the stopping time and E(X1)
is the time to occur the first interruption event. Then, given that 0 < t < dtc ≤ TAtt,
using the Wald’s equation [Wald 1944] the rate of spectrum access is computed as follows.
mat(t)
t
≤ 1
µdtc
+
(dtc − µdtc)
µdtc ∗ t where dtc = max. tolerable delay (4.5)
when E(Xdtc1 ) = µ
dtc then Equation 4.5 evaluates to
mat(t)
t
≤ 1
µdtc
⇒ (mat(t)
t
)min =
1
Xdtc1
(4.6)
Therefore, Equation 4.6 is the minimum rate for a given value of dtc. It can also
be inferred that for any other value for dtc (which satisfies dtc ≤ Xdtcj ), the rate will be
greater than the minimum (Equation 4.6). Once the re-entrant SU exceeds the delay (i.e.
TAtt = dtc), the spectrum sensing needs to start again to regain the channel access as a new
arrival. After each re-try the total delay gets updated and the condition
∑i−1
j dtr,j < dtc
is verified.
4.4.4 Delay Computations for Always-staying Spectrum Access
Sequence
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, there are two types of spectrum hand-off sequences: always-
staying and always-changing. Continuing with the Equation 4.1, for always-staying se-
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quence, the delay Davg experienced over kintr number of interruptions can be computed
using the busy period (Tbusy) (as the equivalent waiting time) due to the current high
priority occupancy of a channel and the probability of being interrupted (pi) during the
ith event of interruption (Equation 4.7).
Davg.kintr = (
kintr∑
i=1
(E[Tbusy]j)(1− pi) + ¯tsw,i)
kintr−1∏
i=0
pi (4.7)
Applying Little’s formula, E[Tbusy]j for the j
th channel can be computed using the
relationship for a single server that the ratio between the busy period and the sum of
both the idle and busy periods equal to the fraction of the time the server is busy. When
there is a maximum tolerant delay for each retrial after experiencing an interruption, the
Equation 4.7 can be re-written in terms of d′ as shown in Equation 4.8. It is assumed that
the maximum delay is experienced at each retrial over kintr interruptions (i.e. Davg = d
′).
d′ =
(
∑kintr
i=1 (E[Tbusy]j)(1− pj) + ¯tsw,i)
∏kintr−1
i=0 pi
kintr
(4.8)
4.4.5 Delay Computations for Always-changing Spectrum Access
Sequence
Similarly, total delay for always-changing hand-off sequence (Equation 4.9) depends on
the expected waiting time (E[Twait]j) due to the current service time of the high priority
occupancy in the jth channel. According to the Little’s formula, the waiting time is
computed as the mean number of customers in the queue divided by the mean rate of
arrivals. It can be assumed that the channel switching time is very small compared to the
expected waiting time for a SU.
d′ =
(
∑kintr
j=1 (E[Twait]j)(1− pj) + ¯tsw,j)
∏kintr−1
i=0 pi
kintr
(4.9)
E[Twait]j depends on the residual service time for the current high priority occupancy
and the cumulative work-load experienced due to the additional PU arrivals during Twait
in the jth channel.
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As mentioned in the previous section, the re-entrants need to be scheduled along
with the remaining SUs for channel assignment. Once the schedule is prepared, spectrum
allocation can be performed. For example, the Hungarian method [Kuhn 2010] is a well
known method for allocating the channels. In the Hungarian method [Kuhn 2010] can
find the optimal number of assignment of SUs to available primary channels, such that
no two channels get assigned to one user and no two users get the same channel assigned.
The scope of this chapter does not cover the spectrum allocation, but, assumes that for a
TCRM application, channel allocation is reliable and efficient.
4.5 Reliability Analysis
In this section reliability analysis is performed to demonstrate the worst case delay for a
re-entrant SU. It is assumed that the re-entrant SUs have a higher priority than the new
arrival SUs to transmit on a particular channel.
When the spectrum is not available for a re-entrant SU it is a disadvantage as the
opportunity to transmit is lost. This scenario can also be interpreted as degrading the
high priority to a low priority. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that two SU classes
have equal priority. In such a scenario, the re-entrant priority class SU must wait for i)
any high priority SU already in the queue, ii) any low priority SU already in the queue
and iii) its own service time. Similarly, for a low priority SU there are three terms for the
residual time. This can be summarized as follows (see Equation 4.10).
¯Resh = y¯h ¯servh + y¯l ¯servl + ¯servh (4.10)
¯Resl = y¯h ¯servh + y¯l ¯servl + ¯servl (4.11)
where Resh and Resl represent the residual times for high and low priority SU classes,
servh and servl are the SU service times, yh and yl are the occupancy values. Since the
waiting time is w¯ = (R¯es− ¯serv), following results are obtained.
w¯h = w¯l = U¯h ¯Resh + U¯l ¯Resl (4.12)
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where Uh and Ul represents the fraction of time the server is busy with high and low
priority class SUs. This result tells us that irrespective of the context, a fixed amount
of waiting time is experienced by a SU. Considering the transmission during a time-slot,
the value of d′ = w¯h computed using Equation 4.12 is the worst case waiting time for a
re-entrant SU who intended to transmit during this time slot. For any other scenario the
waiting time is less than d′ > w¯h.
4.6 Experimental Analysis - Retrial based Scheduling
This section described the experiments conducted to evaluate the reliability of the pro-
posed model and the effectiveness of scheduling the re-entrant SUs.
4.6.1 Experimental Setup
The re-entrant scheduling was simulated using Matlab Simulink with pre-defined delay
constraints. The queuing model and the spectrum allocation strategies (both always-
staying and always-changing access sequences) were implemented using the SimEvent
library. The service time is an exponential distribution and the arrivals to follow a Poisson
distribution. The maximum occupancy of the queue is varied and delay performance is
compared. The main objective of the experiments were to demonstrate the feasibility of
the proposed model and its effectiveness in adapting to different delay constraints.
Scheduling methods are compared to identify the most suitable scheduling strategy
to queue the re-entrants. As described in Section 4.2.1, Earliest-deadline-first, least laxity
first, maximum urgency first, modified least laxity first scheduling methods are compared.
The two performance measures success ratios and utilization [Salmani et al. 2005][Li and
Ba 2012] of the system are used to compare the performance of each scheduling method.
4.6.2 Results and Discussion
As described in Section 4.4.2, the backlog depends on the new data (Xi(t)) and the
available channel capacity (see Equation 4.1). the effect of fading on the available channel
capacity and the backlog is shown in the following results (see Figure 4.1). This analysis
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consider the variation of fading to be as described in [Goldsmith and Varaiya 1997] when
m = 1 to m = 2. Based on the results, it is evident that when the fading intensity reduces
the available channel capacity increases and results in decreasing the total backlog.
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Figure 4.1: Effect of Fading on the available channel capacity (C) and the backlog (B)
for a fixed new arrival data blocks.
As shown in Figure 4.2, the results of the re-entrant SUs and their retries for a single
vacant channel in terms of delay constraints are described. In this particular simulation
instance there are three retries and the corresponding inter-arrival pattern is shown in
4.2. Next, the variation of the number of re-entrants when there are more than one vacant
channel and the corresponding average waiting time (w¯) is shown in Figure 4.3.
As shown in Figure 4.4, variation of dtr,i is comparatively analysed for always-changing
spectrum sequence based hand-off management. When pi is a large value, dtr,i increases.
When the service time takes an exponential distribution the impact of pi to increase dtr,i
reduces comparatively. However, the variation of dtr,i reduces for 0.1 ≤ pi ≤ 0.5 when the
values of dtr,i increase as the number of re-trials (kAtt) increase up to nine (09).
As shown in Figure 4.5, when pi increases, dtr,i also increase. Compared to a fixed
Tbusy value when it takes an exponential distribution, overall dtr,i is much lower in the
latter case. It can also be inferred that when the number of re-trials are greater than six
(06) the delay reduces for any 0.1 ≤ pi ≤ 0.9.
Comparing the delay variations in always-staying and always-changing spectrum se-
75 (February 20, 2018)
CHAPTER 4: DELAY SENSITIVE RE-ENTRANT DATA TRANSMISSION
Figure 4.2: Simulation Experiment Scenario - The results of the reschedule of the high
priority SUs in the priority based feedback queuing model with a single channel. In this
particular scenario the blocking probability is 0. The maximum occupancy of the queue
is 25.
Figure 4.3: Variation of the total number of re-entrants and the average waiting time (w¯)
for different number of vacant channels.
quences for hand-off management, Following inferences can be made. First, it can be
inferred that pi is a significant factor which contributes to high dtr,i values. Second, for
always-changing spectrum sequences, delay relatively decreases for an exponential service
time distribution. Third, when the number of retrials increase at different thresholds the
EDF based scheduling policy becomes most effective as the delay reduces to zero.
Next, the average delay of the proposed delay sensitive re-trial method are compared.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.4: Delay (dtr,i) analysis of Always-Changing Spectrum Access Sequence with
the number of re-trials (kAtt). Results are shown for different arrival and service time
distributions for different probabilities of being interrupted (pi).
As mentioned before, [Zhang et al. 2013a] consider a maximum of 5 interruptions. In
the experiment a single server pre-emptive priority queue with exponential arrival and
service time is used. The occupants have priority labels assigned. Re-entrant SUs have a
higher priority than the new SU arrivals. The PU has the highest priority. PU arrivals
are random. Maximum tolerable delay of a SU is set as d′ = 30 and the channel switching
time is considered to be very small compared to the delay. The work of [Zhang et al.
2013a] and the proposed method are compared based on the expected delay for each user
in a schedule with priority assigned users. In [Zhang et al. 2013a], the re-entrants are
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.5: Delay (dtr,i) analysis of Always-Staying Spectrum Access Sequence. Results
are shown for different arrival and (Tbusy) distributions for different probabilities of being
interrupted (pi).
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not scheduled based on the delay but by a fixed higher priority than the new SUs in the
queue. In the proposed method all the SUs are scheduled based on a pre-defined criterion
(e.g. deadline, urgency).
Table 4.2: Comparison of Average Delay Variation when (i) the number of new SU arrivals
are fixed (considered 06) and (ii) the number of new SU arrivals vary (each row corresponds
to 6, 8, 10 new SU arrivals)
Re-entrants
Average Delay (s) using the Proposed Method
For Re-
entrant (i)
For New
SUs (i)
For Re-
entrant (ii)
For New
SUs (ii)
3 16.8 58.2 16.8 58.2
5 28.2 70.1 28.2 72.8
7 42.5 84.5 42.5 104.2
Based on the results shown in Table 4.2, when the proposed delay-constrained method
is used the delay experienced by the re-entrants increases when either the number of re-
entrants increased or when the queue becomes larger with new SU arrivals.
Next, the performance of different scheduling methods are empirically assessed to
identify which may offer the lowest possible delay for a re-entrant as well as for a newly
arrived SU. In this experiment the maximum delay and the maximum execution time both
are 100. Execution time are exponentially distributed with an expected value of 15. The
time duration of a task is assigned from the range (maximum execution time, maximum
delay) with a uniform probability distribution. Deadlines are assigned based on the time
duration of that task. The average values of the performance measures are computed after
300 repeated experimental instances. Figure 4.6 shows the performance of the scheduling
methods. Based on the results, MUF is more reliable for re-entrant scheduling as the
success ratio is higher than the other three methods.
79 (February 20, 2018)
CHAPTER 4: DELAY SENSITIVE RE-ENTRANT DATA TRANSMISSION
Figure 4.6: Comparison of Different Re-entrant Scheduling Methods (Earliest-deadline-
first (EDF) [Liebeherr et al. 1996], least laxity first (LLF) [Mok 1983][Oh and Yang 1998],
maximum urgency first (MUF) [Salmani et al. 2005] and modified least laxity first (MLLF)
[Oh and Yang 1998]). Performance measures are success ratio and the utilization [Salmani
et al. 2005][Li and Ba 2012].
4.7 Conclusion
The possible number of attempts within a known delay bound is computed using renewal
counting process. The main assumption is that the maximum tolerable delay is set as twice
the largest possible active spectrum sensing time [Liu et al. 2013], which is considered as
30s [Weichold et al. 2015]. For always-changing spectrum hand-off approach, when the
probability of interruptions is high, the maximum number of retrials are limited to nine
(09) when the maximum tolerable delay is set to 30s provided that the channel switching
time is very small. For the same maximum tolerable delay, the always-staying hand-off
approach can allow up to six (06) re-trials. When compared to the available scheduling
methods, maximum urgency first method is more suitable to schedule the re-entrants to
achieve a greater utilization.
4.8 Epilogue
So far the reliable channel availability is guaranteed by trust based cooperative sensing
and delay bounded persistent channel availability over unreliable sensed spectrum. In the
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next chapter an energy efficient secure and reliable data transmission solution is described.
81 (February 20, 2018)

CHAPTER 5
Energy-efficient Secure Data
Transmission
5.1 Outline of the Chapter
This chapter describes a reliable and secure energy efficient sensor data transmission
solution for TCRMSs. Encrypted data transmission offers greater security compared to
raw data transmission over unreliable wireless channels which are susceptible to malicious
attacks such as sniffing, data modification using relays. Since the cognitive radio sensors
have limited energy reserves, efficient data encryption and route selection are significant
aspects of reliable data transmissions. Security of the encryption depends on the key
size. If the channel conditions do not vary drastically so that the energy required for
spectrum sensing does not increase, then, the power consumption for data encryption will
be proportionate with the key size. However, energy-efficient encryption key length should
be such that it is less susceptible to reproduce (or guessing attacks). The main contribution
of this chapter is an energy-aware physically unclonable function (PUF) based encryption
key size selection criterion based on the residual energy of the CR sensor. Also, under
given conditions, it is analysed how the encryption key size affect the energy consumption
and its impact on the energy efficient route selection methods. Part of the content of this
chapter is published in [Premarathne et al. 2015c].
83
CHAPTER 5: ENERGY-EFFICIENT SECURE DATA TRANSMISSION
Rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 an overview of the research
problem, summary of the limitations of existing work and the specific contributions are
described. The notations used in this chapter are summarized in Section 5.3. Next, in
Section 5.4, the energy-aware physical unclonable function based key size selection model
is described and the experimental results are discussed. Subsequently the residual energy
efficient route selection using different cost metrics is analyzed in Section 5.5 where the
remaining energy content vary due to the selected encryption key size. Finally, the Section
5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Introduction
Energy reserves of CR sensors are limited. Most of the energy is consumed during the
data transmission, encryption and spectrum sensing. Typical capacity of a sensor battery
is about 2.5Ah [Mainwaring et al. 2002]. In CR sensors, apart from spectrum sensing
and encryption, large amount of energy is spent on data transmissions (about 20nAh to
transmit a data packet, about 1.25nAh for radio listening and 8nAh to receive a packet
[Mainwaring et al. 2002]). In TCRMSs, sensed data need to be securely and reliably trans-
mitted over the wireless channels. For example, in pervasive health monitoring systems
and smart grid surveillance applications, 128 bit encryption key generated based on the
Advanced Encryption Standard is used to securely transmit the sensitive data over un-
reliable wireless channels [Pantelopoulos and Bourbakis 2010][Al Ameen et al. 2012]. To
ensure the minimal chances for key reproducibility, the encryption should be sufficiently
robust with appropriate length or key size. On the other hand, the operational life-span
of a sensor (generally measured in hours) will reduce due to rapid energy dissipation if it
continues to encrypt using large keys over many iterations. Specifically, it depends on the
energy consumed per encryption function while transmitting a block of data.
In addition to secure data transmission, the reliability of the relaying path is also a
vital aspect in TCRMSs. If the intermediate sensors do not have sufficient energy reserves
to support the data transmission, the data needs to be re-transmitted over an alternative
path with a higher delay or completely lost. This is a significant failure for a TCRMS.
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Also, due to rapid energy depletion, the mean time to failure will increase [Rausand and
Høyland 2004] causing to degrade the overall dependability of the TCRMSs [Rausand
and Høyland 2004]. Furthermore, the stability of route selection is vital for TCRMSs.
However, due to the heterogeneity of resources in CRNs, for the TCRM applications the
direct adoption of the conventional routing mechanisms may result in poor performance.
According to [Youssef et al. 2014], instability means one or more sensors in the route be-
comes unreachable. Assuming that PU interferences are at a minimum, the instability can
largely be attributed due to the low residual energy of the CR sensor nodes. Therefore, the
energy efficient path selection is another important aspect of reliable data transmissions
in TCRMSs.
Based on the above discussion it is evident that the significance of selecting an en-
cryption key of sufficient length with energy efficiency provide more reliable and secure
data transmissions for TCRMSs. Therefore, to ensure the data is reliably delivered to the
destination energy-efficient encryption and residual energy-aware route selection is vital.
5.2.1 Limitations of Existing Work
In addition to the discussions provided in Section 2.2.4 and Section 2.2.3, additional
information on existing low power encryption solutions and limitations of related work
are discussed.
PUF hardware use simple digital circuits that are easy to fabricate and consume less
power which are suitable for sensors [Herder et al. 2014][Rostami et al. 2014]. PUF based
keys are highly secure. These keys cannot be forged since the responses are generated
with hardware inherent noise characteristics which are unclonable [Ru¨hrmair et al. 2010].
PUF based key generation essentially requires the keys to be generated so as to preserve
the uniqueness among the keys. Although the entire key cannot be cloned by equivalent
hardware circuits, part of the key may be guessed to reveal the possible combination.
Recent work propose physical unclonable functions (PUFs) based secure key generation
and deployment schemes for more reliable data transmissions in wireless sensor networks
based TCRMSs [Selimis et al. 2011][Guajardo et al. 2008]. In Section 2.2.5, examples of
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PUF based mutual authentication solutions for TCRM applications are discussed. Among
different PUF based key generation techniques include arbiter PUF [Devadas et al. 2008],
pattern matching based PUF key deployment using a trusted server [Paral and Devadas
2011], which is more viable for distributed authentication applications.
Pattern Matching Method - Recent work on pattern matching approaches uses
Hamming distance metric to preserve the uniqueness of PUF based cryptographic keys
[Paral and Devadas 2011]. In this approach, the challenges are not disclosed, but the
response bits are kept public [Paral and Devadas 2011]. In PUF-based pattern matching
key generation technique requires multiple streams to select the patterns. Then, the key
is generated as a composition of the selected patterns. These patterns are substrings in
a long stream of (noisy) PUF output bits. These substring indices are considered to be
secret as they directly reveal the secret key. The patterns are stored as public helper
data; other stream bits are not exposed. In order to reconstruct the key, the patterns
are matched along their regenerated streams. The matching procedure is essentially to
measure the Hamming distance [Paral and Devadas 2011]. Among the advantage of the
pattern matching method, the complex error correction logic, such as Bose Chaudhuri
Hocquenghem (BCH) decoders [Bose and Ray-Chaudhuri 1960], are not required. In
addition, this method [Paral and Devadas 2011] is a more efficient and less complex tech-
nique suitable for real-time decision making applications in TCRMSs (e.g. smart grid
surveillance). However, if the key length is not sufficiently long enough, the helper data
can be used to reveal the secret key by hardware attacks as well as statistical predictive
attacks. For example, in replay attacks, the helper data is maliciously used to reconstruct
the original secret PUF key [Rostami et al. 2014]. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that
there is a minimal chance for an attacker to disclose part of the key or the whole key by
ensuring that the key size is sufficiently large.
As discussed in Section 2.2.5, although considerable work exist on PUF based sensors
very few have addressed the energy efficient encryption using PUF applicable to sensors.
To the best of the knowledge there are no existing work to be directly related to this work
on CR sensors with PUF based secure data transmission applications. Therefore, the
proposed solution is compared with the related works of [Meguerdichian and Potkonjak
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Function
N bit 
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PUF-based Key
N bit Encrypted 
Sensor Data
Figure 5.1: Block-Cipher Encryption Function in a Cognitive Radio (CR) Sensor. The
encryption is equivalent to a one-way function with XOR operation over a data block with
n-bit PUF-based secret key to output a ciphertext.
2011b] (M01) and [Wei and Potkonjak 2012] (M02) along with the energy aware routing
protocols specifically recommended for CRNs [Youssef et al. 2014]. The two models M01
and M02 have been discussed in Section 2.2.5 and the energy aware routing protocols will
be described in the next section.
5.2.2 Energy-aware Reliable Route Selection
Next, the energy aware route selection approaches are reviewed. Traditionally, multi-path
routing refers to topology-wise disjoint paths with no common node except the source
and the destination. This concept is useful in CRSNs to find spectrum-wise disjoint
paths, based on a selected metric. These paths may share a common node [Youssef
et al. 2014]. Another requirement for selecting such paths is that different bands/channels
are assigned for the links around the common node [Youssef et al. 2014]. Among the
various possible metrics, delay, route stability, energy efficiency are important concerns
in TCRMSs. Several published work propose to use more than one metric and combine
them as a global routing metric. For example, in [Ma et al. 2008] use routing metrics that
combines channel switching time and multi-flow interference which contributes to the
delay in transmission. As stated in [Herder et al. 2014], in order to achieve a performance
trade-off among different routing metrics, these are combined to form a global metric.
Among the available techniques which helps to combine different metrics include,
1. to form the global utility metric to combine the metrics in the form of weighted
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Table 5.1: Existing Residual Energy based Cost Functions for Transmission Route Selec-
tion.
Cost Function (C(rt)) Description
ei,j In [Ettus 1998] (M1), ei,j is the energy consumed to transmit
one packet between i and j
ei,j
Ei
In [Chang and Tassiulas 2004] (M2), ei,j is the energy con-
sumed to transmit one packet between i and j, Ei is the
residual energy at i
ei,j
Etri
In [Ok et al. 2009] (M3), ei,j is the energy consumed to trans-
mit between i and j through tr, Ei is the residual energy at
i
exp( 1
sin(pi−piE
tr
i
E0
)
) In [Liu et al. 2012] (M4), pi is the period of the sine function,
E0 initial energy of i, E
tr
i current residual energy
exponential sum [Yu and Leitmann 1974].
2. to compute a lexicographic metric [Stadler 1988], in which the atomic routing metrics
are arranged in the order of importance.
3. to compute a weighted min-max metric [Stadler 1988] to achieve certain balance and
fairness among the different atomic metrics.
4. to transform each metric into constraints without introducing weights [Herder et al.
2014].
Existing energy efficient schemes for wireless sensors propose several measures to
compare with the related work. In [Gandham et al. 2003], several comparable metrics
for sensor life-time management are defined including the time for the first sensor to die,
total number of messages received until a fraction of nodes die, energy spent in routing
a message in one round. Additional metrics such as variation of node lifetime, average
energy consumed per packet, time until the last node dies are proposed in [Younis et al.
2002]. However, these comparative measures are not specific for the PUF based solutions
for sensors. Since this chapter focuses on the energy efficiency, the cost metrics based
on the residual energy are considered. Summary of the existing transmission energy cost
functions is shown in Table 5.1.
For a TCRM application, it is important to consider the cost of energy efficiency
in terms of the residual energy to select a reliable path depending on data encryption
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requirements. Since the primary stability concern for reliable data transmission is the
residual energy of the CR sensors, recent review on CRN based route selection mechanisms
have recommended the following protocols [Youssef et al. 2014]. In power aware routing
protocol [Singh et al. 1998], there are five measures selected to ensure reliable energy aware
route in an adhoc network. These five metrics are,(i) energy consumed per packet when
transmitting over one hop, (ii) minimal set of nodes required to complete a reliable route,
(iii) selection of node which have minimum number of packets waiting to be transmitted,
(iv) residual energy of the sensor nodes and (v) total number of nodes (or the path length).
In minimum weight routing protocol [Pyo and Hasegawa 2007], the cost of transmission
between two points is stated in terms of the amount of transmission power computed
using the free space propagation model. This solution consider the distance between the
transmitter and receiver as the contributing factor. In NDM-AODV protocol [Ding and
Liu 2010], the SUs are selected based on the residual energy. The total remaining energy
is calculated for the path and then selects the path with the maximum value. All of
the above recommended energy aware routing protocols for CRNs do not consider the
contribution of encryption on the residual energy depletion.
5.2.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter include the novel approach to select reliable and
secure sensed data transmissions for TCRMSs. Specifically, the first contribution is to
select the length of the encryption key such that minimum bit reproducibility is ensured.
The Lovasz local lemma is used to compute the theoretical bounds on the minimal bit
reproducibility of the PUF encryption key. The second contribution is the investigation of
the impact of encryption key size selection on the energy aware path selection for reliable
data transmission route selection.
To comparatively assess the contributions of this chapter with the related work de-
scribed in Sections 2.2.5 and 2.2.4, four qualitative aspects are defined. The first qualita-
tive aspect is the energy efficiency to support CR communications (EECC). It describes
the extent of a particular solution to support energy efficient CR communications when
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the PU interruptions are at a minimum and a large proportion of the energy is consumed
for data transmission. The possible values are 1 and 0 which indicates the presence and
absence of support for EECC [Lee et al. 2013][Yang et al. 2011]. The second qualitative
measure is the energy efficient secure key generation (EESK) is used to describe the
ability of the solution to determine the PUF key size based on energy consumption of the
CR sensor [Lin et al. 2010][Majzoobi et al. 2012]. The encryption key size is determined
to adapt to the residual energy of the sensor rather than only to satisfy certain security
requirements for data transmissions. The possible values are 1 and 0 which indicates the
presence and absence of support for EESK.
The third aspect is the adaptive encryption key length selection to control minimum
leakages (AKCL) [Herder et al. 2014][Devadas et al. 2008][Maes and Verbauwhede 2010] to
ensure that the primary energy consumptions are dedicated to cognitive communications
and PUF based security computations. The PUF based sensor solutions needs to prevent
the power leakages to enhance its reliability by minimizing the key reproducibility. The
possible values are 1 and 0 which indicates the presence and absence of support for AKCL.
The forth aspect is the security against masquerading attacks (SAMA) [Delvaux and
Verbauwhede 2014] [Meguerdichian and Potkonjak 2011a] [Lee et al. 2013]. It is the ability
of the PUF solution provide sufficient resilience against tampering to launch masquerading
attacks by exploiting the identity and location of a sensor. The possible values are 1 and
0 which indicates the presence and absence of support for SAMA.
Summary of the qualitative comparison is shown in Table 5.2. The subsequent sec-
tions will provide the detailed descriptions of the specific contributions.
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Table 5.2: Qualitative Comparison with the Existing Work.
Existing Solution EECC EESK AKCL SAMA
[Meguerdichian and Potkonjak
2011b] - energy efficient PUF
solution
0 0 0 1
[Wei and Potkonjak 2012] -
lightweight PUF solution for
wireless sensor networks
0 0 0 1
[Yang et al. 2011] - PUF authentica-
tions in delay tolerant wireless sen-
sor networks
0 0 1 1
[Mahapatra et al. 2015] - PUF based
mutual authentication
0 0 1 1
[Lee et al. 2013] - PUF based mutual
authentication
0 0 1 1
[Meguerdichian and Potkonjak
2011b] - low energy mPPUF
0 0 1 1
[Delvaux and Verbauwhede 2014] -
robust PUF based authentication
0 0 1 1
[Singh et al. 1998] - power aware
routing
1 1 0 0
[Pyo and Hasegawa 2007] - mini-
mum weight routing
1 1 0 0
[Ding and Liu 2010] - NDM-AODV
routing
1 1 0 0
Proposed solution 1 1 1 1
5.3 Notations
In this section, the notations used in this chapter are summarized.
Notation Description
kblock block size (bits)
wi a bit pattern of the i
th key
subi sub-string of a bit pattern of the i
th key
P (Evi) probability of an event of reproducing a sub-string bit pattern
p probability value (p ∈ [0, 1])
oc average probability of occurrence
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P (Ev∗i ) probability of non-existence of an event of reproducing a sub-string bit
pattern
kev total number of events
d number of events which are mutually dependent to reproduce a key
Ev set of all possible events
G = (V, Vev) event dependency graph with V nodes and Vev edges⋃
union operator
tHd Hamming distance
Rbit bit reproducibility
THd pre-defined threshold for Hamming distance
Pmiss probability of missing the reproducibility of a pattern
Pmiss−bit probability of missing the reproducibility of a bit
BIN Binomial distribution
n size of data (bits)
ztr(n) energy consumption to transmit an encrypted data block
zpr(n) energy consumption to encrypt a data block using a N bit encryption
key
E1total energy consumed during transmission of one bit
E2total energy consumed during encryption of one bit
Etotal total energy expenditure in a CR sensor
Eresidual,i total residual energy after i rounds of data transmissions
E0 initial residual energy before commencing the i rounds of data transmis-
sions
t1 transmission time
t2 processing time
tch,idle channel idle time
Psuccess probability of most desirable channel transmission
dRate data rate
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N encryption key size
op the number of rounds of encryption per data block
e(n) encryption efficiency
et energy per bit consumed by the transmitter electronics
b the energy dissipated in the transmit amplifier
distij the Euclidean distance between two nodes j and j
apl the path loss factor
kPU,act the total number of instances which the PU was detected as active
ksense to the total number of spectrum sensing instances
¯PintPU average probability of the potential PU interruption in a route rt
PintPU average probability of the potential PU interruption of a node
C(rt) cost in terms of residual energy of the nodes in rt
GM(rt) global route selection metric
∆C cost variation
∆GM variation in the global metric
ω the relative weight set by the SU balancing the two atomic metrics in-
dicating its preference
EECC energy efficiency to support CR communications
EESK energy efficient secure key generation
AKCL adaptive encryption key length selection to control minimum leakages
SAMA security against known masquerading attacks
DN not applicable to address the feature requirement
PS partially satisfying the feature requirement
FS fully satisfying the feature requirement
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5.4 Mutually Dependent Events for Pattern
Reproducibility
In this section, the impact of pattern reproducibility with the PUF encryption key size
is investigated. Novelty of this analysis is the use of Lovazs Local lemma to compute
the mutually dependent event probability for pattern reproducibility [Paral and Devadas
2011].
It is generally assumed that for encrypting the data, the PUF-based secret key gener-
ation [Paral and Devadas 2011] and the raw sensor data are used. The encryption function
is a bit-wise XOR operation over the blocks of size kblock bits (Figure 5.1). This approach
is cryptographically strong, since a one-way compression function that transforms two
fixed-length inputs into a fixed-length output, which makes it difficult, given a particu-
lar output, to compute inputs which compress to that output. The difficulty for pattern
reproducibility of the PUF encryption depends on the size of the key.
5.4.1 Impact of Key Size on Pattern Reproducibility
It is evident, when the key size is large, the security offered is high as the reproducibility of
the key reduces [Delvaux and Verbauwhede 2014][Paral and Devadas 2011]. However,for
secure transmissions of CR sensors, large key sizes demand more processing power from
the sensors in encrypting and decrypting the data since these devices have to perform
spectrum sensing in addition to data transmission. Therefore, it is necessary to find a
feasible pattern size to determine a sufficiently large key size based on the residual energy
of the CR sensors.
Consider a pattern wi which is vulnerable to be reproduced. The ability to predict
the whole pattern wi depends on the ability to guess the bit values based on an observed
sub-string subi. This sub-string is part of the pattern wi. This approach is more realistic
than to assume independent guessing of each bit. The security objective is to reduce the
likelihood of reproducibility of the patterns so as to minimize the misuse of PUF-based
key generation. To address this requirement it is assumed that the events of guessing the
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sub-strings of the pattern is not limited but the dependency of these events are limited.
Such a dependency structure can be well represented by using the Lovasz local lemma
[Moser and Tardos 2010]. In the Lovasz local lemma it states that, when the events are
not independent of each other their dependencies can be restricted.
The probability of an event for reproducing a sub-string bit pattern is defined as
P (Evi) ≤ p (where 0 < p < 1). The probability of non-existence of an event with
a dependency for reproducing a sub-string pattern is defined as P (Ev∗i ) ≥ 0. If it is
assumed that the dependent events occur very rarely, then, these event can be represented
by Poisson trials. This is true only when the encryption key size is sufficiently large. Then,
the value of P (Evi) ≈ e−oc (where oc is the average probability of occurrence). Consider
that the P (Ev∗i ) is the probability of non-existence of an event of reproducing a sub-string
bit pattern. In general, the aim is to prove that, the average event dependency probability
is such that, P (∪dj=1Ev∗j ) = P (Evi|∪dj=1Ev∗j ≤ P (Evi)) where d is the number of such
possible events with a mutual dependency.
In order to prove this result the event dependency graph structure is used [Moser
and Tardos 2010]. Event dependency graph structure is G = (V, Vev) such that (Ev =
Ev1, · · · , Evkev) are the possible events to which V = 1, · · · , kev are the assigned numbers
and (i, j) ∈ Vev (where i and j represents a number assigned to two nodes in the set V ).
An event Evi is mutually independent of the event Evj if (i, j) /∈ Vev.
The symmetric Lovasz local lemma states the following. Consider a set of ’bad’ events
Evi, which result in an undesirable outcome, in a probability space. Also, suppose each
Evi is mutually independent of at least n − (d + 1) other events and P (Evi) ≤ p. If
e.p(d+ 1) ≤ 1 (where e = 2.718), then, the probability P (∪dj=1Ev∗j) ≥ 0 is such that no
bad event occur. In order to understand this result, p and d are evaluated for different
combinations of values (Figure 5.2).
It is evident from the results that when the value of p is less, d increases. When
the likelihood of an event occurrence is less the number of events which has a mutual
dependency to reproduce a key increases. The implication is that the total possible event
space has to be much larger. It is also interesting to see that the node degree increases
when the probability p < 0.3645. So the range for p = [0, 0.3645].
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Figure 5.2: Relationship between p and d.
In [Delvaux and Verbauwhede 2014], for a pattern wi, Hamming distance tHd (where
a threshold value is defined as THd), BIN is a Binomial distribution, and a bit repro-
ducibility Rbit, the probability of missing the reproducibility of the pattern (Pmiss) is
defined as,
Pmiss = 1−
THd∑
tHd=0
fBIN (t;wi, ¯Pmiss−bit) (5.1)
where, Pmiss−bit = 2Rbit(1−Rbit)
fBIN (t;w, p) = (wt)p
t(i− p)w−t
¯Pmiss−bit =
∫ 1
0 Pmiss−bit(Rbit)PDFRbit(Rbit)dRbit
where Pmiss−bit is the probability of missing the reproducibility of a single bit. From
the above formulation (see Equation 5.1, when tHd = THd, the corresponding THd values
can be computed to satisfy the range for p. Different values for wi were used for the
analysis: wi = 8, wi = 16 and wi = 32. Results are shown in Figures 5.3, 5.5 and 5.4
respectively.
The results for wi = 48 and wi = 124 are not shown as the values for p is very small
in the order of 10−12. Based on the results it is evident that when the key size grows the
Pmiss becomes very small as THd can be a larger. However, in CR sensors, due to the
residual energy constraints large keys may not be feasible to use for the data encryption.
In such situations the THd = 3 may take a low value for Pmiss even when Pmiss−bit can
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between THd and Pmiss when wi = 8.
Figure 5.4: Relationship between THd and Pmiss when wi = 16.
vary over a considerably wide range of value.
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Figure 5.5: Relationship between THd and Pmiss when wi = 32.
5.5 Residual Energy Constraint for Route Selection
In this section, the impact of the encryption key size on the residual energy based route
selection is investigated.
5.5.1 Relationship between the Encryption Key and the Residual
Energy
As mentioned in [Mainwaring et al. 2002], a typical sensor node (Mica sensor node) con-
tains a AA battery of 2.5Ah(≈ 9000J). The total residual energy (Eresidual,i) after i rounds
of data transmissions depends on the initial energy content E0 before the i rounds of data
transmissions and the energy expenditure by each sensor Eexp,j , which in turn depends
on zsense: the percentage energy contribution for spectrum sensing, ztr(n) (Equation 5.3),
and zpr(n) (Equation 5.4): the energy consumption in transmitting the encrypted data
(of n bits) and the energy consumed in encrypting the data using N bit key respectively.
Eresidual,i = E0 −
i∑
j=1
Eexp,j (5.2)
Eexp,j = (ztr(n) + zpr(n) + zsense)j
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ztr(n) = E
1
total.Psuccess.n.t1 (5.3)
The transmission energy consumption for one bit is given in [Han et al. 2017] as E1total =
et + b × distaplij , where, et is the energy/bit consumed by the transmitter electronics, b is
the energy dissipated in the transmit amplifier, distij is the Euclidean distance between
two nodes i and j, and apl is the path loss factor. In [Mainwaring et al. 2002], it is stated
that the energy consumption in electric circuit and the power amplifier of the transmitter
circuit are in the order of nJ/bit and pJ/bit/m2 respectively. In [Han et al. 2017], use
et = 50nJ/bit, b = 100pJ/bit/m
2, apl = 2, zsense = 150nJ/bit and the E0 = 20J for a
500byte size packet over a 1kbps data rate for an AWGN channel with Rayleigh fading. t1
is the transmission time and Psuccess ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of the most desirable
transmission channel state without any interruptions offered by the PUs and no collisions
from SUs [Oto and Akan 2012].
zpr(n) = E
2
total.e(n).t2 (5.4)
where E2total denotes the energy consumed during encryption of one bit, t2 is the processing
time to perform encryption e(n) for n bits of data ( in terms of number of computations
Equation 5.5).
Since the proposed scheme is a symmetric encryption technique, it is assumed as
a one-way block cipher computation with the transformation function as XOR (Figure
5.1). Based on the efficiency of a hash function stated in [Bartkewitz 2009], it can be
approximated that the average computational efficiency of the encryption function as
follows.
e(n) =
op.n
kblock
(5.5)
where n is the size of the data chunk (i.e. total number of bits), op is the number of rounds
of encryption per data block and kblock is the number of bits per data block. The value of
op can also be considered as the product of the number of clock cycles [Kim et al. 2006]
for each round and the number of rounds [Paral and Devadas 2011]. The block ciphers
operate on a block of raw data with a fixed size and encrypt it using a symmetric key
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where several modes of operations exist to encrypt large raw data chunks. For example,
in counter mode, a nonce is combined with a counter value and encrypted. The result
is used as encryption pad and XORed with the raw data. The XOR operation can be
calculated in hardware in less than one clock cycle [Kleber et al. 2015]. For simplicity it
is assumed that a XOR operation takes one clock cycle.
Next, consider the variation of the CR sensor energy expenditure for different encryp-
tion key size where the energy spent on transmission and spectrum sensing are considered
to be constant. As shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, when the encryption key size is larger,
the residual energy declines rapidly when compared to a smaller key size.
Figure 5.6: Variation of (Eresidual,i) after i rounds of data transmissions for Different N
values to transmit 1MB data with E2total = 500nJ .
5.5.2 Reliable Route Selection using Residual Energy Metric
In a CRN the path (or the route) through which the data are transmitted to a pre-defined
destination is necessary. Multi-path routing is more focused here as it is more fault tolerant
and thus more reliable. To select an appropriate route, among the several possible metrics
[Herder et al. 2014], the link stability is vital. Shortest path is desirable for TCRMSs as
the transmission delay will be a minimum.
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Figure 5.7: Variation of (Eresidual,i) after i rounds of data transmissions for Different N
values to transmit 1MB data with E2total = 1000nJ .
A more reliable route selection mechanism based on the residual energy and the
likelihood of PU interruption is considered. Suppose the data is transmitted from a source
to a destination, based on the minimum bit reproducibility requirement, the encryption
key size is selected. Then, depending on the size of the data block the energy consumption
is calculated assuming that the transmission power is fixed. Then, the residual energy of
the transmitting node is computed. Once the source updates its residual energy to the FC,
the most reliable path is selected based on the total residual energy of the other sensors
along the shortest possible path.
Example : Consider the scenario in a smart grid surveillance application [Premarathne
et al. 2015c], where, the CR nodes have to find the shortest path to reliable deliver the
sensed data. In a potential shortest path (or a route rt), the stability of the link between
two nodes depend on the (i) residual energy, and the (ii) likelihood of a PU interruption.
It is assumed that the channel conditions do not vary drastically.
As the first metric, to assess the potential of a PU interruption, the PU activity history
from the spectrum sensing data is used. As described in Chapter 01, the trustworthiness of
a SU is vital to get more reliable spectrum sensing local decisions. Therefore, the trusted
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SU data are used to compute the average probability of the potential PU interruption
( ¯PintPU ) in a route rt. For each node, (PintPU )is computed as the ratio between the total
number of instances which the PU was detected as active (kPU,act) to the total number of
spectrum sensing instances (ksense). The link metric is computed as, log( ¯PintPU ) [Herder
et al. 2014]. The second metric is the cost in terms of residual energy of the nodes, denoted
as C(rt). The link metric is the maximum total residual energy of the nodes in the route
rt [Ding and Liu 2010]. In [Ding and Liu 2010], the number of possible routes is limited to
3. Next, to combine the two metrics into a global one, denoted as GM(rt), weighted sum
of exponentials method [Yu and Leitmann 1974] is used (Equation 5.6). This approach is
compared with the linear combination method, where instead of the log value, ¯(PintPU is
used in Equation 5.6.
GM(rt) = ω. ¯log(PintPU ) + (1− ω).C(rt) (5.6)
where ω is a relative weight set by the SU balancing the two atomic metrics indicat-
ing its preference. For example, smaller the value of ω, the SU prefers a greater stable
and robust route less impacted by the PU traffic. When the cost variation is ∆C the
corresponding variation in the global metric is ∆GM . It is evident from Figures 5.8 and
5.9, when the preference for the cost measure is high, the variation of the global metric
is relatively small with a comparatively less increment as the ¯log(PintPU ) value increases.
Thus, it is evident that in order to find the energy efficient route selection, it is a necessary
condition to consider PintPU to not have a drastic variation. In order to practically realize
this requirement, the sufficient condition which needs to be satisfied becomes the accurate
cooperative spectrum sensing ability of the CRN.
Next, existing transmission energy cost functions (shown in Table 5.1) are compared
with the different PUF encryption key sizes provided that the minimum reproducibility
is ensured with atleast wi > 32 (see in Section 5.4.1). It is also assumed taht cooperative
spectrum sensing is accurate and the PintPU has a minimal impact on the reliability of
route selection. Depending on the key size the selection of a route based on different
residual energy dependent metrics (Table 5.1) is analyzed for a pre-defined network of
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Figure 5.8: Linearly combined global metric variation ∆GM corresponding to the ∆C for
different preference values (ω), where 0.1 < ¯log(PintPU ) < 1 taken in ascending order with
the corresponding ω.
Figure 5.9: Global metric variation ∆GM based on weighted sum of exponential method
[Yu and Leitmann 1974], corresponding to the ∆C for different preference values (ω),
where 0.1 < ¯log(PintPU ) < 1 taken in ascending order with the corresponding ω.
10 nodes (similar to the example shown in [Youssef et al. 2014]). As evidenced by the
cost metrics shown in Table 5.4, the rt1 is more reliable based on the available energy to
103 (February 20, 2018)
CHAPTER 5: ENERGY-EFFICIENT SECURE DATA TRANSMISSION
Table 5.4: Residual energy based cost variation based on PUF encryption key size for
routes rt1 and rt2 to transmit a 10kB packet.
Route Key Size
Average value of C(rt)
M1 M2 M3 M4
rt1
1024 3.5J 0.45 0.287 0.167
512 6.78J 0.7 0.56 3.164
256 7.33J 0.7 0.758 0.3648
rt2
1024 2J 0.26 0.3 20.75
512 4.5J 0.48 0.52 0.221
256 6.2J 0.72 0.8 9.9018
transmit a packet of size 10kB.
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5.6 Conclusion
This chapter describes an energy efficient key size selection method by ensuring minimum
reproducibility of the encryption key for CR sensors. Based on the results, to produce a
minimum reproducibility the pattern length should be 32 bits or a larger value. Further-
more, the impact of the encryption key size on the residual energy to select energy efficient
paths for reliable data transmissions is analyzed. Based on the comparative analysis, per-
formance of energy efficient route selection metrics reduces as the encryption consumes
more energy due to large key sizes. Contributions of this chapter provides energy efficient
secure and reliable data transmissions for TCRMSs.
5.7 Epilogue
The solution described in the next chapter helps to achieve reliable user authentications
for data access using a trustworthy cloud based identity management model.
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CHAPTER 6
Reliable Identity Management for Initial
User Authentications
6.1 Outline of the Chapter
In TCRMSs, the sensed data stored in the cloud repositories are accessed by decision mak-
ing agents to perform various decision making tasks. Authentication process is necessary
to validate the claimed identity of a legitimate decision making agent based on a set of
digital identities. Federated identity management is a scalable solution which effectively
manage the digital identities in cloud platforms to facilitate the user authentications over
trust negotiations. Inefficient user authentication mechanisms may require multiple itera-
tions to validate the digital identities which result in significant delays to access the data.
Furthermore, poor identity management with uncooperative and untrustworthy identity
providers may cause prolong trust negotiations. Reliable identity provider identification
is vital to ensure efficient failure-free user authentications in cloud data repositories of
TCRMSs with federated identity management. The main contribution of this chapter in-
cludes the development of novel trust measures to assess the reliability of identity providers
to facilitate efficient federated identity management. Part of the content of this chapter
is published in [Premarathne et al. 2015a].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, the introduction to the
research problem, limitations of the existing solutions and the contributions are described.
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In Section 6.3, the notations used in this chapter are summarized. The significance of re-
liability and the related assumptions of the federated identity management system are
discussed in Section 6.4. Next, in Section 6.5, novel trust metrics are defined. Subse-
quently, the experimental evaluations and the results are described in Sections 6.6 and
6.7. Finally, the chapter concludes with Section 6.8.
6.2 Introduction
Dependability of TCRMSs largely rely on the efficient decision making ability. This ability
is determined based on how efficiently the sensed data can be accessed [Satyanarayanan
et al. 2013]. Hindrance to access the remote monitoring data (e.g. continuous monitoring
voltages at main breakers) may delay to process critical decisions (e.g. to operate a circuit
breaker to stop a cascading failure in the smart grid) which may cause drastic consequences
(e.g. black-outs). Access to data should only be granted to the legitimate users. User
authentication is the main criteria to validate an incoming request initiated by a legitimate
user. Authentication is a process in which a set of digital identities (or credentials) are
validated to verify the claimed identity [Stallings 2006].
Cloud repositories are being used as scalable storage solutions to offer ubiquitous ac-
cess to the sensed data generated from the distributed remote monitoring systems [Cum-
mins 2017][Netbiter 2017]. In distributed computing platforms, between a user and a
service provider, trust negotiations are used to authenticate the claimed identity of that
user based on one or more digital identities [Bertino et al. 2010]. Trust negotiation is
an iterative bilateral process in which an identity provider (e.g. the user or a trusted
third party) discloses and exchanges the digital identities according to a set of pre-defined
rules [Bertino et al. 2004]. The trust negotiations are advantageous as these are scalable
and do not require complex access management policies to authenticate users. During a
trust negotiation process, identity providers (IDP s) verify and provide necessary digital
identities upon request from a service provider. Among the various identity manage-
ment approaches used in cloud platforms, federated identity management is considered
to be more appropriate to efficiently perform trust negotiations [Bertino et al. 2010][Noor
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et al. 2013]. Failure to respond during a trust negotiation process may cause delays or
a complete failure of authentication due to uncooperative identity providers. Thus, the
reliability of a successful trust negotiation process to authenticate a user depends on the
cooperation of identity providers in disclosing the appropriate digital identities.
In cloud computing, trust is used to describe the reliability of an entity (e.g. user,
server, system component) in order to convince a service provider that an entity requesting
to access data is accurately identified or credible [Nagarajan and Varadharajan 2011].
However, specific definition of trust depends on the application [Noor et al. 2013]. In
this chapter, trust denotes the level of reliability of the identity providers expected by
a particular service provider, in terms of their (i) cooperation in releasing the digital
identities (or credentials) without prolonged delays and (ii) the ability to release digital
identities (or credentials) without failure in view of potential security vulnerabilities.
6.2.1 Limitations of Existing Work
A detailed discussion of the trust management models in cloud environments has been
given in [Noor et al. 2013]. Cloud based trust management models can be classified
to four different categories: (i) policy, (ii) recommendations, (iii) reputation and (iv)
prediction based. In policy based trust management a set of policies define a set of
authorization levels with minimum trust thresholds [Noor et al. 2013]. The threshold trust
values can be determined using, (a) monitoring and auditing approaches (e.g. service level
agreement violations), (b) entity credibility approaches (e.g. response time, availability) or
(c) feedback credibility (e.g. trustworthiness, expertise) approaches. Recommendations
based models can use explicit or transitive recommendations [Krautheim et al. 2010].
Reputation based models compute aggregated trust metrics based on the feedback received
by different users based on their previous interactions. Prediction based trust management
models are used when there are no prior information regarding the cloud based interactions
[Habib et al. 2013].
In general, for a particular entity, the history of successful interactions is determined
when a non-conflicting service level policy (e.g. a service level agreement) is satisfied [Al-
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mutairi et al. 2012] without considering any specific contextual requirements. Between two
entities, the interaction history based trust is computed by taking the ratio between the
number of successful interactions and the total number of interactions. It is important to
note that its accuracy depends on the available information about the previous interactions
between two entities. For example, to compute the trustworthiness of a service provider,
the application specific interaction history is used to compute the context-dependent trust
[Ries 2009]. In [Ries 2009], the context is measured in terms of the number of times a
particular application is accessed. However, the intention of accessing the application,
whether it is benign or malign, is not considered when computing this context-dependent
trust.
Reputation based scoring techniques have been proposed to supplement the above
mentioned information inadequacy of interaction history based trust [Jøsang et al. 2007].
Another solution to the information inadequacy is to use subjective logic [Jøsang et al.
2006][Cerutti et al. 2015]. In [Nagarajan and Varadharajan 2011], authors present a
multiple trust attributes based framework and the trust attributes are combined using
subjective logic.
In SelCSP [Ghosh et al. 2015], the service providers are selected using the trustwor-
thiness and the competence. Using the trust and the competence level, a risk measure
for a particular context: qualitatively stated in terms of importance and utility, is com-
puted to rank the service providers. Competence is measured in terms of the conformance
to the service level agreements. It is evaluated as {low (0.1), moderate (< 0.5), high
(≥ 0.5)} with a score. Trust is computed based on the interaction history. When there
are no previous interactions, reputation score is used. Trustworthiness is measured in
terms of {distrusted (0 to 0.5), partially trusted (0.5 to 1.5), trusted (1.5 to 2)} with the
corresponding scores.
In [Chahal and Singh 2016], service providers are selected based on public review
trust, auditor trust and direct trust. The direct trust is computed based on the previous
interaction history. Public review trust is computed based on the attributes: reliability,
performance, security and vulnerability based on the information given by a broker (or a
third party). Auditor trust is computed based on the attributes: performance, availability,
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scalability and accuracy as monitored by an auditor. It is evident that the above mentioned
trust based cloud service provider selection methods use additional trust measures other
than the interaction history based direct trust.
In addition to the above mentioned solutions, computation of the trustworthiness
of identity providers need to consider the security stealth against the existing security
vulnerabilities to declare their responsiveness. This is significant for TCRMSs, where
the contribution of a denial-of-service attack through malicious identity providers do not
disrupt the access to the decision making agents [Li et al. 2012a][Niyato et al. 2013][Pre-
marathne et al. 2015c].
6.2.2 Main Contributions
This chapter describes a set of novel trust attributes to assess the reliability of an identity
provider to ensure a failure-free trust negotiation process to authenticate the users in a
cloud platform. The main contribution of this chapter is a set of novel evidence-based
trust attributes to evaluate the trustworthiness of identity providers. Computation of
the metrics are based on the level of security enforcements, plausible attack resilience
against selected security vulnerabilities and policy based constraints. Suitability of the
proposed metrics is comparatively assessed using an existing cloud-based trust framework
[Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012b] for federated identity management. Results reveal that
the proposed trust computation approach is more suitable to ensure a failure-free trust
negotiation process for user authentications in TCRMSs.
6.3 Notations
This section summarizes the notations used in this chapter.
Notation Description
IDP identity provider
S trust negotiation process
si i
thstep of the trust negotiation process
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ktn number of steps in a trust negotiation process
[DiscAttr] set of all possible identity credentials
[σ]i sub-set of identity credentials
PL(X,Y ) credential disclosure policy between a user X and a service provider Y
Ptr,j probability of trust for carrying out an interaction when there is j
th
security feature installed
kdsv known detectable and preventable security flaws in the absence of a
security feature
kesv expected number of security vulnerabilities which requires atleast one
particular security feature
Ydomain,i number of domain specific policy dependencies in i
th sub-domain
Cdomain,i cost associated based on the complexity of evaluating the i
th domain
specific policy dependent constraints
Ysub−domain,i number of sub-domain specific policy dependencies in ith sub-domain
Csub−domain,i cost associated based on the complexity of evaluating the ith sub-domain
specific policy dependent constraints
S trust negotiation process
si i
th step of the trust negotiation process S
P (si) the likelihood of credential disclosure in each step si
RAj risk attitude for the j
th attack scenario
Natt number of attacks
pc policy constraint
[DiscAttrpc] set of all possible credentials that can be disclosed by a particular policy
pc
[DiscAttr∗pc] set of actually disclosed credentials based on a particular policy pc
dTNfu delay associated in gaining access to a service for a first time user
dTNru delay associated in gaining access to a service for a recently serviced user
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dTNwfu worst-case delay associated in gaining access to a service for a first time
user
dTNwru worst-case delay associated in gaining access to a service for a recently
serviced user
dTNafu average-case delay associated in gaining access to a service for a first
time user
dTNaru average-case delay associated in gaining access to a service for a recently
serviced user
min([dIDPs− ])respective minimum value of the possible set of delays in the correspond-
ing steps (i or j)
6.4 Overview of the Federated Identity Management
Model
In this section the federated identity management model, the related requirements and
the assumptions are described. Based on these requirements the novel trust metrics will
be described in the next section.
In this thesis, it is assumed that the digital identities are managed using a feder-
ated identity management model in a cloud platform. There are four main entities in
this identity management model (Figure 6.1): users, cloud service providers and identity
providers. All these entities are assumed to have mutual trust relationships for reliable
inter-communications. However, in order to reliably disclose the credentials, it is neces-
sary to review the policy constraints [Yu et al. 2003]. In a more generalized scenario, in
a cloud platform it is also possible for the user and a service provider to have their own
policies of credential release and acceptance [Pearson and Casassa-Mont 2011][Ranchal
et al. 2010]. It is assumed that the primary aspect of reliability of the identity providers
is their cooperativeness in disclosing the digital identities of the users to ensure a failure-
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free trust negotiation processes. According to the classification of identity management
models described in [Zwattendorfer et al. 2013], it is possible for all of these entities to
function as a single entity, or different entities, depending on whether they reside in the
same domain or in different domains. In cloud platforms, a domain is a separable network
which can be clearly identified using network identification measures including Internet
protocol address, or virtual private network identities.
IDP Ranking 
based on 
Cooperativeness
IDPs Residing in Different Domains
Cloud based Service 
Provider
Collaborative 
Users
Access 
Requests
Trust Negotiations
Applications
Figure 6.1: Functional Entities in Cloud based Trust Negotiations Model.
According to [Almutairi et al. 2012], the identity providers can collaborate as i) feder-
ated, ii) adhoc or iii) loosely coupled manner. In federated collaboration, the collaborating
clouds are required to be managed through a global policy, which is consistent with their
local policies. In a loosely coupled collaboration, there is no global policy but the local
policies dominate. In the adhoc scenario, initially there are no restrictions to join or leave
for collaboration. In this chapter, it is assumed that the identity providers collaborate
in a loosely coupled manner so that the flexibility to authenticate a user through trust
negotiations can be fully realized in the distributed network of a TCRMS.
According to [Almutairi et al. 2012][Gopalakrishnan 2009][Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012a][Birrell
and Schneider 2013], it is essential to consider the associated policies for credential dis-
closures in the respective domains in which the identity providers reside. These policies
will state certain constraints involved during their communications over the trust negoti-
ations [Baselice et al. 2007][Yu and Winslett 2003][Squicciarini et al. 2012]. For example,
consider a set of credentials that is expected to be disclosed in a specific order. Generally,
it is the underlying policy which will describe the order in which these are disclosed. For
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example, whether the credentials are disclosed one after periodically the other or as tu-
ples etc. Cooperative identity providers are assumed to adhere to these underlying policy
constraints when releasing the credentials during a trust negotiation process.
6.4.1 Impact of Reliability of identity providers on Identity Disclosure
in Federated Identity Management
Consider a trust negotiation process (S) with ktn steps. The credentials disclosed at each
step is a subset of all possible credentials [DiscAttr] that can be disclosed.
(6.1)[DiscAttr] = {[σ1], · · · , [σktn ]}
where, [σ1] ∪ [σ2] ∪ · · · ∪ [σktn ] ⊆ [DiscAttr].
For example, assume for a trust negotiation step si is a tuple given by si =<
PL(X,Y ), SP1, SP2, [σ]i >, where PL(X,Y ) is the credential disclosure policy between
the user (X) and the service provider (Y ) to disclose the credential [σ]i by an identity
provider. The user X makes a data access request to a service provider Y . The user has a
identity disclosure policy of SP1 and the service provider has a corresponding credential
acceptance policy of SP2. To disclose the set of credentials [σ]i, both the SP1 and SP2
should be non-conflicting. Then, the identity provider is able to disclose the credentials
according to PL(X,Y ) between X and Y . The order in which the credentials are agreed
to be disclosed should not be violated by the identity provider, as the order in which these
are accepted by Y is non-conflicting.
Next, possible failures of credential disclosure strategies are analysed. First strategy,
is where the credentials are disclosed all-at-once. Second strategy is the step-by-step
credential disclosure over number of steps. At each step a finite number of credentials
are disclosed. For the first strategy, for the response-to-request tuple (rs,rq), the failure
criterion is stated as follows.
[DiscAttr∗pc] * [DiscAttrpc]⇔ P (si) 6= 1 (6.2)
where ([DiscAttr∗pc] = [σ1] ∪ · · · ∪ [σi]) is the set of actual credentials disclosed based on
the known policy constraint pc and [DiscAttrpc] is the set of all possible credentials that
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can be disclosed based on the same policy constraint. If P (si) 6= 1, then the likelihood
of credential disclosure in each step si is unreliable since the pc is conflicting causing the
trust negotiation process to fail.
For the second type of credential disclosure strategy, at each step si, a set of credentials
([σ∗i ] ∈ [DiscAttrpc]) is disclosed. In order to preserve monotonicity of credential disclosure
based on pc constraints [Yu et al. 2003], it implies that the identity providers should be
cooperative. In order to satisfy the failure criterion, the identity providers should not be
cooperative. If [σi] is the set of credentials that is required to be disclosed during si in the
negotiation process S, then the negotiations will fail if the disclosed credentials are not a
subset of the intended credentials that requires to be disclosed.
[σ∗i ] * [σi]⇔ P (si) 6= 1 (6.3)
It is also possible to analyse the delays associated with the potential failures depending
on the type of user. In general, for a cloud based federated identity management system,
there can be two types of users: (i) first-time user, and (ii) a user who has been provided
with the services recently [Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2007][Gopalakrishnan 2009]. Consider a
scenario which is similar to that described in [Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2007]. An external
user requesting a service for the first time requires to negotiate the necessary identity
attributes from the identity providers. For a user, who has recently requested services, can
easily retrieve the identity attributes from the respective identity providers in federation.
This is possible based on their short-term session tickets and trust tickets. A trust ticket
is issued at each step when the disclosure of the identities are successful where as a
session ticket is issued for each trust negotiation process. If the delays associated in
gaining access to a service for a first time user and a recently serviced user are dTNfu and
dTNru respectively, it is evident from the above discussion that dTNfu > dTNru. These
delays are solely due to the identity credential disclosures during the trust negotiation
process assuming there is no other delays involved. However, if the identity providers
do not cooperate and due to their untrustworthiness fail to disclose the required identity
credentials, the trust negotiation process fail. In such a scenario, it is possible to compute
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the worst-case delays (dTNwfu and dTN
w
ru) as follows.
dTNwfu = 2 ∗ dTNfu +
∑
j
dIDPsj (6.4)
dTNwru = 2 ∗ dTNru +
∑
i
dIDPsi (6.5)
For the average-case delay (dTNafu and dTN
a
ru) for this scenario would then be computed
as follows.
dTNafu = 2 ∗ dTNfu + min([dIDPsj ]) (6.6)
dTNaru = 2 ∗ dTNfu + min([dIDPsi ]) (6.7)
where min([dIDPs− ]) indicate the respective minimum value of the possible set of delays
in the corresponding steps (i or j) in the trust negotiation process. From the above
formulation, it is evident that the largest delay contributing steps are most critical in
determining the worst-case delay.
Based on the above discussion, in order to avoid the above mentioned failure condi-
tions, the identity providers need to adhere to the pc constraints on the disclosure of the
required credentials during the trust negotiation process S. Therefore, it is evident that
in order to successfully complete a trust negotiation, the cooperativeness of the identity
providers is vital.
6.5 Reliable Trust based Identity Provider Selection
In this section, the novel trust metrics are defined to rank the identity providers based on
their reliability. The reliability is expressed collectively by these trust metrics. Then, the
most reliable identity providers are selected when the collective trust value is higher than
a pre-defined threshold.
6.5.1 Metric 01 - Security Threat Vulnerability based Trust
For an identity provider, greater exposure to vulnerabilities is an indication of more failure-
prone unreliable disclosure of credentials. The risk attitudes can qualitatively describe
the attitude of an identity provider to withstand the potential vulnerabilities despite
117 (February 20, 2018)
CHAPTER 6: RELIABLE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT FOR INITIAL USER AUTHENTICATIONS
the installed security enforcements (e.g. firewalls, intrusion detection systems, network
anomalous traffic filters). Different risk attitudes are useful to qualitatively compare the
potential vulnerabilities [Weber 2010]. There are three different risk attitudes: (i) risk-
averse, (ii) risk-loving and (iii) risk-neutral. Risk aversion is the dislike to take risks. Risk
loving is the greater likelihood to take risks. Risk neutral means that there is no specific
preference to like or dislike to take risks. A risk attitude is merely a descriptive label for
the shape of a characteristic function [Weber and Milliman 1997] which describes how a
risk factor behaves in a particular situation. In this chapter, the risk attitudes are used to
describe each of the attack modeling factors [Schechter 2002][Schechter 2005]. In general,
an attack is modeled using for four factors.
1. Risk to execute the attack (e.g. identity of the attacker being revealed),
2. Cost to execute the attack (e.g. time spent),
3. Rank of an adversary is determined based on the skills, tools used and the previous
instances of attacks and
4. Incentives gained by the adversary by launching the attack.
The rank of an adversary and the potential incentives corresponds to risk-loving
attitude. When the rank of the attacker is higher, it increases the likelihood of a successful
attack. The cost and the risk of launching an attack corresponds to risk-averse attitude.
For example, attackers are more likely to use less complex tools such as Extensible Markup
Language - Denial of Service (X-DoS) due to lack of any real defense. On the other hand,
risk loving attitude of the adversary describes the cost or the investment to succeed certain
attacks. However, the time invested essentially increases the chances of an adversary
being caught and identified which indicates that the risk factor is modeled as a risk
averse behaviour. Incentives gained can be identified as a satisfaction (e.g. financial or
psychological) gained by the attacker which takes a risk loving attitude.
For an identity provider, the value of Metric01 is computed as the average of the risk
attitudes (RAj) corresponding to the contributing attack modeling factors (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
for Natt number of attacks (Equation 6.8). Larger value for Metric01 indicates that the
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reliability of the identity provider is less while a lower value corresponds to higher reliability
level.
Metric01 =
∑
Natt
∑
j RAj
Natt
(6.8)
Example: Consider the published data of distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
[in Cyber Systems and of MIT 2000]. The progress of a DDoS attack is a series of steps
with specific malicious objectives (or outcomes). At each step the attacker aims to achieve
a partial result. If all the steps are completed without failure, the attack is declared as
successful which implies that the intended objectives (or incentives) of the attack have
been achieved. Based on the data set 2000-1.0 of a DDOS attack data [in Cyber Systems
and of MIT 2000] shows that the first phase of the attack contributes mostly to succeed the
four subsequent phases (Figure 6.2). It is also evident that by just having resources do not
assure the attack being successful. The perseverance and capabilities of an attacker also
determines the success of an attack. The second 2000-2.0 DDoS attack data set, reveals
that in the fifth phase of the attack, unless the attacker persist over several hours the attack
may not succeed. Therefore, the rank of an adversary (modeled by the attack motive),
the cost (modeled as resource consumption), benefits to the attacker and potential losses
to the victim have to be considered when assessing the security threat vulnerability.
The novelty of trust computation using Metric01 is the application of risk attitudes to
quantify the possible scenarios of loss of reliability of the identity providers corresponding
to a known set of attacks. Each scenario is described using the above mentioned attack
modeling factors. A fuzzy inference system is developed to determine the contribution of
each of these four factors in order to compute the extent of the security threat vulnerability
of an identity provider.
6.5.2 Metric 02 - Attack Resilient Strength based Trust
Although an identity provider is vulnerable, there may be security enforcements (e.g.
firewall, traffic filters, intrusion detection systems) already installed to detect or mitigate
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Figure 6.2: Data Set 1.0.2000 - A five phase DDoS Attack Scenario where the attacker
probes the network, breaks in to a host by exploiting the Solaris sadmind vulnerability,
installs trojan mstream DDoS software, and launches a DDoS attack at an off site server
from the compromised host. Shows the dependency graph and the inferences over four
features: Rank, Cost, Benefits and Loss.
certain types of attacks. In this view, the main limitations of using the Metric01 include
the following.
• Require sufficient data to infer the necessary information on attack modeling factors
and the associated risk types.
• Already implemented attack mitigation or preventive measures are not included in
the trust computation.
To address the above limitations, the second trust measure is defined which uses the
information about the security enforcements to mitigation strategies to assess the security
stealth of an identity provider. For a particular security enforcement mechanism, three
factors are considered to develop the Metric02.
• Number of threats that can be prevented,
• Number of threats that can be detected and
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• Number of threats that cannot be prevented or detected by security enforcement
mechanism.
For example, consider the firewall as the security enforcement. The firewall is expected
to prevent as well as detect a set of known security threats [Wool 2004]. However, the
understanding of the preventable and detectable security threats based on the actual
operations can be less than the expected number. This difference may arise due to the new
types of attacks or configuration errors [Wool 2004]. So if the level of security attributed
to the firewall has to be computed, then, the ratio of known to expected preventable and
detectable threats can be used. Based on these values the level of trust in terms of security
resilience due to the firewall can be computed.
Next, the Metric02 computation for a particular identity provider is described. Prob-
ability of trust (Ptr,j) for carrying out a secure interaction due to the enforcement of a
security feature ′j′. For each security enforcement, it is computed as the ratio between the
number of known preventable, detectable security flaws (kdsv) and the expected number
of security vulnerabilities (kesv).
Metric02 =
∑
j
Ptr,j =
∑
j
(
kdsv
kesv
) (6.9)
Practical limitation in accurately quantifying the kdsv and kesv for already available
security enforcements, is the lack of sufficient information. Information about the vul-
nerabilities are publicly available on several databases such as Open Source Vulnerability
Database (OSVDB), Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure List (CVE) and NIST Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (NVD). In cloud computing platforms, the vendors and de-
velopers do not always provide comprehensive descriptions of all the possible preventable
and detectable vulnerabilities along with the security enforcements. And also, over time
there are new attacks and vulnerabilities discovered which makes it difficult to give an
accurate prediction [Kohlrausch 2009][Grieco et al. 2016]. For example, zero-day attacks
can be launched by exploiting vulnerabilities that has previously not been disclosed [Bilge
and Dumitras 2012]. So unless potential vulnerabilities are known it is difficult to enforce
countermeasures to completely detect and mitigate future attacks. In Section 6.6.2, to
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compare the preventable and detectable set of attacks, the theory of fuzzy rough sets is
used [Jensen and Shen 2002]. Any value less than 1 indicate the minimum security fea-
ture is enforced. When it is required to have more than one security feature, the security
stealth measure may get interpreted as ’low’ on a qualitative scale.
6.5.3 Policy Dependency based Cost Metric (PDCM)
The policy constraints are represented as a cost or an overhead [Almutairi et al. 2012][Gopalakr-
ishnan 2009]. A cost based representation can assess the potential mis-trust contributed by
an identity provider during a trust negotiation process. In this view, a policy dependency
cost metric (PDCM) is defined as follows.
(6.10)PDCM =
∑
i=1
Ydomaini . ∗ Cdomaini + Ysub−domaini . ∗ Csub−domaini
where Ydomaini is the number of domain specific policy dependencies and Cdomaini is
the associated cost estimated based on the level of complexity of evaluation. Similarly
the number of sub-domains and the associated costs are denoted as Ysub−domaini and
Csub−domaini . A larger value for PDCM indicates higher dependencies which lower the
reliability for cooperation due to the dependency constraints.
In order to calculate the values for domain specific policy dependencies and the as-
sociated costs, service level agreement violations and the associated costs are used [Ullah
et al. 2016]. Generally, the relationship between a cloud provider and a customer is gov-
erned with a Service Level Agreement (SLA). The SLA is established to define the level
of the service and the associated costs. The failure of providing a service is called a SLA
violation. To identify SLA violations it is necessary to have specific details of quality-of-
service parameters and service level objectives (e.g. availability, throughput and response
time). According to the recent publication [Ullah et al. 2016], provide the SLA violations
and the corresponding costs. These published data are used for the PDCM calculation
(Table 6.3). According to the available data, there are no sub-domains involved in the
SLA cost computation data.
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Table 6.2: PDCM Computation using Service Level Agree-
ment Violations (no. of violations) and Associated Costs
(monetary costs in terms of $) [Ullah et al. 2016].)
Identity
Provider
Ydomain Cdomain PDCM
IDP01 3184 97.21 3.091× 105
IDP02 980 106.55 1.044× 105
IDP03 1916 98.75 1.892× 105
IDP04 464228 98.9 459.1× 105
IDP05 47878 130.31 62.4× 105
IDP06 53391 101.63 54.3× 105
IDP07 59599 89.06 53.1× 105
IDP08 327 95.29 0.312× 105
IDP09 344 94.06 0.323× 105
IDP10 36436 101.64 37.033× 105
6.5.4 Trust based Ranking
The above described trust metrics (Metric01, Metric02 and PDCM) are used to estimate
the reliability of the identity providers. The ranking process is essentially a two stage
decision process. In the first stage the PDCM values are computed. Then, overall trust
is computed using Metric01 and Metric02. During the first decision making process,
the identity providers with the lowest values for PDCM are selected. During the second
decision making process, from those selected identity providers, the ones with the largest
overall trust values are selected to participate for the trust negotiations. Ranking of
identity providers is demonstrated in the example described in Section 6.6.3.
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6.6 Experiments and Results
In this section publicly available attack data and vulnerabilities are used to for the com-
putations of the two trust metrics Metric01 and Metric02. Then, an example scenario is
described to demonstrate the identity provider selection method based on PDCM .
6.6.1 Computation of Metric01
In order to compute the Metric01, attack history data sets are used [in Cyber Systems and
of MIT 2000]. Specifically, the five (05) phase DDoS attack data sets (2000-1.0 (DS01) and
2000-2.0 (DS02)) of 2000 and two attack data sets of ”mailbomb” (attack id - 42.155148)
and ”fdformat” (attack id - 52.16243504) of 1999 (DS03 and DS04 respectively) are used.
For each attack scenario, the corresponding characteristic functions for the contributing
attack modeling factors are derived. For example, according to the 1998 dataset the
cost in terms of the time taken to launch the attack takes a numerical value. The risk,
skill and the incentives take a qualitative value {high,moderate, low}. Then, the RAj
values are computed for each attack scenario. Fuzzy variables are able to model linguistic
declarations such as low, medium, high, etc [Dondo 2008]. A fuzzy number is assigned
with a range of possible values to represent each linguistic descriptors. To make inferences
using these fuzzy numbers, if-then rules are specifically defined. To obtain the result of
the inference, defuzzification process is applied to get the crisp values. In [Dondo 2008], a
vulnerability is represented using a fuzzy number. To compute the Metric01, the attack
modeling factors are assigned with the appropriate fuzzy numbers. Membership functions
are selected and defined for each attribute depending on the range it needs to represent.
The convention is to select a simple (i.e. less computationally complex) membership
function to represent an attribute [Dondo 2008]. Examples of such simple membership
functions include triangular, trapezoidal. In addition, the membership function should be
able to adequately describe the range of possible values for each attribute.
By definition, the risk attitude is computed as the ratio between the first and the
second derivative of the characteristic functional form, also known as the utility function
[Arrow 1964][Millner and Pratt 1991][Weber and Milliman 1997]. On a normalized scale,
124 (February 20, 2018)
SECTION 6.6: EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
the utility of a risk attitude takes a maximum value of 1 and a minimum of 0. Generally, the
risk averse attitude is described using concave utility functions [Keeney 1972]. Examples
include the logarithmic and power functions. The risk loving attitude is described using
convex utility functions. Examples include exponential and negative power functions.
However, if there are not enough numerical data to support the attack modeling factors
to characterize the utility functions, then, more flexible methods which can account for
descriptive values (e.g. cost of the attack is high, low or moderate) need to be considered.
Table 6.3: Analysis of the Contributions of Each Attack Mod-
eling Factor (Skill of the attacker, Cost to launch the attack
(in terms of time) and the Incentives gained by the attacker.)
1998 Data Set [in Cyber Systems and of MIT 2000]
Attack name Skill Cost Incentives
back low high high
dict high low high
eject low high high
ffb high high high
format low moderate high
ftp-write moderate low high
guest high high high
imap moderate low high
ipsweep low high high
land high high high
loadmodule high high high
multihop high moderate high
neptune high high high
nmap low moderate high
perlmagic high high high
phf low high high
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pod low high high
portsweep high high high
rootkit high high high
satan high high high
smurf high high high
spy high high high
syslog high high high
teardrop high moderate high
warez high high high
warezclient moderate low high
warezmaster high high high
2000 Data Sets [in Cyber Systems and of MIT 2000]
DDoS 2.0.2 low high low
DDoS 1.0 low high low
1999 Stealth Attack Data Set [in Cyber Systems and of MIT 2000]
eject high moderate high
sqlattack high moderate high
loadmodule high moderate high
ps high moderate high
ffb high low high
perl high low high
format high low high
Among the four attack modeling factors, the extent of the attackers’ identity being revealed
does not have sufficient data to be evaluated. Therefore, in this experiment only three
attack modeling factors are considered. For example, 1998 data set [in Cyber Systems
and of MIT 2000], the cost of launching the attacks in terms of the normalized time never
falls below 0.33 or beyond 1. Low and moderate costs are differentiated around 0.43.
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Between the high costs are distinguished from the moderate costs above 0.52. Attacker
skill is qualitatively evaluated as follows: 0.7 and above as high, 0.5 and below 0.7 as
moderate, between 0.3 and 0.5 as low [Kotenko and Doynikova 2014]. According to [Pardue
et al. 2010], based on the simulation experiments, it is reasonable to value the attack
incentives as follows: above 0.3 up to 1 as ”High”, between 0.2 to 0.3 as moderate and
lowest possible being 0. Table 6.3 shows the summary of the analysis for an attack
dataset. The output is the risk attitude (RAj). As shown in Figure 6.3, low and moderate
risk attitudes are represented using the psigmf function already defined in Matlab fuzzy
inference toolbox (the shape represent the risk averse behaviour in separate interval) while
the high RAj value is represented using sigmf function defined in Matlab fuzzy inference
toolbox (to describe a risk loving behaviour). Corresponding fuzzy inference output using
the trapezoidal fuzzy membership functions is shown in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.3: Memebership Functions to Represent RA for each attack modeling metric.
Figure 6.4: RA output for attacker skill factor and cost factor.
To demonstrate how the Metric01 is calculated, consider the following example sce-
nario. Assume there are five identity providers. These identity providers are assumed to
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be vulnerable to a set of security threats (from Table 6.3) as shown below. The corre-
sponding RAj values for each (j
th) threat is computed using the fuzzy inference system.
Then, using the Equation 6.8, the value of Metric01 is calculated.
Table 6.4: Computation of Metric01 for an example scenario
of five (05) identity providers who are vulnerable to different
sets of threats.
Identity
Provider
Threats Metric01
IDP01 [eject, dict, ffb, DDoS 1.0] 0.625
IDP02 [perl, dict, ffb, warez, ps] 0.537
IDP03 [ps, dict, format, sqlattack, DDoS
1.0]
0.59
IDP04 [eject, ps, ffb, DDoS 1.0, DDoS2.0.2] 0.52
IDP05 [DDoS1.0, loadmodule, dict,
sqlattck, ps, warez]
0.566
6.6.2 Metric02 Computation
To compute Metric02, a set of attacks with the possible detection and prevention se-
curity enforcements (Table 6.5) are considered. It is assumed that the impact (or the
consequences) are equal for each of the attacks shown in Table 6.5. Then, possible set of
vulnerabilities were extracted from Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) repos-
itory [CVE 2014]. These are relatively newly discovered vulnerabilities and the possible
remedial/preventive solutions to reduce the impact or to mitigate them are use in this
analyses. Next, these incidental vulnerabilities are used along with their remedial mea-
sures to derive the relative attribute values to compute the Metric02 (Table 6.6). As the
example scenario a set of identity providers are assumed to have a combination of these
enforcements as shown in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.5: Security Enforcements for Detection and Preven-
tion of a Set of Known Attacks
No. Attack Detection Measures Prevention Measures Range of
Affiliation
Values
(minimum -
maximum)
A1. Fraudulent
resource con-
sumption at-
tacks [Idziorek
et al. 2013]
1.a) Application level log
analyzer
1.b) Black listing first time
offenders. Impose back-off
time-outs to anomalously
behaving clients.
(0 - 0.9)
A2. Hypervisor
attacks [Gr-
uschka and
Jensen 2010]
2.a) Code integrity mea-
sures (e.g. Trustvisor).
2.b.01) Defenses to pro-
tect hypervisor code (e.g.
HyperGuard), 2.b.02) In-
put/Output device secu-
rity (e.g. Bitvisor),2.b.03)
functionality shift to user
level (e.g. NOVA).
(0 - 0.9)
A3. XML based
denial of ser-
vice attacks
[Chonka et al.
2011]
3.a) Packet level compar-
ing and analyzing against
known attack messages.
3.b) Service oriented trace
back architecture (mes-
sage analysis - SOAP mes-
sage header information
[Chonka et al. 2011]).
(0 - 0.9)
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A4. Timing at-
tack [Cleem-
put et al.
2012][Lom-
bardi and
Di Pietro
2011]
4.a) Cache based load mea-
surements
4.b) Compiler based miti-
gation strategies.
(0 - 0.9)
A5. Cache-based
Side chan-
nel attacks
[Godfrey and
Zulkernine
2013][Zhang
et al. 2011]
5.a) Cache usage measure-
ments in selected cache re-
gions.
Blinding techniques such
as 5.b.01) cache wiping,
5.b.02) random delay inser-
tions.
(0 - 0.9)
A6. Load measure-
ments based
attacks [Ris-
tenpart et al.
2009][Sun-
dareswaran
and Squccia-
rini 2013][Sun
et al. 2011]
6.a.01) Event-based pat-
terns. 6.a.02) CPU cache
usage measurements,
6.a.03) computational
load based co-residence
detection, 6.a.04) traffic
rates measurements to
co-resident servers
6.b) Multi-lateral security
negotiations based load
balancing.
(0 - 0.9)
A7. Unauthorized
data modifica-
tions
7.a. Firewall log analyses. 7.b. Robust access control
policies.
(0 - 0.9)
• V1 is CVE-2014-0654 Cisco Context Directory Agent Replayed RADIUS Accounting
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Message Vulnerability.
• V2 is CVE-2013-6986 Unspecified vulnerability in Oracle Solaris 10 and 11.1 allows
local users to affect availability via vectors related to Name Service Cache Daemon
(NSCD).
• V3 is CVE-2013-5724 Phpbb3 before 3.0.11-4 for Debian GNU/Linux uses world-
writable permissions for cache files, which allows local users to modify the file con-
tents via standard file system write operations. This problem has been fixed in
version 3.0.11-4 and expects the users to upgrade earlier versions.
• V4 is CVE-2014-0791 possible patch is available. Integer overflow in the licensereadscopelist
function in libfreerdp/core/license.cin FreeRDP through 1.0.2 allows remote RDP
servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspeci-
fied other impact via a large ScopeCount value in a Scope List in a Server License
Request packet.
• V5 is CVE-2014-0617 Juniper Junos 10.4S before 10.4S15, 10.4R before 10.4R16,
11.4 before 11.4R9, and 12.1R before 12.1R7 on SRX Series service gateways allows
remote attackers to cause a denial of service (flowd crash) via a crafted IP packet.
Solution is to upgrade to version 10.4S15, 10.4R16, 11.4R9, 12.1R7, 12.1X44, or
higher, to address this vulnerability.
Based on the information given in Table 6.6, each identity provider are susceptible to
different vulnerabilities in spite of having certain security features installed. Next, using
the Equation 6.9, the corresponding Metric02 values are calculated (see Table 6.7). Then,
the overall trust is computed as the sum of the two corresponding trust values.
Table 6.7: Computation of Metric02 for an example scenario
of five (05) identity providers who are vulnerable to different
sets of threats and vulnerabilities shown Table 6.6.
Identity
Provider
kdsv kesv Metric02
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IDP01 7 12 0.583
IDP02 5 12 0.417
IDP03 9 12 0.75
IDP04 4 12 0.33
IDP05 9 12 0.75
6.6.3 Example
Consider a disaster and crisis management support application, where remote monitoring
data from multiple sources (e.g. real-time satellite images, maps) are necessary to access
in order to make necessary analyses and critical decisions [Voigt et al. 2007][Roche et al.
2013]. The data is stored in cloud repositories [Klauck et al. 2011][Puthal et al. 2016] and
the users are authenticated using the digital identities provided by the identity providers
in order to allow access to the data. Consider a scenario where five (05) identity providers
are involved in facilitating user authentications.
In order to explain the trust negotiations and identity management, consider a disaster
response team leader (User01) needs to access A2 application to allocate service requests
to restore power at a known location. The authorization requires a set of two (02) identity
attributes: I1 and I2. Chief electrical engineer (User02), requires to access collaborating
management application (A1) to provision resources to the known location in order to
restore the power. The authentication of the chief engineer (or User02) requires two
identity attributes I3 and I4. To compute the PDCM , values in Table 6.3 are used.
Then, to compute Metric02, the attacks and vulnerabilities described in Section 6.6.2
are randomly assigned to each identity provider. Each identity provider is assumed to
be susceptible to atleast one vulnerability and one known attack. The security feature
sets (see Table 6.6 in Section 6.6.2) are also randomly assigned such that atleast two sets
of features are allocated for each identity provider. The value of Metric01 is computed
for each identity provider as shown in Table 6.4. Next, the trust computation methods
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Table 6.6: Relative Stealth (Metric02) Estimation Using Fuzzy Equivalence Classes -
firewall (F), application log analyses (ALA), antivirus (AV), cache usage measurements
(CUM), packet filtering (PF), packet level analyses (PLA), message analysis (MA), event
detection at application level (ED-AL), load measurements (LM), automated patch update
mechanism (APUM)
Identity
Provider
Feature Specifications
Attributes
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5
IDP01 [F, ALA, AV,
APUM]
0.4 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
IDP02 [F, CUM, AV, MA] 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0 0 0 0
IDP03 [PLA, F, AV,
APUM]
0.3 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
IDP04 [ED-AL, F, AV] 0.7 0.35 0 0 0 0.35 0.35 0 0 0 0 0
IDP05 [LM, F, AV, APUM] 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
IDP06 [F, CUM, PF, AV,
PLA]
0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.4 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0
IDP07 [ED-AL, CUM, F,
MA]
0.5 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0
IDP08 [F, PF, AV, APUM,
PLA]
0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
IDP09 [LM, CUM, F, AV] 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0
IDP10 [LM, F, AV, APUM,
MA]
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
described in [Chahal and Singh 2016] and [Ghosh et al. 2015] are compared with the
proposed method. To compare with the trust computation described in [Chahal and
Singh 2016], since there are no third parties involved, the contribution of the public
review trust and auditor trust are considered to be high. This is mainly because the
attacks, vulnerabilities and the security features contribute to evidence-based trust (as
computed by the Metric01 and Metric02).
According to the proposed trust based ranking ID03, IDP05, and IDP01 are the
most trustworthy. Based on the PDCM value, the identity providers IDP04 and IDP05
are the most unreliable. The significance of this result for the TCRM application is mainly
for User02, it can be assured that the trustworthy IDP02 will provide the necessary
identities (I3 and I4) to access the application A1 although the cloud service provider
initially assumes IDP02 to be less reliable. Since the trust computations are based on a
pre-defined criteria, despite the initial assumptions, most reliable IDP s can be selected.
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Idp1
Idp5
Idp4
Idp3
Idp2
C, T
C, T
C, T
nC, nT
nC, nT
nC, nT = non-cooperative and not-trusted by the CSP
C, T = cooperative and trusted by the CSP
(Ix, Ay) = identity 'Ix' is required to access application 'Ay'
(I1,A2),
(I2,A2)
(I1,A2),
(I4,A1)
(I3,A1),
(I4,A1)
(I5,A3),
(I6,A3)
(I3,A1),
(I2,A2)
Figure 6.5: Time Critical Disaster Response Management Application - Multiple data
access and analysis applications need to be accessed. The necessary digital identities that
can be disclosed by each IDP are indicated. At the cloud service provider, the initial
guess about the reliability of each IDP is shown.
Next, the identity provider selection using SelCSP [Ghosh et al. 2015] and the indirect
trust measurement in [Chahal and Singh 2016] are compared with the proposed model.
According the SelCSP [Ghosh et al. 2015], IDP01 and IDP03 have the lowest risk,
thus, more reliable. According to [Chahal and Singh 2016], only IDP01 is trustworthy.
Although the comparison reveal the identity providers can be selected using the three
methods, the main limitation is the dependency of the indirect trust measures when using
the methods described in [Ghosh et al. 2015] and [Chahal and Singh 2016]. The proposed
trust computation use the evidence-based data to compute the trust associated with the
identity providers.
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Table 6.8: Comparison of the Selection of IDP s using Different Criteria. Overall
trust qualitative scale very high, high, moderate, low and very low get mapped on to
[0,2]={2.0,1.5,1.0,0.5,0}
Identity
Provider
Metric01 Metric02 PDCM Overall
Trust
SelCSP
[Ghosh
et al.
2015]
[Chahal
and Singh
2016]
IDP01 0.583 0.625 3.091 ×
105
1.208 2.137 Very high
IDP02 0.417 0.537 1.044 ×
105
0.954 5.7 Low
IDP03 0.75 0.59 1.892 ×
105
1.105 1.34 Moderate
IDP04 0.333 0.52 459.1 ×
105
0.853 6.325 Moderate
IDP05 0.75 0.566 62.4 ×
105
1.316 4.113 Low
6.7 Comparative Evaluation
In this section, the proposed metrics (Metric01, Metric02 and PDCM) are compared
using several existing identity management solutions by using a cloud based trust frame-
work [Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012b] for federated identity management. This cloud based
trust framework compares a federated identity management model based on the pre and
post federation phases.
The proposed metrics can be interpreted using cloud based trust framework as fol-
lows. Metric01 corresponds to integrity and availability aspects of pre-federation phase.
Metric01 is useful to measure the extent of preserving the integrity aspect attempts to
safeguard against improper information modification or destruction and also to ensure
availability guarantees against malicious attacks (e.g. denial-of-service). Metric02 cor-
responds to availability. Metric01 is useful to measure the extent to ensure availability
guarantees against malicious intrusions based on the history of attacks and impacts as-
sessed based on the existing preventive and defensive measures in practiced by a specific
identity provider. PDCM corresponds to operational interoperability aspect. PDCM
is useful to reveal the policy based constraints between an identity provider and a cloud
service provider to carryout a trust negotiation based authentication of a user on behalf
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of a SP being serviced by the cloud service provider.
Next, the proposed metrics are compared with the existing cloud based federated iden-
tity management solutions: SPICE [Chow et al. 2012], hierarchical cryptography based
solution described in [Yan et al. 2009] and ICEMAN [Dreo et al. 2013]. Each of these so-
lutions are interpreted using the TF [Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012a]. Each existing solution
is interpreted based on TF [Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012a] and compared with the proposed
trust based identity provider selection based federated identity management.
In SPICE [Chow et al. 2012], privacy-oriented group signatures with randomization
are used to establish authentications with subsequent validations of the attributes used in
authentications. This solution corresponds to pre-federation and post-federation authen-
tication and accountability aspects.
In [Yan et al. 2009], federated identity management is used with hierarchical identity
based cryptography such that each user and each server will have its own unique identity,
and the identity is allocated by the system hierarchically for efficient key distribution and
mutual authentications. This solution corresponds to pre-federation authentication and
accountability aspects.
ICEMAN [Dreo et al. 2013] uses existing cloud APIs and Federated Identity Man-
agement protocols, including the Cloud Security Alliances guidance for Identity & Access
Management, Identity Management as as Service (IdMaaS) and the Liberty Identity Fed-
eration Framework maintained by the Kantara Initiative. This solution corresponds to
both pre-federation and post-federation privacy aspects.
In summary, results (see Table 6.9) reveal that the expressiveness and the suitability
of proposed metrics in the proposed trust based identity provider selection method corre-
sponds to the pre-federation phase of federated identity management. Comparison with
the existing models based on cloud based trust model [Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012b] reveals
that the proposed metrics are more expressive in all three dimensions of the pre-federation
phase while the other solutions are limited to a security and privacy risk dimension.
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Table 6.9: Summary of the Analysis of the Expressiveness of the Proposed Three Metrics
(Matric01, Metric02 and PDCM) using Existing Cloud based Trust based Framework
(TF) [Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012b] for Cloud based Federated Identity Management
Model Proposed Metrics TF [Arias-Cabarcos et al.
2012b]
Proposed Model
Metric01 Pre-federation phase → Se-
curity and Privacy Risks →
Integrity and Availability as-
pects.
Metric02
Pre-federation phase:→ Secu-
rity and Privacy Risks →
Availability aspect.
Pre-federation phase:→
Knowledge Risks → Direct
knowledge aspect.
PDCM Pre-federation phase:→ Inter-
operability Risks → Opera-
tional aspect.
SPICE [Chow et al. 2012] -
Pre-federation phase → Secu-
rity and Privacy Risks → Au-
thentication and Accountabil-
ity aspects.
Post-federation phase → Se-
curity and Privacy Risks →
Authentication and Account-
ability aspects.
Hierarchical identity based cryp-
tography for mutual authentica-
tions [Yan et al. 2009]
- Pre-federation phase → Secu-
rity and Privacy Risks → Au-
thentication and Accountabil-
ity aspects.
ICEMAN [Dreo et al. 2013] -
Pre-federation phase → Secu-
rity and Privacy Risks → Pri-
vacy aspect.
Post-federation phase → Se-
curity and Privacy Risks →
Privacy aspect.
6.8 Conclusion
The contributions of this chapter provides a set of novel metrics to asses the reliability of
an identity provider to participate in the authentication processes of TCRM applications.
The metrics were evaluated by mainly using the publicly available data on vulnerabilities
and attack scenarios. Based on the analyses using the cloud based trust model [Arias-
137 (February 20, 2018)
CHAPTER 6: RELIABLE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT FOR INITIAL USER AUTHENTICATIONS
Cabarcos et al. 2012b], the proposed trust metrics and the policy based cost metric have
demonstrated its apt use compared to other such well known existing cloud based iden-
tity management solutions. Based on the findings of this chapter it is evident that the
contributions make the cloud based data access in TCRMSs more reliable when there are
effective methods to select more reliable identity providers.
6.9 Epilogue
This chapter describes a robust trust based framework for reliable user authentications
using cloud based federated identity management. The authenticated user should then be
authorized for the data access requests based on the critical situations in TCRMSs.
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Context-Aware Content-Sensitive Data
Access Control
7.1 Outline of the Chapter
In TCRMSs users access the remote monitoring data from different locations depending
on the critical circumstances. These access requests of the remotely logged-in users need
to be authorized while ensuring minimum possible permission misuses and potential data
disclosure risks. The main contribution of this chapter is a novel location dependent
disclosure risk measure, which helps to enforce the situation-dependent access control
rules by risk-based validations.
Rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 provides an overview of the
research problem and summarizes the contributions. The notations used in this chapter
are summarized in Section 7.3. Next, Section 7.4 describes the novel location dependent
disclosure risk metric. Subsequently, the Sections 7.6 and 7.5 describe the use of the
proposed disclosure risk measure to specify the location-dependent access control rules
and break-the-glass rules. Next, Sections 7.7 and 7.8 describe the comparative results.
Finally, Section 7.9 concludes this chapter.
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7.2 Introduction
In most TCRM applications, during an emergency situation in order to expedite the
responses, exemptions are granted to access the remote monitoring data [Crawford and
Finn 2015][Xu et al. 2014][Samuel et al. 2014]. It is not an uncommon practice during
certain critical emergency situations, to permit otherwise denied data access rights in
order to respond faster [Green et al. 2016]. In such situations, it is reasonable to assume
that the potential risks of data leakages generated by these violations are lower than the
damage caused by a delayed emergency response [Townsend et al. 2006][Scalavino et al.
2010][Carminati et al. 2013]. However, when situation-dependent access requirements are
supported by an access control model, the potential disclosure risks and malicious data
misuses need to be minimized [Rahimi et al. 2014] [Jaramillo et al. 2013]. It is also
important to note that in general, any permission override is inherently associated with
risks (including data disclosure risks) [Fugini et al. 2016][Ayed et al. 2014][Dos Santos
et al. 2014][Ray and Ray 2014].
During critical situations (e.g. public health emergencies), additional context descrip-
tive information may be useful to enforce situation dependent access rights. Context is
defined as any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity [Dey
2001]. Examples include time, location, device of access, type of situation (i.e. whether
it is an emergency). From the recently reported incidents of remote attacks launched to
misuses patient health data [Stevens 2012], it is evident that location can be manipulated
to launch confidentiality and privacy breeches. Thus, the location from where a data ac-
cess is originated becomes an important aspect for a secure repository to consider as an
additional contextual information for access control.
The amount of information allowed to access by a user may be susceptible to high
disclosure risks due to the location of access over unreliable channels coupled with the
associated situation-dependent permission overrides [Freudiger et al. 2011][Liu 2007]. The
risk of disclosure of information is the likelihood of violating the privacy of data by a
malicious entity within the network or from outside, which can be used to launch attacks
to cause undesirable outcomes. For example, in smart grid, the remote monitoring data
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were misused to launch malicious attacks by remotely logging into the control system
to initiate cascading failures in generators [Wei et al. 2011][Chen et al. 2011]. Although
obfuscation techniques are desirable to reduce the disclosure risks, the main disadvantage
is a significant loss of information content [Bezzi 2010]. Therefore, in TCRMSs, it is
necessary to minimize the potential disclosure risks on the amount of remote monitoring
data accessed by the users.
Depending on the context (or the situation), the access control model can alter the
permissions of a user depending on the situational requirements. This can be done by
enforcing break-the-glass rules [Carminati et al. 2011][Ferreira et al. 2009][Brucker et al.
2010], using permission overrides [Petritsch 2014], enforcing emergency policies [Carminati
et al. 2011], implementing adaptive user-role assignment schemes [Ferreira et al. 2009]. A
break-the-glass policy can be used in order to violate certain non-permissible authorization
assignments or override the existing permissions of a role in a controlled manner. When
changing the assigned permissions for each pre-defined role of particular user, it is neces-
sary to ensure that the potential disclosure risks are minimized based on the information
content they may be authorized to access during different situations. For example, when
there are potential disclosure risks involved in accessing data, it is necessary to enforce
the break-the-glass rules to update the permissions of a role depending on the context.
Based on the above discussion, it is necessary to develop new measures which are
sufficiently expressive enough to minimize the disclosure risks while enforcing context-
dependent access rules.
7.2.1 Limitations of Existing Work
Disclosure risk measures are useful to assess the risks involved in accessing privacy sensitive
data. In TCRMSs, depending on the application, different types of data with varying
degrees of privacy sensitivity are generated. For example, in remote patient monitoring
applications, data related to the health conditions of a patient are recorded and stored in
the cloud repositories [Botia et al. 2012][Liang et al. 2012][Thilakanathan et al. 2014]. In
the smart grid, various status updates and related electrical measurements are monitored
141 (February 20, 2018)
CHAPTER 7: CONTEXT-AWARE CONTENT-SENSITIVE DATA ACCESS CONTROL
and stored in cloud repositories to be used by the decision making agents [Cummins 2017].
Based on the discussion provided in Chapter 2, it is evident that all of the existing
disclosure risk measures are content dependent and do not express the context associated
risks of data. The contributions of this chapter differs from the existing risk based access
control models (see Chapter 2) as the location dependencies are used to compute the
disclosure risks to enforce the break-the-glass rules in order to satisfy the situational
access requirements. The existing location based access control models do not use the
location information for enforcing the exemptions (or permission over-rides) depending on
the situational requirements [Gupta et al. 2006][Damiani et al. 2007] [Kirkpatrick et al.
2012].
In [Georgakakis et al. 2011], a distance based satisfaction level measure is used to
indicate whether a denied request needs to be allowed based on some credible contextual
information. This measure evaluates, the extent of the roles of the user (or object), who
has submitted (requested) denied access requests which satisfy conditions in the subject
specification stated in the access control policy. The proposed model differs from that
of [Georgakakis et al. 2011], as location-dependent disclosure risk measure is used as an
attribute associated with a role to enforce the situation-dependent break-the-glass rules.
In Ts-RBAC model [Liu et al. 2016], a dedicated transformation policy is introduced
to provide user-role assignments depending on the break-the-glass requirements and to
subsequently change the permissions accordingly. The proposed model differs from Ts-
RBAC due to the use of an attribute to support the permission changes associated with
a role rather than to change the user-role assignments depending on the situational re-
quirements.
In BTG-RBAC model [Ferreira et al. 2009], the break-the-glass state is ”true” if
there is a rule which allows a role to do an operation on an object. Each permission has
two states: one permitted under normal conditions and the other for the break-the-glass
conditions. Rather than to change the associated permissions of a role, this model use
rule based activation of permissions by activating the appropriate role.
The proposed novel solution significantly differs from the above mentioned models
when the access request is initiated from a remote location to the network, the authoriza-
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tions to access certain privacy sensitive data is decided based on location-dependent data
disclosure risks.
7.2.2 Contributions
Contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• Novel location-dependent disclosure risk computation method - Novel location depen-
dent disclosure risk estimates are derived at record level and file level. This disclosure
risk computation method differs from the existing measures due to its ability to in-
corporate the location dependent risk. As evidenced by the experimental results
and the reliability analysis, the proposed solution is apt for TCRM applications
with sensitive data utilizations for situation-specific data utilization requirements.
• Novel location-dependent disclosure risk constraint based break-the-glass rule enforce-
ment - Belnap logic is used to enforce the possible break-glass authorizations using
the proposed location dependent disclosure risk measure. It is demonstrated how
the location dependent risk can be used as a constraint to control the situation-
specific authorizations. The expressiveness of the rule enforcements are compared
with the existing logic frameworks. Results reveal better expressiveness to achieve
break-glass authorizations for confidentiality preserving data access management in
TCRMSs.
7.3 Notations
Notation Description
LDDR location dependent disclosure risk
kNp population size
kns selected sample size (kns < kNp)
P xyi probability that an indexed variable yi is likely to be found in a cell x
in the contingency table.
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µx probability that a record is unique in a file
pix selection probability of elements belonging to a file
exp() exponential function
loc data access request origin location
EvA event that a user has made a data access request from a known location
Ev′A event that a user has not made a data access request from a known
location
Evrec event that non-trivial record level disclosure risk exists
Ev′rec complement of Evrec
Evfile event that a non-trivial file-level disclosure risk exists
Ev′file complement of Ev
′
file
τfile file level disclosure risk
rep a particular data representation
LDDRrec location dependent disclosure risk at record level
LDDRfile location dependent disclosure risk at file level
Sub subject
Obj object
Opr operation
role role assigned to a subject
SubId subject identifier
SubContext context associated with a subject
CLrole clearance level associated with a role
CLobj clearance level associated with an object
ObjId object identifier
ObjContext context associated with an object
Range range of an attribute
Request access request
SecurityRisk(loc) security risk associated with the request origin location loc
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PL privacy level
CLri clearance level for a record
CLfi clearance level for a file
Thr pre-defined threshold for the location dependent disclosure risk for a
particular situation
TRUE,FALSE binary truth values
> truth value to express inconsistency as an over-knowledge
⊥ truth value to express inconsistency as no-knowledge
L, D, A, V the events corresponding to location change, LDDR estimate, user au-
thentication and break-glass authorization respectively
ψr, ψp, ψn the constraints: responded existence, precedence constraint and not ex-
istence constraint respectively
ei i
th event
Tri i
th trace
pei event probability of the i
th event
pti trace probability of the i
th trace
peα largest acceptable probability of incorrectly verifying the occurrence of
an event
ptα largest acceptable probability of incorrectly verifying the occurrence of
an event
ke number of experiments conducted
7.4 Location Dependent Disclosure Risk (LDDR) based
Data Access
In this section, a novel LDDR based metric and its application to enforce situation-specific
access control rules are described. LDDR is estimated to assess the risk associated with
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a location change with respect to a known secure location. Depending on the severity of
the location based risk involved, the authorization rules based on the context described
in terms of the time, location, data content, and the situation are enforced.
7.4.1 Computation of Location Dependent Disclosure Risks (LDDRs)
In this section, the LDDR estimations at the file level and record level [Manrique-Vallier
and Reiter 2012] are described. Population size (kNp) is the number of records to which a
particular user is given access per access request. This access request may originate from
a known secure network or from a remote location.
According to [Manrique-Vallier and Reiter 2012], the record level disclosure risk is
probabilistically estimated using the concept of population uniqueness as follows.
µx = exp(−kNpP xyi(1− pix)) (7.1)
P xyi is the probability that an indexed variable yi (where yi ∈ Y ) is likely to be found in
the cell x of a contingency table. It is assumed that the record level representation of the
data is generally in the form of tables with finite number of cells. µx is the probability
that a record is unique in a file when kns samples of records are selected from a popu-
lation of kNp. The selection is performed according to Bernoulli sampling with selection
probabilities of pix. In the theory of finite population sampling [Royall 1970], Bernoulli
sampling is a process where each element of the population that is sampled is subjected
to an independent Bernoulli trial which determines whether the element becomes part
of the sample when the elements (e.g. data records, data files) are randomly drawn. In
Bernoulli sampling, all the elements of the population have equal probability of being
included in the selected sample. Each element of the population is considered separately
for the sample.
It is also assumed that the cell count in a contingency table has a Poisson distribution
[Chowdhury et al. 1999]. A contingency table refers to a two-dimensional table with finite
number of rows and columns [Fienberg 1999][Dobra et al. 2009]. Value in each cell contains
private information which needs to be protected. For example, a cell value may contain
information of how many times a cancer patient undergoes certain treatments. Consider
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P xyi as the log-linear estimate on the contingency table. To compute the values of P
x
yi , the
model described in [Chowdhury et al. 1999], the Poisson probability function is used where
the average value varies according to a Gamma distribution. The disclosure limitation
literature for contingency table data is highly focus on the risk-utility trade-off [Dobra
et al. 2009]. The risk is measured in terms of information contained in marginal tables for
small cell counts, by computing the bounds for cell entries, or by counting of possible table
realizations [Dobra et al. 2009][Fienberg and Slavkovic 2005]. However, when there are
contextual dependencies additional factors should be considered to compute the associated
disclosure risks.
Next, Bayes theorem is used to extend the record level disclosure risk with location-
dependent risk. Bayes theorem is useful to compute the conditional probabilities of dif-
ferent events. Suppose EvA is the event that the user has made the data access request
from a particular known location, then Ev′A is the event that it is not from the known
location. The event Evrec represents the existence of a non-trivial record level disclosure
risk of a record (i.e. µx) when responding to a request initiated from the known location.
Then, the location dependent record level disclosure of risk (LDDRrec) can be computed
as follows (Equation 7.2),
LDDRrec =
P (EvA|Evrec).µx
P (EvA|Evrec).µx + P (Ev′rec)P (EvA|Ev′rec)
(7.2)
Similarly, the file level risk τfile [Manrique-Vallier and Reiter 2012] can also be esti-
mated as follows. The main assumption is that the number of record level sample unique
records is also population uniques at the file level. The sample uniques are those records
with highest risks which are the combinations of values of the key variables that are
unique in the data sample. Generally, the sample unique records are identified based on
a probability model (e.g. Poisson, log-linear) [Bethlehem et al. 1990] which generates the
frequencies of the values of the key variables. Then, for a given data representation rep,
the associated file level risk is equal to the sum of record level risks (for each record x).
τfile,x =
∑
{x:repx}
µx (7.3)
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It is important to note that the file level and record level disclosure risk measures
provide different disclosure risk interpretations for a population size kNp. The file level
disclosure risk averages the risk across the whole data sample. The record level measure
helps to identify those parts of the sample where disclosure risk is high. Next, to compute
the location dependent file level risks, the Bayes theorem is used. Consider Evfile to be
the event that a non-trivial file level disclosure risk (i.e. τfile) exist. Then, the location
dependent file level disclosure of risk (LDDRfile) can be computed as follows (Equation
7.4),
LDDRfile =
P (EvA|Evfile).τfile
P (EvA|Evfile).τfile + P (Ev′file)P (EvA|Ev′file)
(7.4)
7.5 Use of LDDR Measures for Access Control
In this section, the use of LDDR for access control is described using the subject specifica-
tion based on RBAC-A [Kuhn et al. 2010]. RBAC-A is a combination of role based access
control and attribute based access control. The definition of a role, object, permission
are as defined in the seminal paper of [Kuhn et al. 2010]. As mentioned before, RBAC-A
[Kuhn et al. 2010] is used to define the subjects and objects with the associated attributes
(SATT and OATT respectively). Continuing from [Kuhn et al. 2010], the role centric
addition elaborated in [Jin et al. 2012]. An attribute is defined as a function which takes
certain inputs and returns values for the defined properties of that input. Each subject
and object is associated with a finite set of attributes. The advantage of this approach is
the ability to retain the maximum set of permissions for a particular role.
The upper bound of the amount of confidential information resources that are allowed
to access is determined based on the clearance level assigned to the role and privacy
levels associated with the data records (or files). Assigning a content dependent privacy
level is useful when different types of data are generated in a TCRMS. For example, in a
distributed power generation remote monitoring system with cloud based data storage and
access management (e.g. Netbiter [Netbiter 2017], Cummins solutions [Cummins 2017]),
there are various data logs accessed to make the necessary time critical decisions. Power
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generation remote monitoring system generates different set of data, such as annunciator,
alternator and engine data, transfer switch data, source, load and switch connection status
etc [Cummins 2017]. Different data are useful for remote operations and maintenance
functions. Therefore, the necessity to manage who gets to access which type of data with
minimum disclosure risks.
Each user (or a subject) is assigned with roles. Roles take values equivalent to the
job title or the designation based on the organizational hierarchy [Kuhn et al. 2010].
Examples of include manager, engineer, accountant etc. For a subject, there is a subject
identifier SubId which takes the value of the name of the user. Additional attributes are
defined to express the context (SubContext = {SCloc,SCtime,SCsit}) including location,
time, situation respectively. In addition to the SubContext and the SubId, a clearance
level (CLrole) is defined as the maximum tolerable data access risk associated with the
role of the Sub.
Objects are the files or the data records. Each object has an identifier (ObjId)
and associated context attributes for location, time and situation as, (ObjContext =
{OCloc,OCtime,OCsit}). Similar to a role, object clearance level CLobj is defined. The
CLobj is estimated using the privacy levels (PL) of the objects. The PL values are
assigned based on the contextual information and content associated using expert knowl-
edge. For a particular record ri, CLri = PLi. For a particular file fi, which is a collection
of n records, CLfi =
∑n
i=1 PLi
n . The associated attributes can be categorized based on
the number of possible values they can take. Each attribute can take a single value (i.e.
atomic) or a set of values known as the Range (Table 7.2).
In general, a data access request tuple Request =< Sub,Obj,Opr, role > gets inter-
preted as follows [Kuhn et al. 2010]. The access control model verify whether the subject
Sub under the permissible role based on the role assignment rules. Then, verifies whether
this role can access the requested object Obj based on role object assignment rules. Sub-
sequently verifies, whether the role is allowed to do the intended operation Opr on Obj
based on role permission assignment rules.
In this chapter, it is assumed that when a user initiate a request, the access control
model interprets it as:
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Table 7.2: Different Types of SATT s and OATT s.
Attribute Attribute Type
SubID set
SubContextloc set
SubContexttime set
SubContextsit set
CLsub atomic
ObjID set
ObjContextloc set
ObjContexttime set
ObjContextsit set
CLobj atomic
Request =< Sub, loc,Obj,Opr, role >.
The additional context information of the location of origin of the access request is in-
cluded. Also, it is assumed that there exists known risk (SecurityRisk(loc)) associated
with the request initiating location (loc) for a user to have remote access to the intended
network. Also, the role gains access to the Obj if and only if CLrole ≥ CLobj .
7.5.1 Example
Consider a power generation remote monitoring system with cloud based data storage and
access management (e.g. Netbiter [Netbiter 2017], Cummins solutions [Cummins 2017]).
The remote monitoring data can be accessed by the authorized users from anywhere
through smart computing devices. For such a remote monitoring system, use of the above
formulated attribute centric model to access the collected data is described in the following
scenario.
DecisionAgent and Machine are two roles in a power plant. These subjects are allowed
to remotely read the error-log and status-file for remote operations and maintenance at
any time provided the subject authenticates. The request will only be approved if the
access is from the network locations nl1, nl2 or any other location loc if the associated
SecurityRisk(loc) < SecurityRisk(nl1) and SecurityRisk(loc) < SecurityRisk(nl2).
According to RBAC-A [Jin et al. 2012], the attribute types, ranges, and the permission
filtering policy which contains the constraints (described as filtering functions) should be
described. For the above scenario, the basic sets (Sub, Obj) associated with different
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types of attributes (sttType), possible values for the attributes (or the range Range)
functions (FMachine, FLocRiskAuthorized, and FAuthorized) and the filtering policy
(TargetF ilter) are described below.
Sub = {decisionAgentof, uloc, stype}
Obj = {type, recordof, oloc, optype}
attType(decisionAgentof) = set
attType(sptype) = attType(otype) = set
attType(oloc) = attType(uloc) = set
attType(type) = attType(recordof) = atomic
Range(type) = {statusfile, errorlog, alarmindicatorfile}
Range(decisionAgentof) = Machine
Machines are those which are remotely monitored at the plant, Machine ⊆ U
Range(recordof) = U
Range(uloc) = Range(oloc) = {nl1, nl2, nl3, nl4}
Range(optype) = Range(sptype) = {low,medium, high}
FILTER = {FMachine, FAuthorized, FLocRiskAuthorized}
FMachine(se : SESSION, o : Obj, read)
{
recordof(o)∈decisionAgentof(sessionowner(se))⊗(sptype(decisionAgentof(session(se)))≥optype(o))
}
FAuthorized(se : SESSION, o : Obj, read : Opr)
{
(∀nl1∈oloc(o).∀nl2∈oloc(o)∈uloc(sessionowner(se).nl1 = nl2))∧
(device(sessionowner(se))∈setofapprovednetworkdevices)∧
(time(session(se)) if
acceptedObl(decisionAgentof(sessionowner(se)), time(sessionowner(se), login, Twindow))
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}
FLocRiskAuthorized(se : SESSIONS, o : Obj, read : Opr)
{
(∀Lk∈sloc(o).∀Lk∈oloc(o)∈(SecurityRisk(Lk) < SecurityRisk(nl1))
∨
(SecurityRisk(Lk) <
SecurityRisk(nl2)))
∧
(device(sessionowner(se)) ∈ setofapprovednetworkdevices)∧
(time(session(se)) if
acceptedObl(decisionAgentof(sessionowner(se)), time(sessionowner(se), login, Twindow))
}
TargetF ilter(se : SESSION, o : Obj, read : Opr)
{
filter{};
casetype(o) = statusfile : filter = filter
⋃
(FMachine
⋃
FAuthorize
⋃
FLocRiskAuthorize);
casetype(o) = errorlog : filter = filter
⋃
(FMachine
⋃
FLocRiskAuthorize);
}
Based on the above example, it is clear that the enforcement of the access control
rules with location dependent risks provides more flexibility to control the situation specific
data access requests in TCRMSs.
7.6 Use of LDDR to Enforce Break-the-Glass
Authorizations
Break-glass rules allow users to grant permissions by overriding access control decisions
based on critical situation specific requirements. The most common method is to use tem-
porary user accounts associated with powerful access rights. This approach is not secure
as access control is enforced in an ad-hoc manner with little scope to verify the override
decisions. Therefore, it is vital to integrate break-the-glass rules to realize more flexible
access management. In the recent past, break-the-glass solutions are integrated by using
obligatory support measures and explicit confirmations of overrides [Brucker and Petritsch
152 (February 20, 2018)
SECTION 7.6: USE OF LDDR TO ENFORCE BREAK-THE-GLASS AUTHORIZATIONS
2009][Marinovic et al. 2014]. Situation dependent access requirements demand break-the-
glass enforcements without compromising security in terms of misuses of sensitive data.
In this chapter, the LDDR is used a decision support measure for reliable enforcement of
situation-specific access requests.
Since LDDR is both a context and content based risk measure, knowledge based logic
representation is suitable to express the formation of rules. Belanp logic is selected as it
is a knowledge based logic representation [Belnap Jr 1977]. Belnap logic is composed of
four truth values. These four truth values can be described based on the difference in
the amount of knowledge each value exhibits. With sufficient knowledge there are two
truth values TRUE and FALSE. When there is a conflict, inconsistency expressed as
an over-knowledge the truth value is expressed as >. When there is no knowledge the
truth value is denoted by ⊥ [Belnap Jr 1977]. Rumpole’s enforcement model [Brucker
and Petritsch 2009][Marinovic et al. 2014], which is based on Belnap logic use three types
of rules, applicability rules, evidential rules and positive break-the-glass rules [Marinovic
et al. 2014]. These three types of rules are used to compose the situation-specific break-
the-glass rules by using the LDDR to enforce break-the-glass access control requirements.
Evidential rules are used to define how LDDR is used to specify the extent of feasibility
to override request based on a contextual description.
Positive break-the-glass rules define the obligatory re-authentications. In order to
verify the positive break-the-glass rule enforcement, the formulation given in [Brucker and
Petritsch 2009] is used. Verification of enforcing a positive break-the-glass rule is impor-
tant to reduce the risks of disclosure in accessing sensitive data. The applicability rules are
used to include the conditional requirements. In order to enforce the break-the-glass ap-
plicability rules with LDDR estimates, the if which is known as the applicability operator
[Brucker and Petritsch 2009] is used. Consider the scenario of allowing a decisionAgent
to read any target log file at anytime from a location loc, provided that LDDR is lower
than a threshold (Requirement01). Following applicability rule defines this requirement.
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competent(Sub,Read,Obj)⇐ role(Sub, decisionAgent) if (7.5)
clearance(Obj,LDDR, Thr)
The notational presentations are Sub - subject, Act - action (where Act = Read),
Obj = file, record - target object (a record or a file), and Thr - pre-defined threshold
for the location dependent disclosure risk for a particular situation. There are two appli-
cability conditions for this rule: i) for the role to be a Nurse and ii) the LDDR to be
maintained at a maximum Thr.
In order to ensure reliability, the positive break-the-glass rules (i.e. a type of evidential
rules [Marinovic et al. 2014]) are defined to grant an override when a possible set of
obligations are specified. For example, a decisionAgent (where Sub = decisionAgent) is
permitted to write on to a MaintenanceUpdate file when that user is already allowed to
read it and has agreed to provide the reason for it (Requirement02). This can be enforced
by the following enforcement rule.
permit(Sub, file, append)⇐ competent(Sub, file, Read) if (7.6)
agreedObl(Sub, log, giveReason)
Furthermore, in order to ensure a reliable enforcement of the above positive break-
the-glass rule, a break-the-glass resolutions query is also enforced to validate the rule
content.
Ω(permit(Sub, file, append) ≥t >) ∧ (deny(Sub, file, append) ≤t ⊥) At (7.7)
(deny(Sub, file, append <t t) ∧ agreedObl(Sub, reAuth, give)
where Ω is a break-the-glass resolution query where the permission override is granted
based on the positive break-the-glass rule if and only if the obligatory re-authentication
(demoted as reAuth) is successful. This enforcement ensures appropriate conditional
constraint enforcement of a break-the-glass rule for accessing a data file.
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7.7 Comparative Analysis of the Expressiveness of
Break-glass Authorizations
In this section, the expressiveness of the LDDR based rules to enforce situation-specific re-
quirements using Rumpole break-glass model [Brucker and Petritsch 2009][Marinovic et al.
2014] is compared with several well-established logic frameworks, described in [Bertino
et al. 1999] and [Jajodia et al. 1997]. Rumpole is a Belanp logic based break-glass model.
The enforcement of the break-glass rules using LDDR measure for specific requirements.
Comparison of the semantics of the three logic frameworks are shown in Tables 7.3
and 7.4. Discussions on the results obtained with the rule specification in each logic
framework are presented in subsequent sections.
7.7.1 Using Authorization Specification Language (ASL)
The Authorization Specification Language (ASL) described in [Jajodia et al. 1997], use
six types of rules and semantics specified to enforce the example authorization require-
ments described in Section 7.6. With ASL, the break-glass authorizations using LDDR
is expressed as a closed policy. The reason is the inability to confirm the possible LDDR
values corresponding to a known set of secure locations as opposed to explicitly specifying
all possible insecure locations (as required in an open policy).
• Requirement 01- A user with an authorized role of a decisionAgent is able to Read
a statuslog provided that LDDR is maintained lower than a threshold.
grant(o, u, r,+Read)
← dercando(o, s,+Read)& do(o, s, Read)&R ⊂ decisionAgent&r ∈ R
← done(o′, u,R,+Read, 1)&typeof(o′, l)
• Requirement 02 - A subject (r = decisionAgent and u = user) is permitted to write
on to a o = MaintenanceUodate file when it is already allowed to read it and has
agreed to provide the reason for performing a write operation.
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Table 7.3: Comparison of the Semantic Support of Logic Frameworks for Expressing
Break-Glass Authorization Rules Using LDDR
Semantic Support for Expressiveness
Properties
Logic Frame-
work
Rumpole
model [Brucker
and Petritsch
2009][Marinovic
et al. 2014]
LFM01 [Jajodia
et al. 1997]
LFM02 [Bertino
et al. 1999]
Rule Types evidential rules,
break-glass rules,
grant policies
resolution rule, ac-
cess control rule,
authentication rule,
derivation rule, done
rule, integrity rule
authorization rules,
support rules
Predicates subject, target, ac-
tion, accepted, con-
text, grant, request-
obligations, deny
cando, do, dercando,
grant, done, active,
dirin, in, typeof, er-
ror
auth, action, object,
user defined predi-
cates, variable sym-
bols (self)
Evaluation De-
cisions
grant, deny, request-
obligations
grant, deny grant, deny
Additional
Features
query operator, pri-
ority override opera-
tor, majority rule for
overrides
General override
approaches: sub-
subject, path and no
overrides. General
conflict resolution
approaches: denial-
take precedence,
permission take
precedence, nothing
takes precedence.
Users, groups and
their hierarchies ex-
ist. General override
approaches: sub-
subject, path and no
overrides. General
conflict resolution
approaches: denial-
take precedence,
permission take
precedence, nothing
takes precedence.
Break-glass
rules and
related policies
positive rules, nega-
tive rules, composite
rules
Not supported. Not supported.
grant(o, u, r,+Write)
← active(u, r)&r ∈ R&R ⊆ decisionAgent&do(o,+Read)
← done(o, u,R,+Oblig)
– Additional resolution rule is used to distinguish between distinct LDDR values
corresponding to two locations l1 and l2.
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Table 7.4: Comparison of the Logic Frameworks for Break-Glass Authorization Rule En-
forceability Using LDDR
Semantic Support for Enforceability
Properties
Logic Frame-
work
Rumpole
model [Brucker
and Petritsch
2009][Marinovic
et al. 2014]
LFM01 [Jajodia
et al. 1997]
LFM02 [Bertino
et al. 1999]
Ability to ex-
press Require-
ment01
Rules are well de-
fined to completely
express this require-
ment (see Expression
7.6)
Sufficient number
of rule types to
express the specific
predicates. Limited
number of predicates
with fixed arity and
attribute types. No
flexibility for user
defined predicates to
associate additional
attributes. (see
Expression 7.8)
Limited number of
rules and predicates
(see Expression 7.8).
Ability to ex-
press Require-
ment02
Rules are well de-
fined to completely
express this require-
ment (see Expres-
sion 7.7). In ad-
dition to completely
express this require-
ment using a resolu-
tion query (see Ex-
pression 7.8).
Limited number of
rules and predicates.
No flexibility for user
defined predicates to
associate additional
attributes. (see Ex-
pression 7.8 and 7.8)
Limited number of
rules and predicates.
Flexible to define
new predicates with
fixed arity (see
Expression 7.8).
error ← done(o, u, r,+Read, t)&
done(o, u, r,+Read, t′)&
typeof(o, l1)&typeof(o, l2)
Compared to the LDDR based break-glass rules formulated using Rumpole break-
glass model in Section 7.6, the enforcement and applicability rules for Requirement01
cannot be completely expressed as the type(o′, l) is limited to a single LDDR value. Since
the predicates do, done, decando, and cando cannot be expressed for other object types, the
obligatory requirements cannot be verified and validated. Since there is limited scope of
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using a resolution rule in ASL, the intended resolution query described using the Rumpole
model [Marinovic et al. 2014] can only be stated in response to the Requirement02. In
order to have the required obligatory response validation expressed using Rumpole model
[Marinovic et al. 2014], it is assumed that there is a specific task Oblig which represent
the obligatory completion of a validation. Additional resolution rule in terms of an error
is specified for two distinct LDDR values on the same object and the same role.
7.7.2 Using Authorization Logic Framework
Next, the expressiveness of the above two requirements using the authorization logic frame-
work [Bertino et al. 1999] is compared.
With this logic framework, the break-glass authorizations using LDDR is most feasible
to express as a closed policy. The reason is the inability to confirm the possible LDDR
values corresponding to a known set of secure locations by using the user defined predicate
symbols.
• Requirement 01- A user with an authorized role of a Nurse is able to Read an
electronic health record provided that LDDR is maintained at a threshold.
(o, s) : {r1 : auth(read, g)← val(type(lddr, th)),
r2 : val(lddr, th)← (self,X)&auth(read, Y )&X 6= s}
• Requirement 02 - A subject is permitted to write on to an electronic health record
file when it is competent to read it and has agreed to provide the reason for it
(o, s) : {r1 : auth(write, g)← val(auth(read, g))}
When specifying the domain for Requirement01, for object o and subject s is autho-
rized to perform the action ’write’ on o if there is no authorization for anybody else to
write on o. The user-defined predicate val is used to validate the value of LDDR and
158 (February 20, 2018)
SECTION 7.8: LOGICAL CONSTRAINTS BASED VERIFICATION OF SITUATION SPECIFIC
AUTHORIZATION USING LDDR
the competence of the associated subject to perform the action ’read’ on o. One of the
limitations of using this logic framework is the inability to specify the existence of the
a specific active role ’Nurse’. However, it is not feasible to specify a resolution query
developed using the Rumpole model [Marinovic et al. 2014] due to the limitations of the
logic framework. In order to compare the performances of break-glass authorization rule
specifications using the above mentioned logic frameworks, properties described in [Tonti
et al. 2003] have been used. Expressiveness is defined as the ability to handle the wide
range of policy requirements. Simplicity is defined as the ease of the policy definition tasks
based on the semantics specified for a specific framework. Enforceability is defined as the
ability to ensure a mapping of authorization requirements into implementable policies.
Based on the rule specifications and the comparative analysis, it is evident that the
expressiveness of the authorization rule enforcements using the Rumpole model [Marinovic
et al. 2014] is higher compared to the other existing logic frameworks (see Tables 7.3 and
7.4). Based on the results, it is evident that the Rumpole model [Marinovic et al. 2014]
provides better rule specification semantic support than the existing logic frameworks.
7.8 Logical Constraints based Verification of Situation
Specific Authorization using LDDR
Next, the application of LDDR as a reliable constraint for access control is demonstrated.
In a reliable system, a set of events are allowed to occur under certain constraints [Rausand
and Høyland 2004]. Based on a set of pre-defined constraints, a trace of events can be
declared as valid if the constraints are not violated. In order to perform such an analysis for
finite set of possible event traces, a declarative process language called Declare language
[Pesic et al. 2007] is used along with runtime verification - finite linear temporal logic
(RV-FLTL) [Bauer et al. 2010]. RV-FLTL is a variant for finite traces based on LTL. The
Declarative language is used to state the constraints of the events in order to develop a
feasible constraint model. To perform state based analysis of the constraints, deterministic
finite automata are developed using the semantics of RV-LTL for each constraint using the
translation as described in [Giannakopoulou and Havelund 2001]. The constraint model
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is shown in Figure 7.1.
Location 
Change
LDDR
Estimate Authentication
Break-glass
Authorizations
Responded
existence
Precedence Not coexistence
Figure 7.1: Constraint model for the Proposed LDDR Framework
Four main events of the situation specific authorization are defined as: (i) location
change (L), (ii) situation-dependent risk variation computed using LDDR estimate (D),
(iii) user authentication (A) and (iv) break-the-glass authorization (V). The upper-case
letter is used to denote each event. For these four events, the constraint model is developed
as shown in Figure 7.1. These events are allowed to take place if certain conditions are
satisfied. These conditions are described as constraints. Based on the semantics described
in [Pesic et al. 2007], the three constraints are constructed as follows. ψr is the responded
existence constraint, ψp refers to the precedence constraint and ψn corresponds to not
existence constraint. For each constraint the deterministic finite automaton is computed
(see Figure 7.2). The S0 indicates the initial state. An accepting state is indicated using
double lines. The gray background corresponds to permanent states.
Local automata describes each constraint but does not monitor all the constraints
collectively. Based on the local automata for all three constraints, the global automaton
is computed as shown in Figure 7.3. The global automaton the product of all three local
automata are used. A state in the global automata represents the states in constraint ψn,
ψp and ψr respectively.
In order to evaluate the traces mentioned above, probabilistic approaches are rec-
ommended [Younes et al. 2006][Sammapun et al. 2005][Filieri et al. 2011]. An event is
defined as an instance of an action or a change in a condition [Talcott 2008][Rajkumar
et al. 2010]. Depending on the TCRM application, the possible set of events may vary.
Consider for each event, there is an associated probability which is defined as the
event probability (pei). To compute pei, consider there are ke number of experiments
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Figure 7.2: Deterministic Finite Automaton Interpretation for Each Constraint: (a) ψr -
responded existence constraint, (b) ψp - precedence constraint and (c) ψn - not existence
constraint. The corresponding states inferred from the constraint model (see Figure 7.2)
are shown here.
Figure 7.3: Global Automaton for the Three Constraints.
conducted. If the particular event ei occurs (i.e. ei = 1), then, such occurrences are
counted. If that event does not occur it is recorded as ei = 0. Then, pei =
∑
ei
ke
[Samma-
pun et al. 2005]. Once the event probabilities are calculated, the corresponding z-scores
are calculated [Sammapun et al. 2005] by using the formula pei−peα√
pei(1−pei)
ke
. Depending on
the constraints applied to pvα, the z-score values vary. The authors in [Sammapun et al.
2005] propose to use two error bounds, the largest acceptable probability of incorrectly
verifying a true property (or the occurrence of an event) and the largest acceptable prob-
ability of incorrectly verifying a false property. Property herein describes the verifiable
information (or identification) that a particular event has occurred. For example, the
event of a successful log-on is indicated in the access control logs. The occurrence of an
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event is accepted if and only if the z-score is less than the largest acceptable probability
of incorrectly verifying a true property (or the occurrence of an event) and if pei < peα.
A trace is defined as a set of consecutive events over a period of time. The minimal
length of a trace is two events. Similar to the above formulation, pti is defined as the
trace probability. A trace is considered to be acceptable only if it satisfies the order of the
events permitted by the constraint model (shown in Figure 7.3). Such permissible trace
occurrences are recorded (
∑
Tri) for each permissible trace over ke number of experiments.
The ratio between
∑
Tri and ke.
Example: Consider an example scenario of a remote patient monitoring application
with 10 users (03 doctors, 02 nurses, 02 clerks, and 03 patients.). These users may require
to access the health data of the patients. Due to the nature of this TCRM, in order to
compute whether an event occurred (or not), the following assumptions and the verifiable
actions are considered.
1. Assumption01: The break-glass accounts are created using verifiable naming con-
vention by authorized high management users.
2. Assumption02: There are sufficient detection controls to verify the logged-on (or
used) break-glass user accounts.
3. Assumption03: Authentication of the users are performed by the trust negotiations
or using fixed credentials.
4. Assumption04: Remote log-on actions are verifiable based on the location verifica-
tion alerts.
5. Assumption05: Log-on request of the user contains verifiable situation specific in-
formation to compute the associates risk when compared to a pre-defined log-on
type (e.g. log-on to the network from a fixed network address) for a particular user
account.
Next, based on the above assumptions for each event L, D, V and A, following
verifiable actions were considered for the analysis (see Table 7.5). Then, for each event,
the following failure conditions are considered.
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Table 7.5: Verifiable Actions for Each Event L, D, V and A.
Event Verifiable Actions
L Location verification alerts
D Situation specific risk alerts
V Break-the-glass accounts log-on
alerts
A User account log-on alerts
Table 7.6: Failure Conditions for Each Event L, D, V and A.
Event Failure Conditions
L Location verification failure: in-
correct location information, re-
sponded outside the allowed time
D Situation verification failure: incor-
rect information to validate the situ-
ation, responded outside the allowed
time
V Risk assessment failure: responded
outside the allowed time
A Authentication failure: incorrect
credentials, responded outside the
allowed time, attempts to use al-
ready disabled or expired accounts
A simulation was run over 1000 times using the set of 10 users, where each user is
given a username (two digits) and a password (randomly chosen four digit number). Each
user request contain the information about the user account, situation specific content,
and the location. The user can authenticate using these pre-defined log-on credentials
or can opt to use a trust negotiation process. In addition to these user accounts, break-
glass accounts are also pre-defined using the suffix ”BRxx”, where ’xx’ are two digits.
Then, depending on the user inputs, the location is verified for each user account. The
location identities are assumed to be known to the users. If it is an unknown location, it is
assumed to have failed the location validation. Periodically, the location is validated. For
this experiment 10s was selected as the location validation period. Based on the empirical
results published in [Freudiger et al. 2011], it is considered that the location risk may
take a value in the range of 0.2 to 0.8, where 0.2 indicates a lower risk than when it is
0.8. According to the published results in [El Emam et al. 2011], it is considered that the
average record level disclosure risk if 0.338 for the health data. For each simulation run, the
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selected location risk and the average record level risks, the corresponding LDDR values
are computed as per the Equation 7.2. There are pre-defined situation specific information
and corresponding risks. Based on the user inputs, the associated risks are calculated.
When the break-glass user accounts are logged-on, separate location and situation specific
content validations are performed and the event are recorded onto a text file. Possible
events are shown in Tables and 7.6. Each event (including both failure and success events)
is given a number Evxx, where xx ranges from 00 to 12.
Table 7.7: Computation of Event Probabilities for ke = 1000.
Event
∑
ei pei
z-score
peα = 0.1 peα = 0.3 peα = 0.7
L 236 0.23 16.53 15.02 12.02
D 149 0.15 4.43 -4.43 48.715
A 562 0.56 9.38 5.31 2.85
V 53 0.05 8.33 41.65 108.33
Table 7.8: Computation of Trace Probabilities based on the Constraint Model in Figure
7.3 and ke = 100.
Trace
∑
Tri pti
z-score
ptα = 0.1 ptα = 0.3 ptα = 0.7
LD 53 0.53 8.61 4.69 -3.469
DA 47 0.47 7.41 3.46 -4.693
AL 21 0.21 2.7 - 2.211 -12.039
AV 34 0.34 5.066 0.851 -7.659
LDA 48 0.48 7.606 11.83 -4.489
DAL 35 0.35 5.241 1.063 -7.44
DAV 45 0.45 7.03 3.061 5.102
LDAV 30 0.30 8.61 0 8.728
Other 13 0.13 0.892 5.059 16.97
The events and the traces summarized in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 reveal that for a lower
values of peα and ptα, the z-score values are larger. The trace and event analyses component
of an operational support system of a remote monitoring system essentially need to allow
only if ’A’ has occurred as the first event. On the other hand, to prevent progressing
an attack, the operational support system can declare a vulnerability if the first and
the second events that are occurred are ’L’ and ’A’ respectively. For other traces which
do not comply with the permissible traces according to the constraint model shown in
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Figure 7.8 occurred during the simulations. These traces were indicated as not accepted
traces. Based on the results, by using a constraint model and pre-defined possible events,
it is possible to identify the permissible traces and events and to quantify the occurrence
probabilities and comparatively asses their significance. The limitation of this analyses
includes the number of traces and events involved and the specific scenario.
7.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, the main contribution is a novel location dependent disclosure risk com-
putation method to enforce situation-dependent authorizations rule specifications due to
remote data access in TCRMSs. Usefulness of the proposed disclosure risk computations
in enforcing situation specific break-glass authorization policies were demonstrated using
Rumpole: a Belnap logic based break-glass model [Marinovic et al. 2014]. When compared
with the other well known logic frameworks, the expressiveness of the break-glass rules
using the semantics of the Rumpole model [Marinovic et al. 2014] and the proposed loca-
tion dependent disclosure risk measure provided greater flexibility. The results also reveal
that the proposed location dependent disclosure risk computation method is a reliable
constraint enforcement mechanism.
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Conclusion
This research was set to explore the two significant dependability factors: reliability and
security of sensed data transmission and access in time critical remote monitoring appli-
cations. The research questions address the limitations of existing methods and propose
novel solutions which resulted the following contributions.
• A multi-attribute trust metric as a decision support tool for accurate and reliable
spectrum hole detection while avoiding malicious spectrum sensing data falsification
attackers from participating in cooperative spectrum sensing (Chapter 03).
• A reliable delay-bounded persistent data transmissions for the re-entrant SUs when
there are multiple interruptions on sensed spectrum channels (Chapter 04).
• Energy-aware PUF-based encryption key size selection to minimize pattern repro-
ducibility to ensure secure and reliable sensed data transmission (Chapter 05).
• Trust based cooperativeness assessment for cloud-based digital identity management
for reliable user authentications (Chapter 06).
• Context-aware disclosure risk based situation-specific authorization enforcement method
for reliable data access (Chapter 07).
In summary, the Chapters 3, 4 and 5 describe solutions for reliable and secure data
transmission over unreliable wireless channels. Chapters 6 and 7 describe the solutions in
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terms of robust user authentications with context-aware situation specific authorizations
for reliable and secure data access.
Future Work
As future work, the usefulness of multi-attribute trust metric described in Chapter 03 is
extended as a decision supporting measure to determine the priority among the secondary
users for channel allocation in TCRMSs. As an extension of the contributions in Chapter
04, it is anticipated to explore the impact of spectrum pricing for multiple re-allocations
for the interrupted secondary users in TCRMSs with different traffic classes. As future
work, the contributions of Chapter 05 is extended by incorporating the stochastic de-
terioration models to model the life-time of the sensor nodes to further investigate the
dependabilities on the encryption key size for secure transmissions in TCRMSs. To ex-
tend the contributions of Chapters 6 and 7, by incorporating the device dependencies and
connectivity constraints to account for the robust user authentications to enforce adaptive
context-aware situation-specific authorizations in TCRMSs with high variety and veracity
data.
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